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[M] ost of what is believed about crime and about the crimi-
nal justice system is false or irrelevant.1
INTRODUCTION
This Article tests Charles Silberman's generalizations about crime
and the criminal justice system through one aspect of that system, the
relationship between the arrests of individuals pursuant to state laws
and prosecutions for the criminal offenses for which they are arrested.
An examination of that relationship reveals at least two "falsehoods"
in terms of the general public's perceptions of crime. Many, if not
most, members of the public assume that: (1) individuals are arrested
1. CHARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE viiii (1978).
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because they are guilty of crimes; the fact that most prosecutions re-
sult in convictions or guilty pleas proves the point; and (2) those cases
in which prosecution does not occur usually are victims of technical
rules of criminal procedure, such as the exclusionary rule, or some
other dynamic over which prosecutors are assumed to have little or no
control.2 Contrary to those widely held beliefs, in a number of large
jurisdictions, the majority of criminal cases at the state level, both mis-
demeanors and felonies, are dismissed without prosecution.3 The ma-
jority of dismissals are made by prosecutors before the cases reach
trial without proof of guilt.4 For cases that are dismissed by the courts
after prosecution has begun, prosecutors report that those cases are
rarely dismissed due to "technical" problems such as the exclusion of
evidence.5
Silberman's claim of irrelevance may be overstated. It is striking,
however, that the volume of material written about the Fourth
Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures
does not deal with whether the constitutional rights of literally mil-
lions of individuals are violated through practices in which the state
arrests individuals but is not required to demonstrate its intention or
its ability to prosecute them. The plight of those individuals, still
clothed with the presumption of innocence, apparently eludes consti-
tutional consideration.
Searches are the primary focus of much of the controlling deci-
sional law on the Fourth Amendment. The constitutionality of arrests
might be discussed in those cases, but often as an incidental matter;
for example, whether a search was "incident to" a valid arrest. Several
recent cases reflect this tendency. In Wilson v. Arkansas,6 the Supreme
Court considered whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits no-
2. See generally id. at 258-308.
3. See infta notes 172-201 and accompanying text (discussing the low correlation be-
tween arrests and prosecutions).
4. See infra notes 238-283 and accompanying text (discussing various factors responsi-
ble for a low prosecution rate).
5. See Steven Duke, Making Leon Worse, 95 YALiE L.J. 1405, 1406 (1986) (discussing a
study published in 1984 by the National Center for State Courts which documented that, in
seven cities, motions to suppress were filed in only 39% of the cases involving search war-
rants); Jerold H. Israel, Excessive Criminal Justice Caseloads: Challenging the Conventional Wis-
dom, 48 FLA. L. Rv. 761, 772 (1996) (contending that "suppression motions tend to be
common only in a limited class of cases"). Professor Duke discussed results of a study
which found that out of 7767 felony cases involving warrantless searches "in nine counties
in three states, fewer than 5% of the defendants filed motions to suppress physical evi-
dence." Duke, supra, at 1409 (footnotes omitted).
6. 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
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knock entries during the execution of search warrants.7 The Court
has also examined whether the Fourth Amendment allows police ran-
domly to request consent to search without articulable suspicion.8
A more recent trend focuses on vehicle stops and subsequent
searches. For example, in Whren v. United States,9 the Supreme Court
addressed whether the stop and temporary detention of a motorist for
a minor traffic violation is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable seizures if a reasonable officer
would not "have been motivated to stop the car by a desire to enforce
traffic laws."' In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 1 the Court addressed the
authority of the police to order a driver out of his vehicle during a
traffic stop. In Mimms, an officer observed a bulge in the driver's
jacket when the driver exited his vehicle and subsequently frisked the
driver and found a loaded revolver. 2 Yet another case, Maryland v.
Wilson, 3 addresses whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits police
from ordering passengers out of a car during a traffic stop. In Wilson,
a quantity of cocaine fell to the ground when the passenger got out of
the car.' 4 In the vehicle cases, the Supreme Court has weighed the
nature and degree of the seizures against concerns about protecting
police officers when they approach vehicles to enforce traffic laws. 5
In none of these cases has the Court balanced an individual's pre-
7. See id. at 929 (stating that "the common law of search and seizure recognize[s] a
law enforcement officer's authority to break open the doors of a dwelling, but generally
indicat[es] that he first ought to announce his presence and authority" and holding that
the common-law "'knock and announce' principle forms a part of the reasonableness in-
quiry under the Fourth Amendment").
8. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435, 439-40 (1991) (reversing the Florida
Supreme Court's adoption of a per se rule "prohibiting the police from randomly board-
ing buses as a means of drug interdiction").
9. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
10. Id. at 808.
11. 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam).
12. Id. at 107.
13. 519 U.S. 408 (1997).
14. Id. at 411.
15. See id. at 412 (finding the justification of an officer's safety "'both legitimate and
weighty'" (quoting Mimms, 434 U.S. at 333)); see also id. (noting that "[o] n the other side of
the balance" the court considers "the intrusion into the driver's liberty occasioned by the
officer's ordering him out of the car").
The more recent noncustodial detention cases grew out of Teny v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968). Terry sanctions stops of individuals on public streets and pat-downs of external
clothing based on an officer's "articulable suspicion" that the person (1) had committed or
was in the process of committing a crime; and (2) posed a threat of eminent danger to the
police officer or the public. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 30, 31 (Harlan, J., concurring). The
Court held that "the specific reasonable inferences" that an officer was "entitled to draw
from the facts in light of his experience"justified the brief detention and superficial search
even though the officer did not have probable cause for a full-blown arrest. Id. at 27, 30.
[VOL. 59:1
2000] ARRESTS WITHOUT PROSECUTION 5
sumptive right to be left alone against whether prosecution is in-
tended or is likely to occur.
One potential result of the Fourth Amendment cases selected for
Supreme Court review is a perception that the amendment primarily
protects guilty persons who challenge their convictions on the ground
that procedural errors committed by police officers require that key
evidence not be used against them.16 By contrast, relatively little at-
tention is paid by the public, by courts, or by scholars to the most
intrusive seizures-custodial arrests that result in the loss of freedom
and consequential economic and social harm to individuals, but
which do not follow constitutionally prescribed procedures. 17 In com-
parative terms alone, the number of persons who litigate their Fourth
Amendment rights after conviction is largely irrelevant compared to
the millions of individuals who are arrested each year throughout the
country, but who never get their "day in court" to challenge the
charges and evidence against them and hold the prosecution respon-
sible for proving their guilt.1 8
Scholarly consideration of the Fourth Amendment has focused
on the history of the amendment,19 theories about interpreting the
amendment,2 ° and particular standards used in applying the amend-
16. Cf Wilson, 519 U.S. at 411 (discussing convictions aided by evidence acquired dur-
ing searches that defendants attempted to suppress); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929
(1995) (same); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991) (same). See generally Bradford
P. Wilson, The Fourth Amendment as More Than a Form of Words: The View from the Founding, in
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 151, 152-53 (Eu-
gene W. Hickok, Jr. ed. 1991) (contending that "[t ] he burgeoning of Fourth Amendment
case law in the twentieth century has rested on the judicial assertion of the so-called exclu-
sionary rule").
17. Articles by Professor Tracey Maclin, Boston University School of Law, are a notable
exception. See Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333 (1998);
Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1271 (1998).
18. See infra notes 58-73.
19. See NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTrrUTION (1937) (discussing the historical use of general
search warrants and their impact on the production of the Fourth Amendment); John E.F.
Wood, The Scope of the Constitutional Immunity Against Searches and Seizures, 34 W. VA. L. REV.
Q. 1, 4 (1927) (same); Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching For History, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1707 (1996) (reviewing WILLIAM JOHN CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:
ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation available from
UMI Dissertation Services, 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106)) (same).
20. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 759
(1994) (arguing for a Fourth Amendment analysis centered on "first principles" such as
focusing on the language of the Fourth Amendment "that all searches and seizures be
reasonable" and on the "lost linkages between the Fourth and Seventh Amendments");
Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1471 (1985)
(suggesting that "current fourth amendment law, complete with the constant tinkering
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ment.21 Much of the scholarly discourse concerning arrest relates to
police discretion to arrest and to law enforcement goals that may in-
fluence that discretion. 2 2 Others have written about and have liti-
gated the abuses of that discretion such as unreasonable force by
police in making arrests, arrest practices that result in a disproportion-
ate number of minorities-particularly black males being arrested,
and motives of police officers in making arrests that may be illegal in
and of themselves, such as those that target individuals because of
their race.
2 3
Often, the prosecution function is examined with respect to the
virtually impenetrable discretion held by prosecutors and the diffi-
which it necessarily entails, should be abandoned altogether" and asserting that there are
only two methods for interpreting the Fourth Amendment); Morgan Cloud, The Fourth
Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Interpretation,
48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 556 (1996) (proposing a return to the theories on the Fourth
Amendment expounded by the Supreme Court during the infamous Lochner era of the
early twentieth century); SilasJ. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amend-
ment As Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 20-21 (1988) (discussing the "remarkable
consensus" that the Supreme Court has "made a mess of search and seizure law" and juxta-
posing various constitutional theories through the lens of the Fourth Amendment).
21. See Elise Bjorkan Clare et al., Warrantless Searches and Seizures, in Twenty-Fifth Annual
Review of Criminal Procedure, 84 GEO. L.J. 743 (1996) (explaining the various standards ap-
plied for fifteen types of warrantless searches and seizures); James M. Humphrey IV, "Every-
body Out!".: The Supreme Court Grants Police the Authority to Automatically Order Passengers Out of
Lawfully Stopped Vehicles in Maryland v. Wilson, 31 CREIGHTON L. REv. 997, 1026 (1998)
(discussing a number of standards used in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, such as the
"brightline rule making in the automobile context" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
22. See Barbara Fedders, Lobbying for Mandatory-Arrest Policies: Race, Class, and the Politics
of the Battered Women's Movement, 23 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 281, 286-96 (1997) (con-
struing the mandatory arrest policy relating to domestic violence and how this policy may
not reflect the experiences of low-income women and women of color); Nancy James, Do-
mestic Violence: A History of Arrest Policies and A Survey of Modern Laws, 28 FAM. L.Q. 509, 511-
13 (1994) (discussing how, until recently, most police forces had a policy of nonarrest in
domestic disputes); see also Terry A. Maroney, Note, The Struggle Against Hate Crime: Move-
ment At A Crossroads, 73 N.Y.U. L. Riv. 564, 600-02 (1998) (noting that police often fail to
label a crime as bias-motivated even though the law may require police to report such
crimes and asserting that ultimately the power to label crimes as bias-motivated "remains
firmly vested in the police").
23. See generally Wes Daniels, 'Derelicts,' Recurring Misfortune, Economic Hard Times and
Lifestyle Choices: Judicial Images of Homeless Litigants and Implications for Legal Advocates, 45
Burr. L. REv. 687, 708-15 (1997) (discussing trial court rulings, reversed on appeal, that
arresting homeless people amounts to punishment for trying to obtain the essentials of life,
such as shelter and food); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public
Places: Courts, Communities and New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 551, 646-50 (1997) (discuss-
ing the problem of police discretion in the enforcement of laws regulating minor forms of
street misconduct, which implicates the void-for-vagueness doctrine); Matthew Siegel,
Note, Africa v. City of Philadelphia: The Third Circuit Drops a Bomb on Fourth Amendment
Protections, 7 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REv. 167, 170, 180-90 (1997) (arguing that when exces-
sive force is used against individuals during an arrest, qualified immunity for those law
enforcement officials should not exist).
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culty of challenging that discretion, absent proof of "intentional or
purposeful" prosecution. 24 Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct
tend to focus attention on an individual prosecuting attorney and not
necessarily on the entire system of which she is a part.
25
The scholarship thus far has contributed richly to constitutional
law. I propose to add to those discussions a consideration of the pre-
sumed end result of arrest, prosecution, and whether the Fourth
Amendment requires that the government ensure that arrests are
used only to begin the process of prosecution and not as ends unto
themselves. From a practical standpoint, without a correlation of ar-
rests to prosecution, we cannot have a clear perspective on the effec-
tiveness of our criminal justice system. From a legal standpoint, we
cannot be sure whether the criminal justice system operates as in-
tended-to charge and to sanction those who are found guilty of
crimes-or, instead, serves as a "shortcut" of the procedural guaran-
tees of the Constitution. Those guarantees include due process, 26 the
right to confront witnesses and evidence,27 and a prohibition on pun-
ishment unless the government proves its case beyond a reasonable
doubt before a jury of the accused's peers or an impartial judge.28
24. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.2, at 623-25,
627-38 (1992) (discussing the broad discretion prosecutors have when deciding whether to
prosecute and stating that it is difficult to prove discriminatory prosecution due, in part, to
the required elements "that other violators similarly situated are generally not prosecuted,"
"that the selection of the claimant was 'intentional or purposeful,'" and "that the selection
was pursuant to an 'arbitrary classification.'" (citations omitted)); cf. Maroney, supra note
22, at 566-67 & n.14 (stating that "[p]rosecutors at worst undercharg[e), refus[e] to
charge, or encourag[e] leniency, and at best fail to give the problem [of bias crimes] seri-
ous attention").
25. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 261 (1993) (considering a prosecutor's
alleged false statements used to secure an indictment); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 482-83
(1991) (considering a claim that a prosecutor failed to disclose a confession that was ob-
tained through hypnosis); United States v. Talley, 124 F.3d 758, 765-66 (10th Cir. 1999)
(finding that a prosecutor violated an in limine order when questioning a witness); People
v. Hill, 952 P.2d 673, 684-94 (Cal. 1998) (holding that a prosecutor committed misconduct
by mischaracterizing evidence, referring to facts not in evidence, making derogatory com-
ments about the defense counsel, and intimidating a defense witness); Commonwealth v.
LaCava, 666 A.2d 221, 231 (Pa. 1995) (reversing on the grounds of the prosecutor's mis-
conduct during the sentencing phase).
26. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V, XIV.
27. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI; see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990)
("The central concern of the Confrontation Clause [of the Sixth Amendment] is to ensure
the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous
testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact."). The Sixth
Amendment also guarantees defendants the assistance of counsel and compulsory process
for defense witnesses at trial. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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This issue has involved examining available data about the rela-
tionship between arrests and prosecutions in a number of large juris-
dictions in the United States and investigating historical and
interpretive treatment of the Fourth Amendment. That examination
has led me to the thesis that it is unreasonable within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment for the government to arrest individuals when
the government lacks a contemporaneous intention and/or ability to
prosecute the individuals for the offenses charged. 9 The governmen-
tal entities relevant to this Article are each of the fifty states, their
respective local subdivisions, and the District of Columbia as they each
enact and enforce criminal laws by arrest and by prosecution. 30 Data
on arrests and on prosecutions for each of the years 1990 through
1994 is used to demonstrate arrest and prosecution ratios.31
My premise does not require that a state guarantee that all or
most prosecutions will lead to convictions, or even that a prosecutor
will be able to garner sufficient evidence to prove a particular case
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Fourth Amendment, however, re-
quires that the government be held accountable for whether its own
actions, or nonfeasance, have resulted in a system in which the major-
ity of arrests become an end unto themselves. 32 This question of gov-
ernmental accountability takes Fourth Amendment analysis beyond
determining whether the Fourth Amendment was violated in a single
interaction between an individual and a police officer. It requires
viewing the constitutional safeguards as first, a delineation between
individual rights and the limited authority of government to interfere
with those rights and, second, as a requirement that the system of law
29. It could, of course, be argued that the underlying assumption of this Article-that
individuals are "punished" by arrest when they do not receive all of the constitutional
rights that apply to criminal cases-is, in essence, a claim of violations of due process. This
Article, however, follows the Supreme Court's holdings that constitutional issues should be
considered by reference to specific constitutional rights, such as the Fourth Amendment,
rather than more general concepts of due process. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
271-75 (1994) (concluding that substantive due process is a generalized claim that will not
bring relief when the constitutional protection asked for exists in a particular amend-
ment); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) ("Because the Fourth Amendment
provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against... physically intru-
sive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of 'substan-
tive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." (citation omitted)).
30. See infra notes 143-154 and accompanying text and tables (demonstrating the rela-
tionship between arrests and prosecution).
31. See infra notes 143-154 and accompanying text and references to tables in Appendix
C.
32. See generally infra notes 58-84 and accompanying text (discussing the application of
the Fourth Amendment to arrests).
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enforcement and prosecution be held accountable to enforce the con-
stitutional protections on behalf of each individual.
Part I gives a brief overview of the language and of the judicial
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment and its relationship to state
arrest laws. 3 Part II examines the operation of state arrest laws, statis-
tics on arrests and on prosecutions, and the respective roles of police,
prosecutors, and the criminal justice system in creating a volume of
arrests that jurisdictions are unable to handle effectively.34 Part III
measures the ratio of arrests to prosecutions by the reasonableness
standard of the Fourth Amendment. 5
Part IV discusses the requisite standard for determining reasona-
bleness, which is a weighing of harm to individual Fourth Amendment
rights against concrete law enforcement rationales.36 Part V explores
possible legal "distractions" that may prevent a coherent and consis-
tent articulation of the Fourth Amendment's limitations on seizures,
such as the concept of federalism and historical interpretations.3 7 Fi-
nally, Part VI sets out possible solutions by courts, by legislatures, by
administrative agencies, and by litigants. 8
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. The Text
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.3 9
On its face, the amendment protects "the people" from govern-
mental action in regards to searches, seizures, and warrants. Second,
it identifies several specific "zones" entitled to protection: it distin-
guishes between persons, their houses, and their papers and personal
effects. Neither the language of the amendment, nor anything re-
maining of or even alluded to in its drafting or ratifying history,
33. See infra notes 39-84 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 85-232 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 233-283 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 284-399 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 400-485 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 486-512 and accompanying text.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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reveals priorities among the zones. It does not give priority to houses
over persons standing on streets; word placement would, if anything,
indicate that "persons" are the primary consideration. The language
of the amendment does treat the zones in the conjunctive; a person is
guaranteed protection from unreasonable search and seizure whether
he is in his house or not. The amendment applies even if a person's
papers are not in or on his property at the time of search or seizure.40
B. Drafting History
The language varies little from the first version drafted by James
Madison and presented to the House of Representatives on June 8,
1789, during the First Congress. The first version read:
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their
houses, their papers, and their other property from all un-
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated by
warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to be
searched, or the persons or things to be seized.4"
The amendments then were delegated to a select committee.42
On July 28, 1789, the House issued a committee report, as a commit-
tee of the whole, on the amendments proposed by Madison. 4' Lan-
guage changes appeared in the provision relating to search and
seizure:
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons,
their houses, their papers and their other poperty effects
from all unreasonable Searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated by warrants issuing, without probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, o and not particularly describing the
places to be searched, o and the persons or things to be
seized. 44
40. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 96-97 (1980) (noting that
the Fourth Amendment's language and specific references to areas of protection are not
procedural, but recognize broader concepts of limitations on government intrusion).
41. CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS 12-13 (Helen E. Veit et a]. eds., 1991) [hereinafter CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS] (Madison Resolution, June 8, 1798).
42. See id. at 103 (The Congressional Register, 21 July 1789).
43. See id. at 29-33 (House Committee Report, July 28, 1789).
44. Id. at 31. Strikeouts have been added to denote text that has been deleted from the




The House Committee Report deleted the original language referenc-
ing unreasonable searches and seizures.45 Obviously, that was more
than a "minor" word change. Yet, constitutional scholar Bernard
Schwartz concluded that the omission was simply inadvertent.46
On August 13, 1789, the House resolved itself into a committee of
the whole again to consider the proposals of Madison and the select
committee.4 7 Amendment-by-amendment consideration occurred be-
tween August 14 and 18; discussions are known to have taken place
regarding the present First Amendment's guarantees of religion, as-
sembly, speech, and press; the provisions regarding the right to bear
arms and quartering of soldiers; provisions relating to double jeop-
ardy, self-incrimination, just compensation and due process that be-
came the Fifth Amendment; and provisions regarding bail, fines and
punishments that became the Eighth Amendment.48 The precursors
to the Fourth and Ninth Amendments received brisk approval.49
The Gazette reports that Representative Gerry asserted that the
language "by warrants issuing" in the search and seizure provision was
not strong enough.5" He proposed the language "and no warrant
shall issue" instead.5" The Congressional Register for August 17, 1789,
however, documents Representative Benson, rather than Representa-
tive Gerry, as objecting to the words "by warrants issuing" and propos-
ing it to be altered to read "and no warrant shall issue."52 Either way,
45. See id.
46. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
BILL OF RIGHTS 177 (Madison House 2d ed. 1992). The legislative history reveals no other
explanation, yet Professor Schwartz's assumption may not be the only possibility. The dele-
tion would make the right against searches and seizures absolute, and not subject to weigh-
ing under a reasonableness standard. The searches and seizures language connotes formal
and specific official action; its deletion could give broader protection from official action,
such as prohibiting any official method of obtaining personal papers, as by subpoena, or
effects, as by forfeiture.
Leonard Levy's analysis of the Fourth Amendment does not make the broader reading
implausible. He asserted that the Fourth Amendment reflects a "myth" that English law,
particularly the Magna Carta, prevented the government's encroachment on private prem-
ises. LEONARD LEVY, SEASONED JUDGMENTS: THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, RIGHTS AND His-
TORY 147-48 (1995). Thus, the broader language could have been intended to make clear
that the protection extended also to intrusions by the sovereign, as well as to those of any
other governmental entities or private parties.
47. See CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 41, at 104-07 (The Daily Advertiser, 14
August 1789).
48. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 46, at 174-78.
49. See id. at 177.
50. CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 41, at 181 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (Gazette of the United States, 22 August 1789).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 188 (internal quotation marks omitted) (The Congressional Register, 17 August
1789); see id. at 31 n.20 (noting the discrepancy between the Gazette and The Congressional
2000]
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the statement is the only expression of the purpose of the change-
that under no circumstances could a warrant be issued without the
procedural safeguards specified in the Fourth Amendment. The pro-
posed language appeared, separating the amendment into two
clauses, by August 24, 1789, when the House approved the amend-
ments and resolved that they be submitted for ratification by the
states.53 The House finished consideration of the amendments on Au-
gust 24, 1789.5" The Senate considered them between August 24 and
September 9.55 The Senate version of the Fourth Amendment was
not altered again in Conference Committee.56 Little record of any
Senate debate on the amendment as a whole is available.57
C. Application to Arrests
The structure of the Fourth Amendment creates two clauses.58
The first explicitly covers both searches and seizures and measures
them each by a reasonableness standard. The second, the warrant
clause, specifies the process for obtaining warrants and the contents
of warrants. The Supreme Court has applied the Fourth Amendment
to all seizures, even those involving only a brief detention of per-
Record). According to both the Gazette and The Congressional Register, the proposal lost on a
vote. See id. at 181, 188.
53. See id. at 39 (House Resolution and Articles of Amendment, August 24, 1789). Rep-
resentative Livermore moved during debate on August 17 that "and not" be deleted be-
tween "affirmative and particularly" in the warrant clause; the House retained the stronger
language. Id. at 188 (internal quotation marks omitted) (The Congressional Register, 17 Au-
gust 1789).
54. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 46, at 181.
55. See id. at 181-84.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 181. Because the "Senate sat behind closed doors until February, 1794,"
the essence of speeches and of formal action taken in the Senate relating to the Bill of
Rights are found only in the Annals of Congress and the SenateJourna4 those accounts, how-
ever, are not verbatim and do not tell us anything "of the discussion during Senate de-
bates." Id. Madison's own intentions and understandings of his drafting mandate are
reflected in his correspondence. See id. at 160-69. His personal notes, however, were not
made public until 1840. See James Etienne Viator, The Fourth Amendment in the Nineteenth
Century, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING, supra
note 16, at 172.
Most of the congressional comments about the amendments were either word-
smithing or discussions about the necessity for amendment. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 46,
at 162-65 (discussing Madison's proposed Amendments and noting that some believed
they were unnecessary); ROBERT J. MORGAN, JAMES MADISON ON THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 132-34 (1988) (noting that even Madison was originally an opponent
of the Bill of Rights).
58. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text (providing
the full text of the Fourth Amendment).
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sons. 5 9 The Supreme Court has, however, created a different standard
to determine the constitutionality of arrests versus the standard for
searches.6 °
A seizure occurs at whatever point a reasonable person believes
he is no longer free "to disregard the police and [to] go about his
business."61 Therefore, if a police officer restrains an individual by
"physical force or show of authority," a seizure has occurred.6 2 The
primary, if not sole, purpose of a seizure is to "set[ ] the criminal jus-
tice mechanism in motion. '"63
The standard for a lawful arrest, whether with a search warrant or
without, is probable cause.6 4 Probable cause requires a showing that
the facts and the circumstances would lead the officer to believe that a
crime has been committed by the arrestee.6 5
The Court has not explicitly answered the debate over whether
the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment, which requires specific-
ity and a statement of probable cause made under oath to a judicial
officer, drives the amendment.66 The Court has, however, borrowed
59. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) ("The Fourth
Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a
brief detention short of traditional arrest" (citing Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1960);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10-19 (1968))).
60. See Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 90-91 n.1 (1994) (ThomasJ., dissenting) (stating
that "a different rule [than for arrests] applies to search warrants"). But see Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) ("The simple language of the [Fourth] Amendment applies
equally to seizures of persons and to seizures of property . . ." but, " ' physical entry of the
home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.'"
(quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972))).
61. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991); see Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.
424, 434 (1991) (explaining that "a seizure does not occur simply because a police officer
approaches an individual and asks a few questions"; rather, "[t] he encounter will not trig-
ger Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its consented nature").
62. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
63. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 10 (1985). In Garner, the Court found that the
use of deadly force is a "self-defeating way of apprehending a suspect" and as such, "guar-
antees that the [criminal justice] mechanism will not be set in motion." Id.; see also infra
notes 256-262 (discussing Garner).
64. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (dictating that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause"); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (stating that, in the absence of a search
warrant, "[w]hether [an] arrest [is] constitutionally valid depends.., upon whether, at the
moment the arrest was made, the officer[ ] had probable cause to make it").
65. See Beck, 379 U.S. at 91 (defining probable cause as "facts and circumstances" within
an officer's knowledge "of which . . . [he] had reasonably trustworthy information . . .
sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing" that an offense was occurring or had
occurred).
66. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-02, 104 (1959) (discussing the early
roots of the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement and measuring the stan-
dard against reasonableness); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 492 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing that upholding a conviction despite a warrant violation
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both from the "reasonableness" standard of the first clause and the
"probable cause" element of the second clause to justify warrantless
arrests. As long as probable cause is present, warrantless arrests in
open fields67 and in public places are explicitly authorized by control-
ling case law.68 There is also an exception to the warrant requirement
for searches if a search is made incident to a valid arrest.69 By con-
would "go far toward relegating the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to a
position of little consequence"). In Coolidge, Justice Harlan noted that some scholars be-
lieve that "emphasizing the warrant requirement over the reasonableness of the search"
reverses the historical basis of the Fourth Amendment. Id.; see also Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 621 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that there is "significant historical
evidence" that the framers of the Constitution did not intend that the warrant requirement
would be elevated above the necessity of probable cause).
67. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (noting that the "special protec-
tion accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers,
and effects' is not extended to the open fields").
68. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976) (finding that although an
officer's "judgements about probable cause may be more readily accepted when backed by
a warrant issued by a magistrate" requiring such a practice is not necessary "when the
judgement of the Nation and Congress has for so long been to authorize warrantless public
arrests on probable cause").
69. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) ("[I]n the case of a lawful
custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant require-
ment of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a 'reasonable' search under that
Amendment.").
The Court has also recognized a warrantless search exception for vehicles and ensuing
arrests. See Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925). The Supreme Court used Carroll to articulate the distinction between requir-
ing a warrant for search of a private dwelling and instances where "it is not practicable to
secure a warrant," because of the mobility of the vehicle. Carroll 267 U.S. at 153. Carroll
holds that a misdemeanor/felony distinction is no longer viable in judging warrantless
searches and seizures, and that seizure of contraband goods and arrest of the transporter
are separate issues, as long as each is sustained by reasonable cause. Id. at 158-59. The
case, however, is dubious authority for a probable cause standard. Police officers originally
attempted to arrange a purchase of illegal liquor from Carroll, who left to procure the
liquor, apparently got suspicious, and did not return. See id. at 135. A couple months later,
the officers saw Carroll driving near the border of Detroit. See id. The officers stopped the
car on the belief that Carroll was engaged in bootlegging liquor, and because of knowl-
edge that illegal activity often occurred at the international border. See id. The Court was
satisfied that probable cause existed because the scene of the search and seizure was a
major point for illegal importation, and the officer believed that the Carroll "boys" were
involved in illegal whiskey transport. See id. at 160. The Court did not address whether the
information available to and suppositions made by the arresting officers constituted prob-
able cause.
Husty is also a Prohibition Act case. The petitioners filed motions to suppress evi-
dence based on the warrantless search of an automobile. See Husty, 282 U.S. at 699. The
Court found that, for illegal transporting cases, "[t]o show probable cause it is not neces-
sary that the arresting [and searching] officer should have had before him legal evidence
of the suspected illegal act." Id. at 700-01 (citing Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435,
441 (1925); CarrolA 267 U.S. at 132). In Henry v. United States, the Court clarified that an
officer "must have reasonable grounds to believe that the particular package carried by the
citizen is contraband." 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959).
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trast, most warrantless searches and seizures inside homes are "pre-
sumptively unreasonable."7 ° The warrant requirement for searches
and seizures made inside homes is relaxed only under a few well-
recognized exigent circumstances, such as the hot pursuit of a fleeing
suspect, the danger that evidence will be destroyed, and the possibility
of danger to a third person.71 The end result of this case law is that
the arrests of millions of individuals do not receive the protection of
the warrant clause-unless the individuals are in their homes.
The Court-made formula that probable cause equals reasonable-
ness for arrests also has relaxed one of the explicit requirements of
the warrant clause. Warrantless arrests omit the other vital require-
ment of the warrant clause that a neutral and detached judicial of-
ficer, instead of a police officer, determines whether probable cause
exists to justify arresting an individual.7 2 Individuals exercising their
presumed rights to use public streets and facilities are subject to
seizure prior to a judicial determination of probable cause. The con-
clusion that an arresting officer's determination of probable cause is
sufficient to seize an individual contradicts the warrant clause. It can-
not be reconciled with the judgment that
[t]he point of the Fourth Amendment... is not that it de-
prives law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection
consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neu-
tral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferret-
ing out crime.
73
70. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)).
71. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750 (discussing exigent circumstances); Michigan v. Tyler, 436
U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (deciding that an ongoing fire is an exigent circumstance); Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (recognizing the hot pursuit of a fleeing felon as an
exigent circumstance); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (finding that
the destruction of evidence qualifies as an exigent circumstance).
72. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 113 n.12 (1975) (finding that the Fourth Amend-
ment has a requirement that " ' where practical, a governmental search and seizure should
represent both the efforts of the officer to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the judg-
ment of the magistrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a citi-
zen's private premises or conversations'" (quoting United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972))).
73. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (footnote omitted). In Johnson,
narcotics officers were tipped off that individuals were smoking opium in a hotel room. See
id. at 12. The officers smelled opium when they arrived in the hotel hallway. See id. They
demanded entry and conducted a search. See id. The Court held that, although the odor
might have been enough to convince a magistrate to issue a warrant, it did not justify
entering without a warrant. See id. at 16, 17.
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Case law, however, has qualified the purpose of the amendment
insofar as arrests are concerned. The safeguard that probable cause
must be determined in the first instance by neutral and detached judi-
cial officers is strictly enforced only for individuals within the four
walls of their homes.
Instead of applying the amendment as written, in Gerstein v. Pugh,
the Court held that the requirement of a judicial determination of
probable cause can be satisfied as long as an arrestee is brought
before a judicial officer in a "timely" manner after arrest."4 Timeli-
ness subsequently was defined to mean within forty-eight hours of
arrest.
7 5
In Welsh v. Wisconsin, the Court explained the reason for its differ-
ent treatment of arrests, which the Court holds usually do not require
warrants, on the one hand, and searches in private premises, on the
other hand, which virtually always require warrants.76 The distinction
is that "[i] t is axiomatic that the 'physical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is di-
rected."'' 77 That rationale has a profound impact on the Fourth
Amendment rights of millions of people each year. It is a direct factor
in the volume of arrests that overwhelm the criminal justice system's
ability to handle them, as demonstrated by the statistics cited in Part
11.78 It has created a schism between those who are shielded from
arrest and its consequences by virtue of the presumed "sanctity" of
their homes and those who interact with the police on an hourly and
daily basis as they travel public roads and frequent public places.
Part IV considers whether this historical justification is valid.79
But the assumption in Welsh and in other cases that the "rationale" of
the Fourth Amendment supports the public place/private place dis-
tinction for arrests is, at best, an interpretation read into words that
do not convey that message. More to the point, it is axiomatic that an
interpretation that subjects millions of individuals to arrest each year
74. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 126.
75. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). The McLaughlin
rule was held to be retroactive for cases pending on the date the rule was announced. See
Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 80 (1994). The majority and dissent in Powell each mar-
shaled support on the question of whether a violation of the 48-hour rule would vitiate the
ensuing prosecution. The suppression issue was not reached, however, because it was not
raised, argued, or decided below. See id. at 84-85.
76. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 748-49.
77. Id. at 748 (quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313
(1972)).
78. See infra notes 85-232 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 284-399 and accompanying text.
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based upon judgments by police officers alone is such a skewed result
that it requires reconsideration.
D. State Laws and the Fourth Amendment
Between 1791 and 1949, the Bill of Rights, including the Fourth
Amendment, applied only to the federal government-to searches
and seizures by federal law enforcement agents.8 0 The relatively few
federal law enforcement agencies and criminal statutes during that
period, no doubt, made it easier to scrutinize the actions of federal
officers with arrest powers and the outcomes of federal
prosecutions.81
In 1949, the Supreme Court found that the Fourth Amendment,
because of its fundamental nature, applies to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 In 1961, the
80. See Lessee of Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. 469, 551-52 (1833) (finding that the
amendments do not apply to the states); see also Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243,
247-51 (1833) (holding that the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against taking private
property for public use "without just compensation" is not a limitation upon state
governments).
81. By 1812, federal prosecutions were authorized only for offenses designated by stat-
ute. See LEvY, supra note 46, at 402-04 (discussing the downfall of the federal common law
offenses). Prior to 1812, federal courts recognized federal common law offenses. See id. at
402-05. In United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, the Court declared that "[t]he legislative
authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare
the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence," and therefore, the circuit courts of
the United States cannot exercise common law jurisdiction in criminal cases. 11 U.S. 32,
32, 34 (1812); see also LEvy, supra note 46, at 405 (examining the Court's decision in United
States v. Hudson & Goodwin).
Many Supreme Court decisions on search and seizure, up through the 1940s, involved
relatively few federal statutes. The majority of these early cases fell under the National
Prohibition Act. See, e.g., Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933); Sgro v. United
States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); McGuire v.
United States, 273 U.S. 96 (1927); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927); Albrecht v.
United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1927); Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435 (1925); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). A number of cases also fell under the War Powers Act.
See, e.g., United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
Nonetheless, even with relatively few federal agencies and statutes at play, the federal
law enforcement system was burgeoning. The Prohibition Era and the Eighteenth Amend-
ment produced an unprecedented number of federal prosecutions. See Charles D. Bon-
ner, Comment, The Federalization of Crime: Too Much of a Good Thing?, 32 U. RICH. L. REv.
905, 911 (1998).
82. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) ("The security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-
is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as
such enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause.").
The Wolf decision does not report any of the facts or procedural play in the case.
Rather, the Court identified the sole issue of the case to be whether the admission in a
state court trial of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment constituted a
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Court ruled that the exclusionary rule that was recognized in 1914 in
Weeks also applies to state court prosecutions." By these rulings, the
number of criminal cases implicating the Fourth Amendment grew
exponentially after 1961. At the same time, the actions of thousands
of state and of local prosecutorial and law enforcement agencies, and
the laws and practices of ultimately fifty states and the District of Co-
lumbia governing that authority, became subject to Fourth Amend-
84ment scrutiny.
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 25-26. Wolf
does not extend the exclusionary rule announced in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914), to state cases. Id. at 30-31.
Weeks establishes the inadmissibility at trial in federal prosecutions of evidence seized
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393, 398. The decision empha-
sizes that the courts "are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution" and are
to enforce the "limitations and restraints" imposed on government officials by the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 392.
83. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that "all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is... inadmissible in a state court").
84. Professorierold H. Israel has noted the "monumental impact" of application of the
Fourth Amendment to state court cases: "[i]n a single decade those rulings expanded the
reach of constitutional regulation of criminal procedure many times beyond that which
had been attained through all of the Court's rulings over the previous 170 years." Jerold
H. Israel, Twelfth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts
of Appeals 1981-1982-Foreward: Selective Incorporation Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 253 (1982).
Professor Israel estimated that more than 90% of both felony and misdemeanor cases,
respectively, in the United States are prosecuted pursuant to state laws. See id. at 254 n.4.
Documented criminal case comparisons between federal and state courts by the Bureau of
Justice Statistics of the U.S. Department of Justice indicate that, by 1990, federal cases
accounted for only four percent of all felony convictions. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1994, at 485
tbl.5.47 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1995) [hereinafter 1994 SOURCEBOOK].
Cf WALTER BERNS, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SEIOUSLY 126-27 (1987) (asserting that
the Bill of Rights "played almost no role in the securing of rights" during the amendments'
first 125 years). Berns's comments were part of academic discussions about the cause of
the relative lack of fanfare when the Bill of Rights was ratified. The public quiet that met
them after two years of congressional "sturm und drang" has led another scholar to con-
clude that the new nation's leaders and citizens did not consider them to be "the most
consequential part of the Constitution." ROBERT A. GOLDWIN, FROM PARCHMENT TO POWER:
How JAMES MADISON USED THE BILL OF RIGHTS TO SAVE THE CONSTITUTION 174 (1997).
Professor Bernard Schwartz also explained another possible reason for the under-
stated presentation of the ratified Bill of Rights. The first Congress was split on whether it
should have taken precious time away from other pressing matters of the new national
government to consider the amendments. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 46, at 187. From this
perspective, the Framers would not have wanted to draw particular notice to the comple-
tion of the amendments, and thereby highlight how many other things were held in abey-
ance during the amending process. The enumerated rights also were familiar; all of the
amendments, in some form, had been proposed by the states themselves during their con-
stitutional ratifying conventions. See GOLDWIN, supra, at 89. Once they were secure within
the new nation's organic laws, the natural order of things for many was restored, and
clamor was no longer necessary.
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II. THE MAGNITUDE AND CAUSES OF THE PROBLEM
A. The Operation of State Criminal Laws
State laws, often supplemented by state common law, define crim-
inal conduct, requisite elements of proof, and penalty ranges for of-
fenses committed within the states' respective borders. Those laws
govern the standards for arrest upon probable cause to believe that a
state criminal law has been violated, to the extent that those laws are
not inconsistent with the Constitution. 5 State laws also establish the
jurisdiction of specific state courts over specific criminal prosecutions,
such as courts of general or limited jurisdiction, misdemeanor and/or
felony cases,86 and designate the prosecuting authority for each geo-
graphical orjurisdictional division within each state.8 7 Those laws and
the courts created pursuant thereto establish criminal procedure and
rules for the prosecution of criminal cases in each state.88
The Court has refused to establish "bright lines" to ensure an ex-
act fit between individual state criminal laws and the constitutional
protection against unreasonable search and seizure granted to all per-
sons by the Fourth Amendment.89 The result is a patchwork quilt of
law enforcement and of prosecutorial practices that leave in doubt
85. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37 (1963) (stating that "the lawfulness of arrests
for federal offenses is to be determined by reference to state law insofar as it is not violative
of the Federal Constitution[;] . . . the lawfulness of ... arrests by state officers is to be
determined by [state] law" (citations omitted)).
86. See, e.g., TEX. CRuM. CODE P. ANN. art. 4.10 (West 1999) (establishing the exclusive
jurisdiction of county courts over bail bonds in criminal cases).
87. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (district attorneys for each county); N.Y. COUNTY
LAw § 700 (McKinney 1991) (stating that "[i]t shall be the duty of every district attorney to
conduct all prosecutions for crimes and offenses cognizable by the courts of the county for
which he shall have been elected or appointed").
88. Professor Richard Boldt, University of Maryland School of Law, has raised the issue
of the nature of those amendments now applicable to the states by incorporation. Prior to
incorporation, each of the amendments were limitations on government action, because
the Constitution granted the federal government only those powers expressly delegated to
it. State powers, however, are "reserved" through the Tenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
Perhaps Justice Harlan answered Professor Boldt's question. Despite his preference
for leaving the states "some elbow room" in their enforcement of criminal law, Justice
Harlan eventually came down on the side of supporting "sound Fourth Amendment princi-
ples at the possible expense of state concerns." Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 769
(1969) (Harlan, J., concurring). The amendments do not break out neatly into "funda-
mental" and "nonfundamental" language. Efforts to wring out such distinctions would
make the amendments even less certain of consistent application than if they were subject
to individual interpretations by each of the states.
89. See generally RoALD Y. MYKKELTVEDT, THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS AND THE PROCEDURAL RIGHTS 109 (1983) (discuss-
ing how "every constitutionally mandated change in Fourth Amendment law" would "apply
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment," and this application of the amendment
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rather than uphold the protection available under the Fourth Amend-
ment to millions of people arrested each year.
B. State Arrest Laws
Citations to and warrantless arrest standards of the general arrest
laws of each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia are set out
in Appendix A. The state laws prescribe by whom arrests can be
made,90 and standards, if any, for conducting arrests.9 Under those
arrest laws, custodial arrests are made in two ways. After issuance of
an indictment or of an information, or after charges are made to po-
lice by a private citizen, a warrant can be issued for the arrest of the
individual who is the subject of the indictment, information, or
charge. 92 Or, if a police officer believes probable cause exists, or an
offense occurs in his presence, he may make an arrest without a war-
rant. 3 Thirty-two states and the District of Columbia authorize arrests
without a warrant for misdemeanors if the offense is committed in the
presence of the arresting officer;9 4 twenty-two states authorize warrant-
less arrests for misdemeanors if the arresting officer has a formulation
of "reason to believe" or of "probable cause" to believe that the arres-
tee has committed a misdemeanor, as through the report of another
person, even if the officer did not see the offense being committed.9
All of the states and the District of Columbia authorize warrantless
arrests for felonies if the arresting officer has some formulation of
"probable cause" to believe that the person has committed a felony,
would be an imposition on law enforcement officials of every jurisdiction, each with their
own specific law enforcement procedures and problems).
90. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (West 1998) (peace officer); TEX. CODE CRIM. P.
ANN. art. 14.03 (West 1999) (peace officer); N.Y. CIUM. PROC. LAw § 140.10 (McKinney
1992) (police officer).
91. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-3 (1997) (permitting officers "[i]n order to arrest
under a warrant charging a crime ... [to] break open the door of any house where the
offender is concealed").
92. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2303(2).
93. See Wayne R. LaFave, Arrest: The Decision to Take a Suspect into Custody, 1965 AM. B.
FOUND. SURV. ADMIN. CRIM. JUST. U.S. 17-21 (noting that generally a police officer can,
without a warrant, make an arrest for a felony if he or she has probable cause and discuss-
ing situations when a police officer can make a warrantless arrest when a misdemeanor is
committed in his or her presence).
94. See app. A (ALA; AL; AK CA; CO; CT; DC; FL; GA; ID; IA; IN; KY; LA; ME; MD;
MA; MI; MN; MS; MO; NE; NJ; ND; OK RI; SC; TN; TX; VT; VA; WV).
95. See app. A (AZ; CO; CT; DE; HI; IL; IA; KS; LA; MT; NE; NV; NH; NY; NC; OR; RI;
TX; UT; VT; WI; WY).
[VOL. 59:1
ARRESTS WITHOUT PROSECUTION
which can, but does not have to, include felonies committed in the
officer's presence."
The state arrest laws, particularly those authorizing warrantless ar-
rests, have at least three immediate consequences. First, the use of
warrants for arrest becomes the exception, rather than the rule.97
Second, the blanket authority of police officers to conduct arrests for
misdemeanors without warrants undoubtedly results in far more ar-
rests than if a "cooling off' period occurred between the alleged crim-
inal incident and the arrest. The Fourth Amendment anticipates the
benefit of that interim period-that a neutral, detached judicial of-
ficer will intervene to determine whether probable cause exists for an
arrest.98 Third, such broad police authority coupled with operational
stresses in the court systems effectively removes the buffer between the
government and that individuals that the Framers intended the
Fourth Amendment to provide.99
C. State Charging Practices
1. Police Control of Charging.-The methods of charging cases
varies among the states and even among jurisdictions within a state.
Those methods allow the majority of arrests to become "cases" in the
criminal justice systems of each jurisdiction either without any or with
little scrutiny of prosecutorial merit or feasibility.1 °° An arrest consists
of physical detention of a suspect based on probable cause to believe
he has committed a specific criminal offense. Other administrative
steps, such as booking, photographing the suspect, and fingerprint-
96. See also LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 24, § 1.2 (stating that in most jurisdictions a
police officer with probable cause can make a warrantless arrest in felony cases).
97. See LaFave, supra note 93, at 15 (explaining that it is "routine" to make warrantless
arrests).
98. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (stating that "the Constitution
requires 'that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer ...be interposed
between the citizen and the police'" (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
481-82 (1963))); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967) (mandating that the Fourth
Amendment was "intended to protect ... from searches under indiscriminate, general
authority. Protection .. .was assured by prohibiting all 'unreasonable' searches and
seizures, and by requiring the use of warrants, . . . thereby interposing 'a magistrate be-
tween the citizen and the police'" (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455
(1948))); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (stating that "[a]n arrest without a warrant
bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause").
99. See infra notes 100-104 and accompanying text (discussing police discretion); see
also infra notes 105-117 and accompanying text (discussing prosecutorial discretion).
100. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN: PROSECUTORS
IN STATE COURTS, 1990, at 3 (1991) [hereinafter PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 1990]




ing, occur after the arrest and after the police identify the offense or
offenses committed. 101
In misdemeanor cases, charging often is complete upon a sworn
declaration, usually called a probable cause statement, arrest report,
or charging statement, made by the arresting officer or a citizen who
has made a complaint to the police.1 °2 For many misdemeanor cases,
the entire process from arrest to disposition of the case involves rela-
tively few stages; the prosecutor is likely to see the case file for the first
time the day before or the morning of the scheduled trial. °3 This
process means that no prosecutorial review occurs at a meaningful
time, unless a case is continued to a new trial date on the motion of
either the defense, the prosecution, or the court in the case of admin-
istrative problems. Thus, an individual's loss of freedom and the
prosecutorial merit of most of those cases stand or fall solely on a
police officer's judgment about the legal sufficiency of the evidence
and of the rules of law applicable to the cited offense(s), and on the
officer's judgment about the merit of an individual case from a public
policy perspective. Even assuming complete good faith on the part of
arresting officers, the likelihood of many such cases being "triable" is
not high. But these cases drive the engine or, more accurately, clog
the engine of criminal justice throughout the country.
2. Relaxed Charging Methods Used by Prosecutors. -More
prosecutorial review occurs in felony cases. Since 1870, however, fed-
eral prosecutions for less serious felony cases frequently have been
initiated by use of an information rather than an indictment by a
101. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 24, § 1.4.
102. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2303.
103. The prosecutor's role at this stage has been described as follows:
Typically, the prosecutor will make the charging decision by consulting the report
the police have provided. As long as the report contains elements of a prima
facie case (something the prosecutor can easily determine), this report in testimo-
nial form typically will be sufficient to meet the pretrial screening requirements
imposed to justify the detention and charging of the defendant.... The prosecu-
tor can rely on this kind of evidence to meet these requirements, secure in the
knowledge that the overwhelming percentage of cases will end in a plea bargain.
Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the In-
nocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1361-62 (1997) (footnotes omitted). Givelber's assump-
tion that most of the cases charged will end in plea bargains is not consistent with the
prosecution rates in a number of large jurisdictions. See infra notes 172-201 and accompa-
nying text.
Yet Givelber's overall view of the method of charging is consistent with an earlier as-
sessment that, "'[u ] nless the police report on its face reveals an inconsistency or barrier to
conviction, the prosecutor accepts the general conclusion of the police without making an
independent investigation or evaluation of the evidence.'" Id. (quoting LLOYD L. WEINREB,
DENIAL OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 58 (1977)).
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grand jury.104 Many states also have adopted the practice of charging
felonies by information rather than by the more cumbersome-and
costlier-grand jury process. 105 An information may be issued on the
sworn certification of the prosecutor alone; 06 there is no process to
measure whether a prosecutor signing an information has any more
knowledge about the case than whatever a police officer has related to
her. There is, for example, no requirement that a prosecutor inter-
view witnesses before charging by information.
Indictments, by contrast, require empaneling grand juries, sub-
poenaing witnesses, and convincing a grand jury of probable cause
that a felony has been committed and that the "target" of the investi-
gation committed it.107 Even though the prosecutor guides the pro-
ceedings and selects what evidence is presented to a grand jury, there
is, theoretically at least, the presumption and the possibility of an in-
dependent assessment of evidence by the grand jurors.10 8
Presentation to a grand jury presumptively requires gathering
credible evidence and assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to sup-
port the elements of the criminal offense(s). At the very least, the
grand jury process requires a prosecutor to explain to the grand ju-
rors the legal elements of each offense and how the proffered evi-
dence supports the elements. Again, theoretically at least, the grand
jury process puts the burden on the prosecutor to display a modicum
of evidence for each count of an indictment.
Indictment by a grand jury, however, is not required to initiate all
criminal prosecutions. The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent
part, that "[n] o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-
wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
104. See Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 7 (1927) ("The practice of prosecuting
lesser federal crimes by information, instead of indictment, has been common since
1870.").
105. Cf BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN: PROSECUTORS
IN STATE COURTS, 1992, at 6 tbl.10 (1993) [hereinafter PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS,
1992] (reporting that for the period from July 1, 1991 toJune 30, 1992, only 28% of felony
cases filed in state courts were charged by indictment); TEX. CONsT. art. V, § 12 (amended
1891) (defining an information as "a written instrument presented to a court by an attor-
ney for the State charging a person with the commission of an offense" and establishing
that use of informations is "provided by law").
106. Cf. Albrecht, 273 U.S. at 6 (stating that when the United States Attorney files an
information under his oath of office, "his official oath may be accepted as sufficient to give
verity to the allegation of the information").
107. See generally LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 24, § 15.1 (describing the process of indict-
ment by grand jury).
108. Cf. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47-53 (1992) (recognizing the well-




Grand Jury."' 9 According to prosecutors and at least one survey,
grand juries are not used in the majority of felony cases.10
3. Failure to Exercise Prosecutorial Discretion. -Prosecutorial discre-
tion assumes that prosecutors make professional judgments based on
careful review of the merits of individual cases, both from a legal and
a public policy perspective. Yet, most of the cases that are the subject
of this Article represent a failure of the prosecution function. The
large numbers of dismissals in certain jurisdictions, and the way in
which they often occur, literally days before or on the day of a sched-
uled trial, are evidence that the "crunch" of caseloads is driving
prosecutorial decisions far more than considerations about the rights
of persons arrested, or legal or policy considerations about the
prosecutorial merit of individual cases. In millions of cases,
prosecutorial discretion is exercised, if at all, only after the depriva-
tion of individual freedom by arrest.
In an article discussing prosecutorial attitudes about hate crimes,
Terry Maroney discussed the broad discretion that prosecutors
have.'11 Maroney made the charge that this broad discretion allows
prosecutors, for example, to elect not to bring hate crime prosecu-
tions.112 He asserted that decisions to prosecute are often reserved for
what might be termed "paradigmatic"-extraordinary or unusual,
cases.
113
The systemic arrests without prosecution present a mirror image
of Maroney's description of hate crime prosecutions. The most com-
mon, if not mundane, criminal cases are allowed to remain in the
system without the application of prosecutorial discretion." 4 It takes
109. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
110. See PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 1992, supra note 105, at 6. In the BJS/Census
Bureau survey for 1992, prosecutors reported having grand juries available in 44% of their
districts. Id. The mean percentage of all felony cases brought by grand juries was 28%. See
id. According to the survey, in 57% of the districts covered by the survey, even misdemean-
ors were brought by grand jury. Id. As discussed, supra, use of a grand jury may ensure
more careful review of evidence prior to charging. However, extensive use of grand juries
for misdemeanor cases begs the question whether prosecutorial resources are expended
wisely.
111. Maroney, supra note 22, at 602-09.
112. Id. at 602-03.
113. Id. at 617. The disproportionate attention paid to extraordinary or to sensational
cases creates an erroneous public perception of the extent and of the nature of crime in
the United States. That attention also can mask the fact that many other serious cases "get
lost" in the system due to lack of preparation. See id. at 604-06.
114. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of prosecutors to
review cases adequately and exercise discretion by dropping charges when appropriate).
But see Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FoRDHAM L. REv.
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the more extraordinary or unusual criminal cases for prosecutors to
marshal the activity and the preparation that will enable cases to pro-
ceed to prosecution."'
The doctrine of prosecutorial discretion makes judges unwitting
participants in this passive approach to most criminal cases. The wall
of prosecutorial immunity blocks out inquiries or complaints from
judges about the volume of cases dismissed.116 Prosecutors are not
required to articulate reasons for dismissal of cases that will not re-
ceive further judicial review or that will not require the defendants to
comply with any conditions that might protect the public from de-
fendants who pose a danger to society.' 17
2117, 2140 (1998) (asserting that, "[p]rosecutors' decisions on whether to pursue a partic-
ular case, and what level of punishment to demand, are ... routinely influenced by ques-
tions of priority and cost"). That statement presupposes that prosecutors routinely "weigh"
cases by their legal or societal merit, against known resource factors. Statistics regarding
case dismissals without prosecution do not bear out the assumption of such a weighing
process. The dismissal rates suggest that decisions to proceed or not are often reactive.
The happenstance occurrences of a witness failing to appear for trial or of the total
number of cases on a court docket on a given day, for example, are the usual prosecution
determinants in that kind of environment; the relative priority or cost of a given case is not
the driving force. And even some of the actual determinants are serendipitous, such as the
adequacy of the police investigation or of a witness's presence at court.
115. Cf MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 177 (1979) (examining criminal cases primarily in the Court of
Common Pleas in New Haven, Connecticut, and asserting that "the prosecution is rela-
tively passive in the criminal process"). Feeley described the dynamic of cases that are
prosecuted in the same way Maroney analyzed cases that are not:
This passive stance is also reflected in the way prosecutors develop-or perhaps
more accurately do not develop-their cases. Only in rare cases that involve a
particularly serious charge, a well-known "bad guy," or a serious injury will the
prosecutor carefully read through the file before arraignment or first appearance
... he may even have to rely on the defendant or his attorney to supply details on
the incident or information about the defendant's prior record.
Id at 178-79.
116. See id. at 69 (stating that "the judge's function is to ratify the decisions of the prose-
cutors and defense attorneys").
117. Jurisdictions often resort to conditional dismissals of criminal cases. They might be
called, for example, probation before judgment, suspension of proceedings, or diversion.
See, e.g., MD. RULE 4-248 (stipulating that on the State's Attorney's motion, the court may
"stet" the charge-put the case on an inactive docket, provided that the defendant does
not object). These dispositions enable defendants to avoid entry of a conviction and of a
potential punishment if the defendants meet certain conditions for a specified time. See,
e.g., THE MARYLAND INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION OF LAWYERS,
CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF MARYLAND § 8.9 (Maureen
L. Rowland ed., rev. ed. 1995) (stating that "[i]n many cases the prosecutor will place
conditions on the entry of a stet" and noting that "[allthough placement of conditions on
the entry of a stet is a frequently used technique, there is no authority in the Maryland
Rules or in case law for placement or conditions on the entry of a stet"). The conditions
may range from no additional arrests during the covered period, to attending and satisfac-
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4. The Role of Politics in Arrests.--Political factors also encourage
more arrests for state law violations. Public officials and law enforce-
ment officers often cite the high volume of arrests as proof of an ag-
gressive and effective battle against crime."' The lack of scrutiny of
case outcomes leaves these claims unchallenged.' 19 Instead, theories
about the deterrent effect of so-called zero-tolerance arrest policies
become the law enforcement rationale, even with conflicting views
about the theories, or conflict between the theories and constitutional
safeguards.
1 20
Michael Tonry has documented this dynamic in the War on
Drugs, which has caused the arrest rate to rise dramatically since
1980.12' He made the case that the Reagan and the Bush administra-
tions declared the war, even though the use of illegal drugs was stead-
ily declining.1 22 The war message filtered down to the "troops" in
local police departments that more drug arrests were needed. 12  The
combination of personnel incentives for police officers to log in more
arrests, 12 and social circumstances that made it easier for police to
torily completing a course of drug or alcohol treatment, to making monetary restitution to
a victim. See id.
118. See Daniel Pedersen, Go Get the Scumbags, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 20, 1997, at 32 (citing
evidence that aggressive police tactics in New Orleans by its city police chief may correlate
with significant reductions in incidences of armed robbery and homicide); David Whit-
man, On Not Believing the Good News, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 29, 1997, at 4446
(noting one reason that New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and Police Chief William Brat-
ton have been effective in cutting crime is that they have "started arresting people for
minor 'quality of life' offenses").
119. SeeJohn A. Martin & Michelle Travis, Defending the Indigent During A War on Crime, 1
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 69, 71-74 (1992) (noting that despite the claim of some public
officials that new policing methods are cutting crime rates, others believe that shifting
demographics are causing the drops in crime rates). Martin and Travis noted, for exam-
ple, that a decrease in the number of persons within the 16-25 age range, which is consid-
ered the most crime-prone age group, might impact the numbers of crimes committed. Id.
at 72.
120. See id. at 82-89 (arguing that the Supreme Court's decisions in the early 1990s
moved constitutional law "[t]oward the right" in part to help promote "tactics developed
and implemented in the nation's war on crime").
121. Michael Tonry, Race and the War on Drugs, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 25, 25. Tonry
noted that between 1980 and 1993, "American prison and jail populations tripled . . .
primarily due to increased numbers of drug convictions." Id. (citation omitted).
122. Id. at 28.
123. See id. at 26 (noting that in many cities, "[m]assive arrests and street sweep tactics"
were employed).
124. Although police departments deny the existence of quotas for numbers of arrests,
news accounts describe allegations that performance standards or psychological pressure
are used by the departments to maintain high arrest totals. See Robin Topping, Ruling:
Nassau Had Illegal DWI Quota, NEWSDAY, Feb. 27, 1997, at A27 (reporting that officers who
made drunk driving arrests were awarded overtime shifts); Troopers See Transfers As Reprisals,
THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 4, 1998, at 17A (reporting allegations by state troopers
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target low-income minority communities, caused the arrest rate to
burgeon.' 25 From the perspective of Tonry, and others, the legitimate
goals of the "war," including assisting minority communities in remov-
ing a scourge, came at the price of a disproportionate social and eco-
nomic negative impact on blacks. Between 1985 and 1989, the
number of arrests of blacks for drug violations almost doubled, from
210,298 to 452,574, while those of whites grew by only 27%.126
The combination of allowing police officers alone to determine if
the majority of cases merit arrest, having more "stream-lined" charg-
ing methods used by prosecutors, and having political messages that
"more arrests are good" have flooded the criminal justice system. 127
This "flood" probably is the primary cause of the phenomenon of so
many arrests not resulting in prosecution. 128
5. A Blind Eye to Negative Police Attitudes.-Justice McReynolds,
dissenting in Carroll v. United States,' 29 warned that warrantless arrests
by police officers posed "no limit to the power of a police officer. '1 30
The dangers of such broad discretion can exist simultaneously with
probable cause. Arrests on charges that will not be prosecuted are
one direct result of such discretion. A volume of cases that overwhelm
the capacity of the criminal justice system to prosecute them puts the
general public at risk.
Except among camps of criminology and sociology theorists, the
purposes of arrest often are unarticulated, the standards for the exer-
cise of the decision to arrest are virtually nonexistent, and the require-
ment of a nexus between millions of arrests and legitimate state
that "quantitative expectations" are de facto quotas); Thomas Ott, Police Say Mentor Still
Using Quotas, THE PLAIN DEALER (Ohio), Oct. 27,1998, at 1B (reporting that a police union
filed grievances protesting the use of quantitative performance standards).
125. See Tonry, supra note 121, at 52-55 (providing a number of reasons why it is easier
to make arrests in minority neighborhoods that are "socially disorganized" and asserting
that because it is easier, police officers are more likely to make arrests in minority neigh-
borhoods than in other neighborhoods because the number of arrests that a police officer
makes has "long been a conventional measure of productivity and effectiveness").
126. See id at 54-55.
127. See app. C, tbl.1 (comparing the annual number of arrests for less serious offenses
in the United States with the annual number of arrests for more serious offenses).
128. Cf Israel, supra note 5, at 772-77 (recognizing that criminal caseloads have grown,
but arguing that other cultural and attitudinal factors are responsible for the perceived
failure of the criminal justice system). But cf FEELEY, supra note 115, at 249-57 (arguing
that an increase in caseload does not result in fewer trials and motions, more plea bar-
gains, more lenient sentences, or more restrictive pretrial releasing policies).
129. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).




interests does not exist, whether they are public safety, maximization
of limited resources, or similar goals."' Limiting the constitutional
standard for arrests to probable cause turns a blind eye to recognized
and documented police attitudes when they do exist.
What might be termed "show arrests" occur either to maintain
respect for police, 132 or to give an impression of "full enforcement. '13 3
Even more problematic are decisions to arrest because police,
although able to articulate probable cause, use an arrest to serve other
law enforcement interests besides prosecuting the instant charge,
such as punishment of the arrestee, a kind of social reorganization
directed at "undesirables," or the desire to gather evidence of other
crimes through interrogation and search made pursuant to the cur-
rent arrest.
134
In Whren v. United States,1"5 the Supreme Court refused to con-
sider possible ulterior motives of police officers who have a lawful
ground-probable cause, to detain an individual or to make an
arrest. '6 That holding could be read to sanction use of the arrest
power, even if there is no intention or ability to prosecute the arrestee
for the offense charged. At the very least, that interpretation of Whren
keeps the floodgates of arrests open. At the worst, it fails to measure
Fourth Amendment compliance by one reality of police work.
131. The lack of articulated standards, goals, and accountability for arrests are not a new
phenomenon resulting, for example, just from the recent surge in drug-related offenses.
See LaFave, supra note 93, at 492-524 (identifying the lack of articulated standards, goals,
and accountability for arrests 15 years before the war on drugs); see also Frank J. Reming-
ton, LaFave On Arrest and The Three Decades That Have Followed, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 315, 315-
21 (arguing that LaFave's 1965 recommendation that police should recognize their broad
exercise of discretion, but that their discretion needs to be critically reevaluated continu-
ously, remained a valid recommendation in 1993).
132. Arrests to force "respect" for police are rife with subjective motivations. They may,
for example, enable a police officer to exact a measure of revenge, even when his own
manner, or lack of manners, has caused an encounter to escalate. Cf Lawrence Sherman,
"Policing for Crime Prevention," in U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Justice Programs,
Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's "Promising" (NCJ 165366, Feb. 1998) 8-1.
133. See LaFave, supra note 93, at 146-49 (identifying situations where police may arrest a
suspect to "maintain respect for the police" or to "avoid the impression of non-
enforcement").
134. See id. at 149-77 (providing hypothetical situations where police may arrest a sus-
pect to serve other law enforcement interests and describing situations and reasons why
police may arrest to control a prostitute or transvestite, or to sanction gambling and liquor
law violations).
135. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
136. Id. at 813. The Court dismissed the idea that a police officer's ulterior motive, such
as the desire to investigate an informant's tip that a suspect is carrying illegal drugs, may
invalidate the officer's actions that are otherwise legally justified. Id.
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In Whren, police observed a truck sitting at a stop sign for an "un-
usually long time," saw the truck make a turn without signaling, and
then speed off at "an unreasonable" speed. 37 When the officers ap-
proached the truck in response to the traffic violations, they observed
plastic bags of what appeared to be crack cocaine in Whren's
hands.13 Thus, Whren's arrest was based on a sighting of suspected
illegal drugs in plain view.
Whren's articulation of a pretext theory was that a reasonable of-
ficer would not have stopped the vehicle for the specified traffic of-
fenses. 139  He speculated that police could use routine traffic
violations to accomplish ulterior motives unrelated to the stated justi-
fication for a traffic stop. 140 The short answer to the claims in Whren
would have been that the petitioners made no showing whatsoever of
ill motive or of pretext in the case. The Court recognized that "l[t] he
foremost method of enforcing traffic and vehicle safety regulations...
is acting upon observed violations. "141
Instead of limiting the decision to the facts before it in Whren, the
Court can only be said to have reached to articulate a broader propo-
sition. The Court stated that "[s]ubjective intentions [of police of-
ficers] play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment
analysis."' 42 The one exception recognized by the Court is discrimina-
tion. 143 That broad declaration regarding possible motives of police
officers, without facts before it that might have illuminated or have
informed it, perpetuates the power of individual police officers to de-
termine the amount of protection available to individuals under the
Fourth Amendment. 14
4
137. Id. at 808.
138. See id. at 808-09.
139. See id. at 814.
140. See id. at 810.
141. Id. at 817 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 659 (1979)).
142. Id. at 813.
143. Id. (stating that "the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based
on considerations such as race").
144. The Court's treatment in Whren of prior motivation cases to draw that broad con-
clusion may have been too glib. The Whren opinion asserts that the Court has questioned
police motive only in cases where probable cause was not established, such as inventory
and administrative searches. Id. at 811. However, the opinion obfuscates the probable
cause and police motive issues that existed in the cited cases.
First, Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987), holds that "[tihe policies behind the
warrant requirement [and the related concept of probable cause,] are not implicated.in an
inventory search," id. at 37 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 371 (1976)),
because probable cause is the antecedent to inventory searches. As the Court pointed out
in Whren, inventory searches occur after police have arrested a driver and seized his vehi-
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Even the allowance in Whren that an underlying motive of racial
discrimination would be sufficient to look past probable cause is
hollow.' 45 Challenges to arrests and to prosecutions on the grounds
of racial bias are judged by a standard that renders the current racial
disparities in the criminal justice system unassailable.
As Michael Tonry pointed out, disparate impact is sufficient to
make a prima facie case of racial or of other discrimination in employ-
ment, for example.'46 The de facto discrimination analysis, however,
does not apply to contexts such as the arrest rate. 1 47 Despite recogni-
cle. Id. at 811 n.1. The searches are preceded by the probable cause that justified the
arrest of the drivers, necessitating that the vehicle be impounded by police. The inventory
search does not require an independent basis for probable cause.
Second, the power to regulate certain industries supersedes the traditional probable
cause requirements. The Whren Court recognized that "[a]n administrative inspection is
the inspection of business premises conducted by authorities responsible for enforcing a
pervasive regulatory scheme-for example, unannounced inspection of a mine for compli-
ance with health and safety standards." Id. at 811 n.2 (citing Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S.
594, 599-603 (1981)). In New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), cited in Wren, the Court
stated that, because a closely regulated industry "has a reduced expectation of privacy, the
warrant and probable cause requirements.., have lessened application [in administrative
inspections]." Id. at 702 (citations omitted). Thus, neither Bertine nor Burger turn on
whether probable cause existed. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 811 (stating that in both Bertine and
Burger, the Court was "addressing the validity of a search conducted in the absence of prob-
able cause").
The Whren opinion also asserts that the lack of probable cause in inventory and in
administrative searches made it incumbent upon the courts to be sure that the government
actors had no underlying impermissible motives. Whren, 517 U.S. at 811. However, neither
Burger nor Bertine link probable cause with police motive. In each of those cases, when
presented with claims of ulterior motive, the Court simply answered the question of
whether impermissible motivation existed, and concluded that it did not exist in either
case. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 716 n.27; Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372. The Court did not state that
the type of search-inventory or administrative-determined whether the motives of gov-
ernment officials were reviewable.
The petitioner in Bertine made "no showing" of bad faith. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 367. The
respondent in Burger attacked the constitutionality of the state statute that authorized the
administrative search that turned up stolen items. Burger, 482 U.S. at 694. The Burger
Court held that the state statute revealed an appropriate regulatory purpose and was not a
pretext to search for evidence of crimes. Id. at 715. The Court also held that the fact that
an administrative search turns up evidence of criminal law violations does not invalidate
the search, as long as the driving force for the search was the administrative enforcement
scheme. Id. at 716. This authority does not support the proposition that the issue of im-
proper motive is foreclosed from Fourth Amendment analysis as long as probable cause
exists.
145. See supra note 142.
146. Tonry, supra note 121, at 73 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971)).
147. To prove a claim of selective prosecution based on race, a claimant must prove the
existence of discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent. See United States v. Arm-
strong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)). By
contrast, the Court recognizes that the disparate impact of employment practices may con-
stitute employment discrimination. The Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
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tion in Whren that racial discrimination in arrests would present an
appropriate constitutional issue, the decision did not alter existing
precedent regarding application of a disparate impact analysis. Thus,
Whren does not offer any way to examine the possibility of underlying
racial animus in arrests. That cause appears foreclosed, even though




If the annual number of arrests in the United States is an accu-
rate measure of the criminal justice system's ability to prevent and to
mete out appropriate sanctions for crime, then the war against crime
has already been won.1 49 The actual numbers probably far exceed the
public's general knowledge. The numbers also test Charles Silber-
1964 covers "not only overt discrimination but also [employment] practices that are fair in
form but discriminatory in operation." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971). The Court routinely scrutinizes statistics regarding employment practices to deter-
mine whether disparate impact exists. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989), the Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals, ruling that plaintiffs' statis-
tical evidence established a prima facie case of discrimination, but reaffirmed that "statisti-
cal proof alone can make out a prima facie case" of employment discrimination. Id. at 650.
Once the plaintiff presents a prima facie case of employment discrimination, the bur-
den shifts to the employer to articulate nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged em-
ployment decision. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The
plaintiff is subsequently given the opportunity to demonstrate that the articulated reasons
are mere pretext. See id. An employer's failure to proffer a nondiscriminatory justification
does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to judgment; however, a fact-finder may infer
that the silence hides discriminatory intent. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502 (1993).
By contrast, in criminal prosecutions, no such evidentiary shifting is available to prove
discrimination. A claimant must demonstrate not just that a significant number of mem-
bers of a racial group were prosecuted, but must also introduce evidence showing that
comparable numbers of individuals of another racial group committed the same offense
but were not prosecuted. See id. In Armstrong, the Court found that the claimant's evi-
dence regarding 24 defendants was insufficient. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 458, 470. It also
held that a claimant is not even entitled to discovery regarding prosecutions unless he
produces "credible evidence" that similarly situated defendants of other races could have
been prosecuted but were not. Id. at 470.
In McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298-99 (1987), the Court rejected a discrimination
challenge to the death penalty, despite substantial evidence of its disproportionate applica-
tion to blacks. The Court held that proof of Georgia's application of the death penalty
more often against blacks than whites amounted only to a "discrepancy that appear[ed] to
correlate with race," and did not prove an intent to discriminate. Id. at 312.
148. See Tonry, supra note 121, at 54 ("the police chief in Charlottesville, Virginia, ..
observed that anti-drug efforts were 'directed mainly at minorities living in poor inner-city
neighborhoods'" (quoting B. Drummond Ayers, Drug Charges Embarrass University of Vir-
ginia, N.Y. TIMES 1-26 (Mar. 24, 1991)).
149. See id. at 56 tbl.1 (indicating that between 1985 and 1989 the total number of ar-
rests annually increased dramatically from 700,009 to 1,074,345).
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man's first hypothesis that most of what is believed about the criminal
justice system is false.' 5 ° Despite public and official focus on serious
crimes,15' most arrests are for low-level crimes.' 52 Increases in arrests
for the period studied, with the exception of drug cases, have been for
nonserious crimes.
1 5 3
Estimated total numbers of arrests by state and by local law en-
forcement agencies are reported annually by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) through its Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) pro-
gram. The UCR gathers data from local law enforcement agencies
nationwide and some centralized state reporting systems. The data is
published in the FBI's annual reports, Crime In the United States: Uni-
form Crime Reports.
The FBI reports the UCR arrest data in two crime categories:
Part I and Part II offenses.' 54 The Part I offenses are used by the FBI
to create a "crime index" to measure "fluctuations in the overall vol-
ume and rate of crime."155 The offenses included in the "index" and
"nonindex" categories, respectively, are listed in Appendix B.
The index offenses correspond to felony offenses in numerous
state penal codes,5 6 and nonindex offenses correspond to state mis-
demeanor offenses."5 7 The FBI, however, does not distinguish be-
tween felonies and misdemeanors in the UCR because punishments,
150. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
151. For example, John Donahue based a study on trends in crime using homicide data
as a proxy and explaining that homicide is the one crime "for which a reliable long-term
time series can be created." John J. Donahue, Understanding the Time Path of Crime, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1423, 1425 (1998). He noted that he was attempting "to sort out
the long-term trends in crime over the last fifty years from the short-term fluctuations" and
that it was difficult "to provide a comprehensive and accurate assessment of the long-run
patterns of all aspects of crime" because of the inferior "quality of the data published by
the FBI over the last half century." Id. The fact that the data set for homicides is more
complete than for any other crime is evidence of the public and the official focus on seri-
ous crime.
152. See FEDERAL BuREAu OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 1995: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1995, at 208 tbl.29 (1996) [hereinafter 1995 UCRI
(indicating that of the 15.1 million arrests in 1995, less than 3 million were for crime index
offenses, which are generally considered to be the more serious offenses).
153. See AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, THE STATE OF CRIMINALJUSTICE 9 (1997).
154. See FEDERAL BuREAu OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME RE-
PORTING HANDBOOK 5 (1980) [hereinafter UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK].
155. 1995 UCR, supra note 152, at 5.
156. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 140.20 (McKinney 1998) (stating that third-degree bur-
glary is a class D felony); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(d) (West 1994) (stating that bur-
glary is a first-degree felony where any party to the offense enters a habitation, and the
entry was made with the intent to commit a felony other than felony theft).
157. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 155.25 (McKinney 1998) (stating that petit larceny is a
class A misdemeanor); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(e) (stating that, with certain excep-
tions, theft of property with a value of less than $1500 is a misdemeanor).
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which may control felony-misdemeanor classifications, vary among
state laws.15 This method of reporting in the largest criminal statisti-
cal database contributes to the difficulty of correlating the statistics
reported nationally with the extent or impact of crime throughout the
United States. The state law categorizations of offenses as either mis-
demeanors or as felonies are indications of perceptions in communi-
ties about the gravity of or threat posed by specific offenses. The FBI's
index system ignores those distinctions. Thus, the UCR treats thefts,
no matter what the value of the stolen property, on par with thefts of a
far greater value. Additionally, thefts are given the same treatment as
robbery, even though robbery is a crime of violence, or is the threat of
violence.' 5 9
Total arrests reported in the UCR program for the years 1990-
1994 nationwide are in Appendix C, Table 1.
In the UCR program, an "arrest" is defined as "each time a per-
son is taken into custody, notified or cited for criminal infractions
other than traffic violations." 160 The number of arrests are counted
rather than the number of individuals arrested, because a person may
be arrested more than once during a reporting period.161 Somejuris-
dictions do not have data available for each reporting period, and
some do not report data covering an entire calendar year; therefore,
the "total" arrest figures are estimated. 62 The quoted arrest figures
may also include rounding off.'
63
State laws authorize police officers to exercise discretion between
making a full-custody arrest and issuing a notice or citation, some-
times also called a summons.' 6 4 Typically, these are forms (resem-
158. 1995 UCR, supra note 152, at 1.
159. For example, Maryland defines robbery as the "felonious taking and carrying away
of the personal property of another, from his person or in his presence, by violence, or by
putting him in fear." Danby v. State, 239 A.2d 584, 588 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968). Mary-
land defines larceny as the "felonious taking and carrying away of the personal property of
another with intent to deprive the owner of his property permanently." Fletcher v. State,
189 A.2d 641, 643 (Md. 1963). Therefore, in Maryland, robbery requires violence or a fear
of violence while larceny does not.
160. 1995 UCR, supra note 152, at 207.
161. See id.
162. See id. (explaining that for the 1995 reporting period, reporting problems at the
state level caused Delaware and Pennsylvania to provide partial data, and caused New
Hampshire to provide no data). The arrest figures in the UCR consist of statistics provided
by individual law enforcement agencies, and estimates for jurisdictions or agencies that did
not report to the UCR in a particular year, or part of a year. See 1990 UCR, at 176, tbl.26,
explanatory note 1.
163. See 1995 UCR, supra note 152, at 208 tbl.29 n.2.
164. See generally N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 130.10 (McKinney 1992) (stating that sum-
monses are available for use in lieu of an arrest warrant); Albrecht v. United States, 273
20001
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
bling traffic tickets) issued by police officers at the scene and that
identify the defendant, specify the offense and date, and inform the
defendant that he is required either to appear in court on a particular
date, or to contact a court administrative office so that a date and time
for his initial appearance can be set.
Arrest data reported through the UCR or through individual
jurisdictions does not specify the percentage of arrests that fall into
this latter category. Some percentage of the notice, citation, and sum-
mons "arrests," however, will subsequently result in full custodial
arrest. Bench warrants are issued for arrest when a defendant does
not appear at court at the time and on the date specified in a sum-
mons or in a notice issued pursuant to a summons. 165 In 1992, the
failure-to-appear rate for felony defendants in the seventy-five largest
counties in the United States was estimated to be twenty-five per-
cent;166 the percentage of "no shows" in summons cases might well be
higher, given the less serious nature of offenses prosecuted by sum-
monses-instilling defendants with less fear of consequences if they
fail to appear-and the irregular and poor quality of life exhibited
through some misdemeanor and petty offenses-loitering and
trespassing. 167
As shown in Appendix C, Table 1, the vast majority of arrests are
made for nonindex-less serious-offenses.' 68 Given the numbers of
arrests and the dearth of police resources for follow-up investigations,
it is almost a foregone conclusion that a nonindex arrest lacking an
U.S. 1, 8 (1927) (recognizing that "a defendant may be brought before the court by a
summons, without an arrest").
165. Cf N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 130.10 (McKinney 1998) (granting the court authority
to issue a warrant for arrest if the defendant does not appear).
166. Cf 1994 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 84, at 495 tbl.5.62 (detailing the "[r]eleased fel-
ony defendants who failed to make a scheduled court appearance in the 75 largest coun-
ties"). BJS has published its Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics annually since 1972. Id. at
iii. The Sourcebook separates the arrest data from the UCR program, in part, by
demographics of arrestees and victims, by budgetary and staffing information about law
enforcement agencies nationwide, by the incidence of drug use in the commission of of-
fenses, by the average time between arrest and case conclusion, and by discrete informa-
tion about corrections populations. See id.; see also David W. Neubauer, Criminology:
Improving the Analysis and Presentation of Data on Case Processing Time, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 1589, 1597 (1983) (stating that issuances of bench warrants range from 5% of
cases in one city to 21% in another).
167. SeeJEROME MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY. AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 10-12 (1996) (documenting 175 arrest warrants for minor crimes out-
standing on a single day in Duval County, Florida, during a monitoring project conducted
between 1989 and 1994; the offenses included "[d]og running loose without leash";
"[h]arvest of redfish in closed season (oversize redfish)"; and "[o]perating a wrecker with-
out registering with sheriff").
168. See infra app. C, tbl.1.
[VOL. 59:1
ARRESTS WITHOUT PROSECUTION
evidentiary component at the time of arrest-the identity of witnesses
or witness interviews-will not be prosecuted. Thus, the law enforce-
ment rationale for making arrests on the basis of minimal evidence
cannot be validated. 1
6 9
From the volume of arrests for less serious offenses, little arithme-
tic is necessary to determine their toll on every phase of the criminal
justice system-police, prosecutors, courts, and jails-and the conse-
quential drain on resources from most index crimes-serious of-
fenses. The hours spent by police officers conducting the booking
process for each arrest, and perhaps waiting at court before a decision
is made to dismiss a case, also have severe consequences for public
safety. In some jurisdictions, the arresting officer-and his partner-
may have to transport the prisoner. 7 ° In jurisdictions that provide
prisoner transport by special police units, it stands to reason that an
arresting officer would have to make a radio request for transport and
then would have to wait at the arrest scene until another police unit is
available to transport the prisoner to jail. In either instance, one or
more police officers are "out of commission" for the time taken to
wait for transport or to drive to the jail, and to complete paperwork
about the underlying incident and the arrest. The number of hours
spent in processing the large volume of arrests means fewer hours
available for investigation and on-the-street presence by police to de-
ter crime.171 It is as though the entire system is geared toward ex-
169. The high dismissal rates also disclose another prosecution anomaly. Given the
number of state laws that authorize warrantless arrests, if offenses are committed in the
presence of police officers, one might assume that proving such cases would be relatively
straight-forward; police officers, far more than members of the public, are, in essence,
.captive" government witnesses. Therefore, for example, it would be logical to expect
higher conviction rates in drug possession cases. Conviction statistics, however, do not
correlate with such logic. See infra app. C, tbl.2 (presenting the number of arrests and
convictions in 1990 for several categories of offenses, including drug offenses).
170. In Maryland, for example, a state officer is required to wait for another officer
when more than one suspect is to be transported. See Maryland State Police, Patrol Manual
ch. 28, § III, Sub. 4-3 (2 ed. June 30, 1993) (on file with author).
171. Some scholars question whether police are generally capable of improving convic-
tion rates by more investigation. See WEINREB, supra note 103, at 48-49 (arguing that "in the
vast majority of cases, all the information on which proof of guilt and a conviction ulti-
mately depend is contained or indicated either in the police report or documents like
witnesses' statements" and that whatever gaps remain, they "are not likely to depend on
unknown information which further inquiry [would] reveal"). If that conclusion is valid, it
bears out the assumption of this article that the state does not have the ability to prosecute
perhaps as many as half of the individuals arrested.
Even advocates for more effective prosecution of domestic violence cases acknowledge
that domestic violence mandatory-arrest laws contribute to crowded dockets without yield-
ing convincing proof that the arrests achieve the desired result of lower recidivism. See
2000]
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pending as much time as possible on the least likely outcome:
prosecution.
E. Prosecution Statistics
Quantifying the arrest/prosecution ratio remains elusive. De-
spite hundreds of pages published annually by the FBI and the Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics (BJS), those agencies do not report complete
statistics for criminal case outcomes in state courts. Statistics are
equally as hard to come by from the individual prosecuting authorities
(usually counties) themselves. Therefore, in the absence of precision,
this Article offers "snapshots" of data for the years 1990 through 1994
to show the relationship of arrests to prosecution.' 72 The snapshots
confirm that there is not a high correlation between arrests and the
perceived end of criminal justice, prosecution. On that basis alone,
the reasonableness of thousands of arrests, when measured against
the Fourth Amendment, is in doubt.173
Pamela Blass Bracher, Comment, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence: The City of Cincin-
nati's Simple Solution to a Complex Problem, 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 155, 181-82 (1996).
172. None of the data gathered is case-specific, and it is not possible to follow an individ-
ual arrestee as his case proceeds from arrest to disposition, whether by dismissal, by verdict,
or by guilty plea. Thus, the annual prosecution statistics may include cases that were be-
gun by arrest in prior years. The snapshot approach is still useful because of the five-year
period covered; the jurisdictions report an average and a median time of less than a year
from arrest to disposition by conviction. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATisrIcs-1995, at 509 tbl.5.62 (Kathleen
Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1996) [hereinafter 1995 SOURCEBOOK] (calculating the
"[a]verage and median number of days between arrest and conviction for felony cases
disposed by state courts").
173. In 1998, Harvard Law Review published an overview of trends in incarceration and
in victimization. See Note, Developments In the Law: Changes In Prison and Crime Demographics,
111 HARV. L. REv. 1875 (1998). Among its conclusions were that, "[criminal law] enforce-
ment has improved," and "a person is far more likely to be convicted today than he or she
was a decade ago." Id. at 1880. The first assertion used arrest rate data in a vacuum. The
second is incorrect if arrests for a broad category of offenses are considered.
First, as proof of improvements in enforcement, the article asserts that the arrest rate
for violent crimes rose almost 50% over the relevant decade, and that that figure outstrip-
ped growth of the crime rate. Id. at 1878-79. The violent crime arrest rate versus the
violent crime rate would be a more relevant comparison to demonstrate the net effective-
ness of law enforcement efforts against violent crime. Second, for the reasons discussed in
this article, an increase in the violent crime arrest rate alone does not prove the quality of
enforcement; statistics used in this Article demonstrate that high dismissal rates continued
throughout the past decade.
Third, the Note contends that the probability of a state law arrest resulting in a convic-
tion rose between 20% and 40% between 1984 and 1988, citing the following: murder
(17% conviction increase), robbery (7% conviction increase), aggravated assault (4% con-
viction increase), and drug trafficking (13% conviction increase). Id. at 1880, 1880 n.22.
Those offenses are all "index" offenses. See app. B. As demonstrated in the arrest statistics
published by the FBI, those crimes constitute fewer than three million of the more than 14
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To test out the conclusion that most arrests do not result in pros-
ecution, statistics maintained by law enforcement agencies in some of
the largest jurisdictions in the United States were requested.1 74 The
most complete data was provided by the City of Los Angeles (Califor-
nia); Riverside County (California); and Kings County (New York).
The information is documented in Appendix C, Tables 5, 6, and 10-
12. The information captured by the statistics, however, is not uni-
form from one jurisdiction to another, so each "snapshot" does not
contain identical information. This lack of uniformity is due, in part,
to the large number of law enforcement agencies in each state;1 75 the
fact that several separate agencies, such as police, sheriffs, prosecu-
tors, and the courts, may each maintain discrete databases in larger
jurisdictions;1 76 and to the variation among jurisdictions of types of
criminal courts, perhaps making it difficult to capture information at
each stage of the process. i 7
To overcome some of those inconsistencies, the Article focuses
on several large jurisdictions reporting at least two junctures or deci-
sion points in the life of a criminal case: (1) arrest and/or charging,
for the number of cases entering the system each year; and (2) spe-
cific disposition statistics, where available, such as estimates about
court dismissals and acquittals and data about the number of convic-
million arrests made in each of the years considered in this Article. See app. C, tbl.1, In
addition, data published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics indicates that, in the years it
surveyed, 1990, 1992, and 1994, convictions occurred in fewer than half of all index offense
arrests. See app. C, tbl.2.
174. The populations of counties throughout the United States, based both on the 1990
Decentennial Census and on estimates as of July 1, 1996, are contained in BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, U.S. POPULATION-BY STATES AND COUNTIES; LAND AR-
EAS 420-38 (1996).
175. See BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. LAW
ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS, 1997, at 1 (1999) (stating that
"[a]s ofJune 1997, there were more than 700 general purpose state and local law enforce-
ment agencies with 100 or more full-time sworn personnel that included 50 or more uni-
formed officers responding to calls for service").
176. The Author has notes and records of responses for data during research for this
Article. Dade County, Florida, provided arrest statistics for the county, but did not include
Miami, the most populous area within the county. Middlesex County, Massachusetts, re-
ported arrest statistics but no information on charging, convictions or on other disposi-
tions. A request for data to Cook County, Illinois, yielded arrest data by offense from the
Chicago Police Department, but no prosecution information. The administrative office of
the Arizona Supreme Court provided data for Maricopa County by type of case (criminal,
civil, or juvenile); the criminal cases were listed by the number of cases filed, disposed of,
and pending, but with no definition of disposition. Kings County, Washington, did not
respond.
177. The court systems may be either unitary (one court of general jurisdiction) or non-
unitary (a limited jurisdiction court that handles the early stages of a criminal case, and a
court of general jurisdiction for trials of criminal cases).
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tions and guilty pleas. Often, the only information regarding disposi-
tions is the number of convictions or percentages of cases resulting in
convictions. That factor requires another level of extrapolation.
First, I have assumed that the number of cases actually prose-
cuted will consist of the number of convictions and guilty pleas plus
the number of acquittals plus the number of cases dismissed at the
trial stage. Each category represents the state's effort to prove charges
against arrestees. Second, where jurisdictions do not report acquittals
or court dismissals, I assume that the statistics provided by the federal
government about the incidence of those outcomes hold true for
most jurisdictions.'78 Finally, cases that do not result in a guilty plea,
trial, acquittal, or court dismissal are "not prosecuted" within the
meaning of this Article.
1. Felonies. -Tables 2, 3, and 4, Appendix C show estimated data
from the FBI and the BJS for the numbers of felony convictions in all
state courts for 1990, 1992, and 1994, respectively.
According to these numbers, in 1990, felony convictions consti-
tuted only 28% of the number of index arrests nationwide, and 6% of
all arrests.' 79 For 1992, felony convictions equalled 31% of the index
arrests, and also 6% of the total of all arrests.'80 For 1994, felony con-
victions constituted 30% of index arrests, and 6% of all arrests. 18 1
Using statistics from the seventy-five largest counties nationwide,
BJS reported that 31% of felony cases adjudicated in 1990 resulted in
court dismissals or in acquittals.18 2 For 1992, the combined "not con-
victed" category was estimated to be 27%.183 The percentage of adju-
178. See BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATITIcs-1991, at 547 tbl.5.55 (TimothyJ. Flanagan & Kathleen Maguire eds.,
1992) [hereinafter 1991 SOURCEBOOK] (reporting the following categories and ranges for
nonconviction in 1988 for 14 states: dismissal (13-32%), acquittal (1-5%), and other non-
conviction (1-9%), and reporting conviction rates in that survey between 62% and 81%,
which is consistent with the sum of nonconviction figures).
179. See app. C, tbl.2. The percentage of convictions per index arrests is approximately
28% (829,344/2,923,300). The percentage of convictions per total arrests is approximately
6% (829,344/14,295,100).
180. See app. C, tbl.3. The percentage of convictions per index arrests is approximately
31% (893,630/2,888,200). The percentage of convictions per total arrests is 6% (893,630/
14,295,100).
181. See app. C, tbl.4. The percentage of convictions per index arrests is approximately
30% (872,217/2,910,400). The percentage of convictions per total arrests is approximately
6% (872,217/14,648,700).
182. BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE
URBAN COUNTIES, 1990, at 13 tbl.15.
183. BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE
URBAN COUNTIES, 1992, at 26 tbl.21.
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dicated cases not resulting in conviction remained near 25% in 1994
as well.' 84
The percentages given for acquittals and for court dismissals are
fractions of the total number of cases prosecuted. It is highly improb-
able that the number of cases resulting in acquittals or in court dismis-
sals was larger than the number resulting in convictions. Even if cases
resulting in acquittals and in court dismissals are factored in to deter-
mine the number of felony cases prosecuted in 1990, 1992, and 1994,
respectively, the data still represents that the number of felony cases
prosecuted did not amount to a majority of felony arrests. 85
Data maintained by individual jurisdictions may give a fuller pic-
ture of case outcomes. Yet, case outcomes are not included in the
FBI's Uniform Crime Reports, so researchers are left to "sample" data
from individual jurisdictions.
For Kings County, New York, the data on Table 5, Appendix C
shows that, on average, only 33% of felony arrests during the five-year
period resulted in felony prosecutions.18 6 Even assuming that some of
the felony arrests resulted in cases filed as misdemeanors, it is prob-
able that more than half of the felony arrests still were not even
charged. In addition, even if the likely ranges of acquittals and of
court dismissals are factored in with the number of convictions as has
been discussed-acquittals constituting 1% to 5% of the cases and of
the dismissals 13% to 32% of the cases prosecuted,187 it is still unlikely
that the total percentage of Kings County cases ending in prosecution
amounted to even 50% of the number of arrests each year.
As shown in Table 6, Appendix C, Riverside County, California,
reports that approximately 50% of felonies requested were actually
filed for each of the five years.' 88 California's arrest laws, similar to
184. See BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. FEL-
ONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 1994, at 3 (1998).
185. For example, in 1992, if the number of convictions (893,630) represented 63% of
felony cases adjudicated, then the total number prosecuted was 1,418,460. The FBI re-
ported 2,888,200 arrests in 1992. Thus the rate of prosecution is 1,418,460/2,888,200 or
49%.
186. See app. C, tbl.5. The annual rate of felony prosecutions per felony arrest for Kings
County, New York is as follows: 1990 = 31.1% (13,332/42,929), 1991 = 36.8% (15,075/
41,006), 1992 = 38.5% (13,901/36,123), 1993 = 34.7% (12,171/35,113), and 1994 = 26.1%
(10,416/39,879). See id.
187. See supra note 178 (discussing the ranges for nonconviction in 1988 among 14
states).
188. Riverside County does not define "requested." I have assumed, however, that it
refers to "requests" by police or by members of the public that criminal charges be filed.
See app. C, tbl.6.
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those of other states, authorize arrests without warrant for felonies.'8 9
Thus, it can be assumed that most case filings would occur after arrest
either by issuance of an information by the prosecutor or by grand
jury indictment.' However, the number of convictions was only one
fourth of the number of cases requested."'9 Like Kings County, New
York,' 9 2 even if acquittals and court dismissals are added to the
number of convictions, the data suggests that the number of prosecu-
tions did not equal half of the number of felony arrests in Riverside
County.
193
A study published in 1970 documented similar gaps and dispari-
ties between the number of felony arrests and the number of convic-
tion rates in six large jurisdictions.1 94 An examination of felony case
dispositions from January to June 1977 also yielded similar results.' 9 5
2. Misdemeanors.-Data on the disposition of misdemeanor
cases, presumably constituting the majority, if not all, of the nonindex
offenses, are not included in the FBI's annual Crime In the United States
or BJS's Sourcebook. BJS has, however, published ranges of conviction
rates for misdemeanor cases from 1991 through 1994, although the
reporting method is not uniform throughout the time period.'9 6
That data appears in Table 9, Appendix C.
Misdemeanor case data reported by several large jurisdictions
themselves produced lower conviction rates than those reported from
189. See app. A.
190. See supra text accompanying note 100 (discussing this Article's assumption that "fel-
ony requests" or requests for criminal charges largely occur after individuals have already
been arrested).
191. See app. C, tbl.6.
192. See app. C, tbl.5.
193. See app. C, tbl.6 (demonstrating in Riverside County that on average 21,454 felony
requests were made and 9355 felonies were filed between 1990 and 1992).
194. See Donald M. McIntyre & David Lippman, Prosecutors and Early Disposition of Felony
Cases, 56 A.B.A. J. 1115, 1154, 1156 (1970); app. C, tbl.7 (1970 Felony Case Disposition
Data).
195. See KATHLEEN B. BROSI, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, A CROSS-CITY COMPARISON OF FELONY
CASE PROCESSING 7 (1979); app. C, tbl.8 (Felony Case Disposition from ArrestJanuary-June
1977).
196. For example, the BJS's Prosecutors in State Courts, 1992, reports that the range of
misdemeanor convictions in 1991-1992 varies between 78% and 94%, depending on the
size of the prosecutor's office. PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 1992, supra note 105, at 3
tbl.3. The BJS's Prosecutors in State Courts, 1996, reports that the range of misdemeanor
convictions, as it relates to the number of people served by an office, is between 77% for
offices that serve a million or more people and 90% for offices that serve under 250,000
people. BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, BULLETIN, PROSECUTORS IN
STATE COURTS, 1996, at 8 (1998) [hereinafter PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 1996]; see
app. C, tbl.9 (BJS Misdemeanor Conviction Rates).
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the BJS/Census Bureau surveys of prosecutors.' 9 7 One possible rea-
son for this discrepancy is that the BJS's conviction rate may represent
the percentages of convictions in cases that were actually prosecuted,
rather than the percentages of convictions for all cases in which an
arrest occurred.'98 Data reported directly by jurisdictions makes that
assumption likely.' 99
The misdemeanor conviction data for the City of Los Angeles,
Kings County, New York, and Riverside County, California, appears in
Tables 10, 11, and 12, Appendix C, respectively. The data indicates
that only Los Angeles obtained convictions in (and, therefore, neces-
sarily prosecuted) more than 50% of the number of misdemeanor
cases in the period between 1990-1995.2oo Riverside and Kings Coun-
ties' respective misdemeanor conviction rates bear out the contention
that misdemeanor prosecutions equal fewer than 50% of the number
of arrests for misdemeanors in large jurisdictions.2 °1
F. Measuring The Intention Or Ability To Prosecute
A few factors are generally cited for the failure to prosecute crimi-
nal cases. The factors most commonly articulated give the impression
that dismissals occur because of circumstances beyond the presumed
control of state law enforcement, of prosecutors, and of courts.
Among the most commonly cited factors are victim and/or witness
reluctance, unavailability of prosecution or defense witnesses, and
197. Compare data in app. C, tbls.9, 10, 11, & 12 (reporting misdemeanor convictions on
national scale and at a county level).
198. See generally FZELEV ET AL., supra note 115, at 21 (discussing the differing results for
rates of conviction when viewed from various "starting points").
199. See app. C, thls.10, 11, & 12 (demonstrating the higher reported rates of conviction
at the county level).
200. The conviction rate for misdemeanor crimes in Los Angeles from 1990-1994 is as
follows: 1990: (136,976 / 219,541) = 62.4%, 1991: (125,671/197, 575) = 63.6%, 1992:
(112,325/176,710) = 63.6%, 1993: (113,226/161,238) = 70.2%, and 1994: (122,653/
161,750) = 75.8%. The average conviction rate for misdemeanors from 1990-1994 was
67.1%. See app. C, tls.10, 11, & 12.
201. Common sense suggests that jurisdictions would make far more arrests for misde-
meanors than for felony offenses, and studies indicate that the largest increases in arrests
over the last decade have been for less serious offenses. See MILLER, supra note 167, at 11-22
(documenting prevalence of arrests for consensual and nonindex offenses). For the years
examined in this Article, the FBI reports almost a five-to-one ratio between nonindex (i.e.,
less serious) offenses and index offenses. See app. C, tbls.1, 2, 3, and 4. The FBI figures
may mean that the misdemeanor/felony difference is even greater than 5:1. As discussed
supra, the index categories include some offenses, such as some forms of burglary, that are
classified as misdemeanors under state law. Inclusion of the numbers of those offenses
would swell the misdemeanor figures. However, statistics from the jurisdictions discussed
in this Article do not approach the 5:1 misdemeanor/felony ratio; Kings County, New
York, for example, reports fewer misdemeanor than felony arrests for the period examined.
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writs of extradition filed by other states.2 °2 State prosecutors also re-
port dismissals by courts due, in part, to "search or seizure problems,"
and legal issues relating to self-incrimination, speedy trial time restric-
tions, and the right to counsel.203
According to statistics reported by the federal government, how-
ever, dismissals during prosecution (as by the court, on the grounds of
one or more of the legal issues cited above) account for approxi-
mately only 27% to 31% of the felonies that actually proceed to prose-
20cution. 04 Thus, the majority of cases are dismissed by prosecutors at
various decision points after arrest but before reaching the trial stage.
The dismissal rates persist even though guilty pleas account for the
vast majority of convictions.2 5 The guilty plea rate suggests that the
conviction rate would be higher if more cases were prosecuted. A low
prosecution rate compared to arrests, therefore, must be caused by
numerous factors or a combination of factors that are dependent on
police and on prosecutors.
Those factors might be: (1) the absence of sufficient evidence for
prosecution, despite probable cause for an arrest; (2) erroneous inter-
pretations of the requisite elements of criminal offenses by police of-
ficers when making arrests; (3) a prosecutor's determination that
requisite evidence was obtained unlawfully; (4) cases that may not
merit prosecution under prevailing community standards; and/or (5)
the inability to review, to develop, or to prepare potentially meritori-
ous criminal cases because of the volume of cases entering the system
by arrest.20 6 Even without exact data regarding outcomes at particular
202. See PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 1992, supra note 105, at 6 & tbl.9. Sixty-nine
percent of prosecutors reported that they had "declined, diverted, or deferred" cases be-
cause of victim reluctance and 37% because of witness reluctance; 49% of prosecutor's
offices reported court dismissals due to unavailability of prosecution witnesses, and 32% of
offices contended with writs of extradition by other states. Id.
203. Id at 6.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 182-184 (discussing the data which provides that
of the cases adjudicated between 1990 and 1994, between 27% to 31% were dismissed by
the court).
205. See PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 1996, supra note 196, at 5 tbl.6 (reporting the
mean of felony conviction rate of prosecutors' offices for the years 1992 (83%), 1994
(86%), and 1996 (86%)).
206. See supra text accompanying notes 127-128 (concluding that the "flood" of arrests
in recent years has resulted in a decrease in the rate of prosecutions). But see FEELEY, supra
note 115, at 244-77 (concluding that data in his study does not support the claim that there
is a relationship between heavy caseloads and lack of trials, and asserting that even without
a trial, the typical adversarial relationship can exist outside of the courtroom, including
plea bargain negotiations and formal motions by the defense and prosecution); Israel,
supra note 5, at 766-74 (challenging the "conventional wisdom" that attributes the
problems of our judicial system to excessive caseloads and arguing the need for reevalua-
tion of the goals of the criminal justice system to facilitate better resource allocation).
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stages of criminal cases, there is even less data available to confirm
assertions that a majority of the "failed prosecutions" occur despite
the best efforts of police and prosecutors. The persistent failure to
prosecute across a number of large jurisdictions over a twenty-year pe-
riod, coupled with law-and-order rhetoric throughout the period
blessing the work of police and of prosecutors, lends great weight to
the conclusion that low prosecution rates have become part of a crimi-
nal justice "culture" in many of the largest jurisdictions, where better
outcomes are not expected.2 °7 Even if a jurisdiction does not require
greater accountability in the use of its resources, each jurisdiction
nonetheless is required to demonstrate the reasonableness of so many
arrests. 2
08
1. Case Preparation By Prosecutors. -It is possible to judge a prose-
cutor's intentions about a case, or an entire system of cases, by steps
taken at each stage of a criminal case. The steps, and the importance
attached to each of them, are not secrets or shifting sands for prosecu-
tors or for defense attorneys. The rules of criminal procedure
promulgated or enacted by each state are the road maps. A prosecu-
tor can help ensure or virtually prevent prosecution by her role at
each juncture.
First, because most cases come to prosecutors after arrest,209 pros-
ecutors have the opportunity to scrutinize police reports for suffi-
ciency of the evidence.2"' "Barebones" police reports immediately
should flag the need for follow-up interviews or for further investiga-
tion. At that first juncture, prosecutors have access to the criminal
history and to the social services information about defendants. 211
207. See supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text (establishing the attrition rates of
criminal cases in five jurisdictions in 1977); see also BRosI, supra note 195, at 10, 16-19
(arguing, in her 1979 study, that many cases are dropped for reasons that might have been
avoided or corrected-a witness failing to appear, problems with witness testimony, and
evidence related problems). Kathleen Brosi, on behalf of the Department of Justice, au-
thored her report on felony case processing in 1979. The problems to which she refers in
Cross-City Comparison, particularly the low rates of prosecution, mirror the problems in our
criminal justice system today. See app. C, tbl.2 (State Court Felony Convictions/Arrests).
This twenty-year span of low prosecution rates is indicative, not of an evolving problem, but
rather an imbedded "culture" of inadequate prosecution.
208. See app. A (describing individual state standards for arrest and finding that while
virtually every state permits warrantless arrests, all have some standard of "reasonableness"
for such arrests-the offense must occur in the officer's presence, the officer must have
probable cause for the arrest, or there must exist reasonable grounds for such arrest).
209. See supra note 100 (noting that a 1990 BJS study concluded that 95% of prosecutors
nationwide first learned of felony cases after an arrest took place).
210. See supra note 103 (describing the prosecutor's role after an arrest has taken place).
211. See PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 1992, supra note 105, at 4 (asserting that almost
all of the Nation's prosecutors reported using adult criminal history data during the course
20001
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Either source could inform the determination of an arrestee's "crimi-
nality"-both society's "need" to prosecute the individual and the req-
uisite mens rea.
Second, as each victim of or witness to an offense is identified,
the prosecutor has the opportunity to cultivate those relationships to
establish enough rapport to make cooperation by the victim or by the
witness more likely.2 12 If a prosecutor remains passive toward the par-
ticipants, the missing or reluctant witness phenomenon is virtually
guaranteed.2 1
Third, textbook methods of investigation and of witness prepara-
tion make or break any criminal case. The steps are so basic to rudi-
mentary case preparation that they are taught in law schools.
2 14
A prosecutor has a number of additional sources of information
to maximize the chances of prosecution and even of conviction. A
prosecutor's office, unlike that of defense attorneys, has available an
overview of all criminal defendants and cases pending or recently con-
cluded in the jurisdiction. "Massaging" that information can result in
(1) the application of years of prosecutorial experience to assess the
relative "value" of any given case; 215 (2) an early indication that a de-
fendant's record provides limited options for disposition of the cur-
rent case; and (3) data about the number and relative "weight" of
cases pending so that the chances of convicting serious offenders can
be given priority.216
of prosecuting felony cases; 47% of prosecutor's offices used criminal history at prelimi-
nary hearings, 67% when filing charges, and 92% during sentencing).
212. See generally supra note 202 and accompanying text (discussing prosecution reports
that witness reluctance is one of the most common factors in case dismissal).
213. See BROSI, supra note 195, at 17 (citing the results of a study in which 1000 citizens
who were victims of or witnesses to crimes were surveyed to compare attitudes of coopera-
tive and noncooperative witnesses, and finding that the major difference between the two
groups was that the "noncooperatives" either did not receive subpoenas (25%) or failed to
understand what they were supposed to do if they did receive them (50%)); HANS ZEISEL,
THE LIMITS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 115-19 (1982) (stating that the withdrawal of the com-
plaining witness from prosecution is a major reason for the dismissal of cases and discuss-
ing various reasons for such witness withdrawal).
214. See generally DAVID A. BINDER & PAUL BERGMAN, FACT INVESTIGATION: FROM HYPOTH-
ESIS TO PROOF (1984) (presenting an entire chapter on "motivating witnesses," which in-
cludes discussion of various approaches to encouraging reluctant witnesses).
215. See STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3.4 cmt. b (discussing
the desirability of placing the screening functions in the hands of staff lawyers whose famili-
arity with trial and appellate problems gives them a broad base for evaluating cases); see also
BROSI, supra note 195, at 14 (discussing the effectiveness of the New Orleans policy of
assigning experienced prosecutors to screening and noting that experienced prosecutors
helped to identify early those cases that would eventually be dropped).
216. Cf BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON
CRIME AND JUSTICE 81-82, 71-72, 74-75 (1988), in CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA: PRESENT
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Each of these methods is used in varying degrees by most prose-
cution offices. 217 The high rate of guilty pleas indicates the use of
defendants' prior criminal records as leverage. However, the fairly
consistent low rate of prosecutions compared to total number of ar-
rests each year in a number ofjurisdictions has put the prosecutors'
offices on notice that their case-handling methods and their judg-
ments are not appropriate for the task. Such a record, over a twenty-
year period, is positive proof that the affected jurisdictions do not in-
tend and/or cannot prosecute the majority of individuals subjected to
arrest.
The Sisyphean routine of prosecution is well known. 218 Each day
is met with hundreds of cases set for "trial," usually without any prior
hearing or interaction between the prosecution and the defense, and
as often without a prosecutor's familiarity with the case or with the
witnesses. The Supreme Court has taken notice of the "frequent re-
sult" of "futility and failure" in such a system. The Court quoted Dean
Edward Barrett:
Wherever the visitor looks at the system, he finds great num-
bers of defendants being processed by harassed and over-
worked officials. Police have more cases than they can
investigate. Prosecutors walk into courtrooms to try simple
cases as they take their initial looks at the files. Defense law-
yers appear having had no more than time for hasty conver-
sations with their clients. Judges face long calendars with the
certain knowledge that their calendars tomorrow and the
next day will be, if anything longer, and so there is no choice
but to dispose of the cases. Suddenly it becomes clear that
for most defendants in the criminal process, there is scant
regard for them as individuals. They are numbers on dock-
ets, faceless ones to be processed and sent on their way. The
gap between the theory and the reality is enormous.21 9
The quotation is an example of the atmosphere created by and
perpetuated by the current-and longstanding-approach to crimi-
REALITIES AND FUTURE PROSPECTS (Paul F. Cromwell & Roger G. Dunham eds., 1997)
[hereinafter CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA] (noting that studies have shown that screening
decisions consider "resource constraints and organization of prosecutorial operations").
217. See supra note 211 (disclosing the percent of prosecutor's offices that report using
criminal history records at various stages of the judicial process); see also BRosi, supra note
195, at 14 (discussing the use of an experienced prosecutor during the screening process).
218. A Sisyphean routine is one that never quite pays off. In Greek mythology, Sisyphus
was condemned to an eternity of hard labor for a crime against the gods; he was to roll a
great boulder to the top of a hill, yet every time he attained the summit, it would roll back
down again.
219. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 35 (1972) (citations omitted).
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nal cases in a number ofjurisdictions. The "great numbers of defend-
ants" and more cases than can be investigated are referred to as
though no one is exactly sure how they have all appeared. Nowhere is
there a requirement of a better correlation between the numbers of
arrests and following those cases through to a determination of guilt
or acquittal.
2. Case Screening By Prosecutors.-In practice, more emphasis
must be placed on the prosecutors' ability (if not duty) to screen cases
for prosecutorial merit early in the process.220 This practice and inter-
action between individual police officers and prosecutors would serve
several purposes: (1) add a level of accountability to the arrest pro-
cess; (2) ensure that police and prosecutors are coordinating their
efforts toward optimum results; and (3) train police officers in the
requisite factual and legal bases for successful prosecution. Jurisdic-
tions in which the decision to arrest is not reviewed sooner experience
a higher rate of case dismissals.22' In those jurisdictions, an individual
arrestee remains a pawn in a chess game where the outcome-no
prosecution-is known virtually to a mathematical certainty.
As shown on Tables 1-5, the most comprehensive data collection
on arrests and on prosecutions, those reported by the FBI and the
BJS, and that available "randomly" from large jurisdictions, demon-
strate that convictions as a percentage of the overall numbers of ar-
rests have remained relatively stable throughout the period
considered in this Article, 1990-1994.222 Those figures also show that
the consistent pattern is that most arrests do not result in prosecution,
whether by guilty plea or by verdict after trial.22 ' The odds of any
given case proceeding to actual prosecution in such an environment
depend on an astrological phenomenon of the orbits of defendant,
witnesses, and evidence. If a bare minimum of any of those factors is
220. See STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3.4 (stating that a prose-
cutor should establish standards for evaluating complaints to determine whether criminal
proceedings should be instituted); id. § 3.4 cmt. b (furnishing a method of measuring the
successfulness of the screening process so that if the prosecutor's screening processes are
effective, acquittals should not be frequent; a high acquittal rate is itself a prime indicator
of the inadequate exercise of discretion in making the charge). But see CRIME AND JUSTICE
IN AMERICA, supra note 216, at 188 (stating that "usually, once an arrest is made and the
case is referred to the prosecutor, most prosecutors screen cases to see if they merit
prosecution").
221. See CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA, supra note 216, at 188 (discussing prosecutorial
screening units and finding that "jurisdictions that accepted most or all arrests usually had
high dismissal rates").




present at the time a case is called for trial, there is some possibility
that the case might proceed to prosecution. Yet, more often than not,
the planets are not in alignment, resulting in dismissal of the majority
of cases for which individuals have been arrested.
3. Evidence of a Systemic Inability to Prosecute More Cases.-For fel-
ony cases, the data indicates that convictions are obtained, whether by
guilty plea or by guilty verdict, in the vast majority of cases that actu-
ally proceed to prosecution.224 That correlation, from a law enforce-
ment perspective, argues in favor of concentrating more resources on
preparing cases for trial. Statistics over many years, including the pe-
riod considered here, however, suggest either an indifference to a re-
lationship between arrest and prosecution, or the inability to
prosecute more cases. The law enforcement rationale for arrests has
to be measured against the government's ability to prosecute the indi-
viduals who are arrested.
The intention to prosecute a person for the arrest charge is not
measured here in terms of the discretionary function of deciding
which laws to enforce or which cases to bring based on either legal or
on public policy considerations. If arrest/prosecution ratios are a
function of criminal justice resources, however, it is appropriate to
require that the state demonstrates its intention to prosecute most of
the individuals it arrests, as by allocating or by reallocating sufficient
resources to bring about that result. The Fourth Amendment prohib-
its arrest unless the state intends and is able to carry through each step
of the criminal justice system as defined by Amendments IV,12 2 5 V, 2 2 6
gI,227 and VIII.228
224. See supra note 205 (discussing the ten-to-one ratio of felony convictions resulting
from guilty pleas to convictions resulting from guilty verdicts).
225. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
226. The Fifth Amendment states, in relevant part, that
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury .... nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
227. The Sixth Amendment states, in relevant part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial .... and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
20001
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
The comparison of police resources, prosecution budgets, and
court caseload statistics would be an objective measure of the arith-
metical likelihood of a given number of arrests resulting in prosecu-
tion; budgetary and other resource limits in every jurisdiction make
that number finite. The likelihood of an increase in prosecution re-
sources or in decisions to reallocate more existing resources to prose-
cution also would be a determinant. Evidence is lacking, however,
that the criminal justice resources necessary to ensure prosecution are
likely to be increased significantly in any jurisdiction.
To the contrary, the evidence is that there will "never" be suffi-
cient resources to close the gap between the numbers of arrests and
the cases actually resulting in prosecution, if current patterns con-
tinue. 229 The resource side of the equation has been virtually con-
stant. Jurisdictions face taxing and revenue limitations, usually caused
by voter choices or by shifts in their respective tax bases.23 ° Other
social and economic needs compete for public funding. 21a Funding
sources remain uncoordinated so that increased appropriations may
be available for "bells and whistles," such as new police cars, but not
for systemic overhauls. 21 2 Theoretically, one could read into the fund-
ing dynamic that in each jurisdiction members of the public have
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
228. The Eighth Amendment states, in relevant part, that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONsT. amend. VIII.
229. See Israel, supra note 5, at 770-71 (reporting that while the rate of index crimes
increased by 278% between 1960 and 1985, the increased per capita spending on police,
accounting for inflation, was only 73% over the same period (citing 1995 SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 172, at 354-55; BUREAU OFJUsTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, REPORT TO
THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 120 (2d ed. 1988))).
230. See generally Israel, supra note 5, at n.25 (stating that "[s] ince almost 90% of crimi-
nal justice financing comes from state and local governments, the primary competitors are
the government services ... such as education, waste disposal, local transportation, and
certain aspects of public welfare support; . . . the courts simply have no political clout in
budgetary terms" (citing Alexander Smith & Harriet Pollack, The Courts Stand Indicted in
New York City, 68J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 252, 257 (1977))).
231. See id. at 769-70 (stating that "the war on drugs initiated during the 1980's in-
creased competitive demands for funding from other areas of government, and difficulties
in obtaining coordinated spending increases among police prosecution, and courts-led
to an overall failure of funding to keep up with the increase in crime, arrests, and
prosecutions").
232. See generally 1994 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 84, at 6 tbl.1.6 (reporting that in the
fiscal year of 1992, of the total state and local budget for justice system activities, 43.1%




made an assessment of the limits of their "public interest" as far as law
enforcement is concerned.
At the very least, one can presume that the public expects that
the finite law enforcement resources made available through the
political process will be used with professional judgment. Continua-
tion of or increases in arrest rates that grossly outpace the allocated
criminal justice resources run on a track unrelated to manifested pub-
lic interests. One likely result is an arithmetical impossibility to prose-
cute the majority of cases brought into the system by arrests. The
other is the creation of a "subsociety" within law enforcement that
sacrifices the freedom of millions of individuals to unarticulated, and
probably unattainable ends.
III. "UNREASONABLE" IN TERMS OF LACK OF PROSECUTION
A. Constitutional Requirements for Prosecution
The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the Consti-
tution relate to the criminal justice process. The amendments recog-
nize the discrete phases of the process and the two possible "end"
points of the system, trial, or a knowing and voluntary guilty plea and,
if the defendant is convicted, punishment. The Fifth Amendment re-
quires that capital and "infamous" crimes be charged by presentment
or information (the "charging" phase), prohibits a person from being
put in jeopardy twice for the same offense (the trial phase), and pro-
tects an individual against self-incrimination (at any time during the
process) .23
The Sixth Amendment guarantees rights during trial itself as fol-
lows: a speedy and public trial, the right to be informed of the
charges, and assistance of counsel. 2 4 Additionally, the Sixth Amend-
ment provides that a person is entitled during a trial to a jury of his
peers, appropriate venue for the trial, the right to confront witnesses
against him, and compulsory process to secure evidence. 2 5 The
Eighth Amendment guarantees reasonable bail at the commencement
of the criminal proceedings and prohibits cruel and unusual punish-
ment at the penultimate stage of the criminal justice process.236
233. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see supra note 226 (providing relevant text).
234. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see supra note 227 (providing relevant text).
235. Id.
236. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see supra note 228 (providing relevant text).
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B. The Purpose of Arrest In Prosecution
Within that progressive scheme of criminal prosecution, an arrest
serves as the manner in which an individual is "introduced" into the
system. 23 7 At least two constitutional rights must occur in conjunction
with the arrest. The arrest provides the first opportunity for the de-
fendant to be told the nature of the charges against him as required
under the Sixth Amendment 23 8 and to have a reasonable bail set, as
specified in the Eighth Amendment.239 The bail determination is
made by balancing an individual's presumptive right to freedom
before trial with conditions necessary to ensure a defendant's pres-
ence at trial when the state will carry its ultimate burden of proving
the arrestee's guilt, whether through the defendant's guilty plea, or
through conviction after trial, beyond a reasonable doubt.24 0 The bail
determination may also include consideration of whether a defendant
poses harm to the public in the period before a trial is commenced.24'
This scheme demonstrates that an arrest constitutes only one step
toward the ultimate goal of presenting evidence against an individual
for commission of an offense within the constraints of the constitu-
tional procedural requirements. The system and the constitutional
237. See LaFave, supra note 93, at 4 (defining arrest as a distinct operational step in the
criminal justice process, namely, the decision to detain an individual so that the official
process may be invoked).
238. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see supra notes 226, 234-235 and accompanying text. The
Supreme Court, in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) held that the Fourth Amendment
requires "a timely judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to detention."
Id. at 126. In Gerstein, the Court reasoned that "a policeman's on-the-scene assessment of
probable cause provides legal justification for arresting a person suspected of a crime, and
for a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps incident to arrest." Id. at
113-14. The Court also stated that "[o]nce the suspect is in custody, ... the reasons that
justify dispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate," and "the suspect's
need for a neutral determination of probable cause increases significantly." Id. at 114.
239. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see supra notes 228, 236 and accompanying text.
240. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (stating that "federal law has unequivocally
provided that a person arrested for a non-capital offense shall be admitted to bail ...
[because] [t]his traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered
preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to con-
viction" (citing Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895))). The Court also noted that
'the right to release before trial is conditioned upon the accused's giving adequate assur-
ance that he will stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty." Id. at 4-5 (citing Ex
parte Milburn, 9 Pet. 704, 710 (1835)).
241. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (holding that the Bail Reform
Act of 1984, which allows a federal court to detain an arrestee prior to trial if the govern-
ment demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence after an adversary hearing that the
arrestee poses a threat to the safety of individuals or to the community which no release
conditions can dispel, does not facially violate the Constitution).
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scheme do not permit arrest for any other purpose.24 2 Therefore, in
determining whether an arrest is "reasonable" within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment, it is necessary to consider whether an individ-
ual is seized solely to facilitate the ultimate permissible goals of the
criminal justice system. The data presented indicates that, in far too
many cases, arrests occur in jurisdictions irrespective of whether pros-
ecution by the state, with the opportunity for the defendant to chal-
lenge the state's case, will occur. For purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, therefore, those arrests are unreasonable because they
are not related to a constitutional outcome.
Much of the Fourth Amendment arrest precedent has focused on
probable cause to make an arrest as the outer limit of constitutional
consideration. 43 That scrutiny conforms to one aspect of the Fourth
Amendment, only stated expressly in the second clause relating to
warrants, that a seizure must be based on probable cause. 244 It is an
appropriate case-specific standard when the initial justification for
seizing a suspect or for conducting a search is at issue. The existence
of probable cause, however, is not the sole measure of reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment. 245
As a practical matter, judicial scrutiny of probable cause determi-
nations by police generally do not add much reassurance that even
the nominal standard is being met. Professor Abraham S. Goldstein
242. As discussed supra note 133 and accompanying text, LaFave, however, has noted
that, in practice, people are arrested for other purposes. He stated, for example, that while
taking people into custody for purposes of prosecution is
clearly contemplated by the law .... some are arrested for purposes other than
prosecution. For example, it has long been a practice to arrest intoxicated per-
sons and release them when they are sober, the purpose of the arrest is to provide
for the well-being of the drunk and the purpose of his release is to avoid the cost
of a judicial proceeding thought to accomplish nothing in the way of rehabilita-
tion or prevention.
LaFave, supra note 93, at 12. LaFave noted, however, that "[t]he problems created by the
arrest and release of a drunk for whom these are adequate grounds for arrest are obviously
different from those created by arrest of persons on insufficient evidence" but these two
situations have not been sufficiently "differentiated in either law or practice." Id. at 13.
243. SeeWhren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996) (stating that "the only cases in
which the court has found it necessary to perform the 'balancing' analysis [weighing the
governmental and individual interests,] involved searches or seizures conducted in an ex-
traordinary manner, unusually harmful to an individual's privacy or physical interests");
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1975) (stating that the standard of probable cause
.represents a necessary accommodation between the individual's right to liberty and the
State's duty to control crime").
244. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV; supra note 225.
245. The Fourth Amendment also requires warrants to be supported "by Oath or affir-
mation," particularly describing the places to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. Id.
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has examined the method by which probable cause is in fact scruti-
nized by magistrates and by judges in issuing warrants. 246 His article
asserts that there is no reason to assume that judicial officers employ
more rigid scrutiny of probable cause after-the-fact of arrest.247
According to Professor Goldstein, court review of probable cause
often does not amount to "independent judicial determination. "248 If
the judicial officer does not question the affiant about underlying
facts and circumstances or go behind hearsay and "boiler plate" asser-
tions, the claim of probable cause by a police officer remains
untested.249
The post-arrest probable cause hearings themselves impede in-
dependent scrutiny. More often than not, they are part of a long
docket.25 The pressure to move quickly through the docket and the
desensitizing process of hearing so many identical assertions over the
space of a few hours is enough to make any magistrate or judge too
impatient or too weary to delve deeply. 251 In such a system, logically,
all of the pressure would be to maintain the status quo (assume the
validity of an arrest and move the defendant along to another court,
judge, or docket).
As a matter of law, the Fourth Amendment itself requires scrutiny
of more than the arresting officer's belief that probable cause existed.
Despite the views of some that only a very narrow inquiry is necessary,
there are case law examples of other factors that can render a search
or seizure unreasonable. In Chimel, the Court distinguished between
the existence of probable cause and the additional factors that may
246. See Abraham S. Goldstein, The Search Warrant, the Magistrate, and Judicial Review, 62
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1173 (1987). Professor Goldstein's article examines the impact of United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), on judicial review of search warrant affidavits. Goldstein
contended that Leon's good faith modification for application of the exclusionary rule may
have a salient effect. Id. at 1175. In his view, Leon may encourage police officers to use
warrants, because they will be "rewarded" for their good faith efforts and be subject to less
judicial scrutiny. Id. at 1176-77.
247. Id. at 1202-03 (stating that "[flor the most part, . . . lower courts have tended to
avoid the probable cause issue and have moved directly to the 'defense' of good faith
reliance").
248. Id. at 1187.
249. See id. at 1182-83.
250. The arrest statistics for individual counties, cited in Tables 5 and 6 in Appendix C,
can be divided by the average number of court days (assume 250 days) to determine the
approximate number of probable cause hearings (for felony arrests) heard each day. For
example, in Kings County, New York in 1990, 42,932 felony arrests took place. See app. C,
tbl.5. This averages to 171 probable cause hearings per court day in 1990.
251. Cf Goldstein, supra note 246, at 1201 (stating that the Court's inquiry into matters
on post-warrant review is "meant to probe more deeply into the officer's experience and
state of mind" than the use of an objective "reasonable officer" standard connotes).
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draw the reasonableness of a search or seizure into question.252 The
Court acknowledged that reasonableness depends upon "the facts and
circumstances-the total atmosphere of the case," viewed against
Fourth Amendment principles. 25  Even though the police officers in
Chimel had an arrest warrant certifying probable cause for his arrest,
the Court held that the ensuing search of Chimel's entire house was
unreasonable.254
The totality-of-circumstances approach must apply to arrests and
to the Fourth Amendment principles underlying arrests. 2 5  if the
state does not intend to or cannot ensure that the constitutionally
mandated "mechanism" will be available following arrests, the arrests
have no constitutional footing. They are, therefore, unreasonable as a
matter of law, irrespective of the existence of probable cause.
Other cases also have made clear the distinction between prob-
able cause and the totality-of-circumstances test for determining rea-
sonableness under the Fourth Amendment. In Tennessee v. Garner,2 56
the Court struck down a state statute that authorized the use of deadly
force against unarmed fleeing suspects. 257 The plaintiff brought a suit
for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the death of his son, who was
shot and killed by police when seen fleeing a house after a report of a
burglary.258
For the Court, balancing all circumstances in the case led to the
conclusion that, "notwithstanding probable cause to seize a suspect,
an officer may not always do so by killing him."259 The state had ar-
gued that " [b] eing able to arrest such individuals is a condition prece-
252. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (discussing the reasonableness of
search and seizure in light of factors such as officer safety and the preservation of
evidence).
253. Id. at 765 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66
(1950)).
254. Id. at 753-54, 768.
255. See id. at 765 (noting that a case's surrounding "facts and circumstances must be
viewed in the light of established Fourth Amendment principles").
256. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
257. Id. at 4-5 & n.5, 22 (invalidating TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982)).
258. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 3-5. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
259. Garner, 471 U.S. at 9.
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dent to the state's entire system of law enforcement. '26" The Court
responded that apprehending a suspect is the way of "setting the crim-
inal justice mechanism in motion" but that deadly force was a "self-
defeating way" of accomplishing that goal.261
Garner is the appropriate lens through which to measure arrest
practices.262 Arrest is the starting point, not the end result, of crimi-
nal prosecution. Even if probable cause exists, a court must ensure
that all of the circumstances surrounding an arrest, when measured
against Fourth Amendment principles, constitute reasonableness.
The systematic practice of arresting individuals without intending or
being able to weigh the cases under the government's requisite bur-
den of proof renders the nonprosecution arrests unreasonable.
The nature of the state's interaction with individuals at the point
of arrestjustifies this scrutiny. Arrests immediately deprive individuals
of liberty and freedom of movement. As discussed, arrest decisions
are ripe environments for individual and for subjective decisions by
law enforcement officers who struggle daily with frustration over di-
minishing returns from their persistent efforts, the constant danger,
the attendant stress, and the critical assessment by the general
public.263
The Fourth Amendment does not draw distinctions between sep-
arate components of a government. 264 Thus, it does not confine "un-
reasonable" only to the acts of some parts of a government, such as
police officers. 265 It requires assessment whenever any government ac-
tion infringes an individual's right to be left alone by government ab-
sent reasonableness.
Reading the Fourth Amendment to elevate a police officer's
probable cause decision to the status of the sole determinant of rea-
sonableness creates a false dichotomy between the state and the indi-
vidual employees or agents of the state. Governmental power is
260. Id. at 10 (quoting Petitioners' Brief at 14).
261. Id.
262. The Court has often taken this position as well, invoking its decision in Garner when
analyzing questionable arrest practices. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818
(1996) (utilizing Garner as an example in analyzing whether police traffic stops, which led
to convictions, were constitutionally permissible); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388,
394-96 (1989) (considering Garner when determining the standard under which to analyze
"a free citizen's claim that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of
making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of his person").
263. See supra Parts II.C.1, II.C.5, & II.D.
264. U.S. CONST. amend IV; supra notes 225, 244-245 and accompanying text.
265. See U.S. CONST. amend IV; see also Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 188
(1957) (acknowledging that "[t]he Bill of Rights is applicable to investigations as to all
forms of governmental action").
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carried out through the institutions and through individuals empow-
ered to act on behalf of a government. In the area of criminal law and
procedure, states act, first, through their legislatures in defining and
in setting penalties for criminal offenses. The legislatures, in turn,
delegate many of the day-to-day responsibilities of law enforcement to
individuals acting in specific roles on behalf of the state such as
judges, prosecutors, and police officers.266 Each authorized individ-
ual, however, is vested with, and may carry out only as much multi-
layered authority as has been delegated by the state.
The multi-layered criminal justice systems, composed of legisla-
tive, judicial, prosecutorial, and law enforcement actors, mean that
Fourth Amendment violations may occur through the actions of any
part, or combination of parts, of a government. Setting probable
cause as the sole determinant of reasonableness overlooks both the
concept of agency inherent in the exercise of governmental action
and the systemic practices that may also violate the Fourth Amend-
ment. The government as a sovereign entity remains liable for inter-
fering with the right of the people, irrespective of which individual
officer of the state may cause the circumstances that amount to a
violation. 2
67
The state, through its agents, the police, is authorized to detain
an individual temporarily under the probable cause standard.2 6 The
purpose of the temporary detention is to facilitate administrative mat-
ters related to the arrest.269 The state, and its agents, are required to
266. See generally LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 24, § 1.2, at 6-9 (discussing the responsibili-
ties of police officers, prosecutors, magistrates, and trial judges and remarking on the wide
discretion exercised by each in the criminal justice system).
267. For example, in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, the Court found
that the "person" language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 included municipalities for purposes of civil
ights liability. See 436 U.S. 658, 688-90 (1978) (finding that "the 'plain meaning' of § 1 [of
the Civil Rights Act] is that local government bodies were to be included within the ambit
of the persons who could be sued" and concluding that this analysis "compels the conclu-
sion that Congress did intend municipalities and other local government units to be in-
cluded among those persons to whom § 1983 applies"); supra note 258 (providing the
relevant text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983). But see Monel, 436 U.S. at 694 (concluding that "a local
government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or
agents" under respondent superior). To recover damages from a municipality, the Court
required that a plaintiff prove that the municipality actually approved or adopted the chal-
lenged custom or practice. See id. (explaining that "it is when execution of a government's
policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly
be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is
responsible under § 1983").
268. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text (discussing the probable cause
standard).




present a detainee for a judicial hearing and determination of prob-
able cause for any detention beyond that necessary to accomplish the
steps of booking and of charging. Any person held by a state up to
the date of trial is subject to reasonable bail.27° In state prosecutions,
the standards for bail are prescribed by state law.271
The arrest and temporary pretrial detention of individuals under
the probable cause standard enable the state to prepare to prove its
burden in a criminal trial. The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a
trial in criminal cases encompasses the due process requirements that
an accused be afforded ajury determination of guilt, and that proof of
guilt must be beyond a reasonable doubt.27 2 There is a fundamental
and quantitative difference between probable cause and the reason-
able doubt standard. As the Supreme Court has explained it, prob-
able cause means a "reasonable ground" for belief of guilt, and that is
less than the evidence sufficient to convict. 273 The higher standard of
beyond a reasonable doubt is a safeguard against conviction of the
innocent.274 The elevated standard also maintains respect for and
confidence in the criminal justice system.
The constitutional scheme requires that the acts of arrest and of
lodging criminal charges be carried through to the conclusion and
according to the standards prescribed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments.275 Therefore, constitutional scrutiny of ajurisdiction's
arrest practices cannot occur solely in relation to the physical act of
arrest.
The question of whether arrests without a contemporaneous in-
tention or without an ability to prosecute individuals for the charged
offenses is unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment and requires focusing on and measuring systemic state practices
rather than looking only at the facts of a particular arrest in an indi-
vidual case. This focus is appropriate, because the Fourth Amend-
ment, like the other provisions in the Bill of Rights, preserves
270. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
271. See, e.g., MD. RULES 4-216 and 4-217.
272. See Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam) (citing In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
273. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
274. See Cage, 498 U.S. at 40.
275. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, VIII; supra notes 226-228; see also 1 FOWLER V.
HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 3.18 (1956) ("To be lawful, not only
must an arrest be made on a proper occasion but, whether by officer or citizen, it must be
made for the purpose of apprehending the person arrested and taking him before a court
or public official.").
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individual rights in the face of sovereign authority asserted to inter-
fere with that right.
2 76
In the cases of the arrests discussed in this Article, the states are
asserting their respective sovereign authority in a systematic way
against many individuals. That system is the gravamen of the Fourth
Amendment violation. For jurists and scholars who need to find a
footing in the Framers' experience to justify a constitutional interpre-
tation that scrutinizes a systematic practice rather than only one appli-
cation of the practice, one exists. The use of general warrants, which
was at least part of the history that resulted in the Fourth Amend-
ment,2 77 was a parallel experience. The attack on general warrants
similarly was directed at a practice-the arbitrary use of the war-
rants-not only at the application of a warrant in a particular case.2 78
Among the evils of the general warrants was their use to seize individu-
als, not with a mind toward an ultimate lawful process, but as harass-
ment or intimidation because of the individuals' political or religious
views, or commercial competition. 279 The net result of the practices
was condemnation of the system of using general warrants; not simply
276. See Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 661 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that a general
crime roadblock system violates the Fourth Amendment and recognizing that the reasona-
bleness inquiry may focus on an individual stop by police, or on the entire program).
277. See GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION: A COMMENTARY
69-70 (1995) (explaining how the Fourth Amendment was drafted, in part, to protect
against traditional abuses such as the use of general warrants); Barbara C. Salken, The
General Warrant of the Twentieth Century ? A Fourth Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion
to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 221, 254 (1989) ("The fourth amendment was
designed to prevent the arbitrary and indiscriminate searches permitted by general war-
rants and writs of assistance.").
278. See ANASTAPLO, supra note 277, at 69-70 (discussing general warrants broadly and
characterizing them as a form of abuse, as opposed to specific instances of abuse); Salken,
supra note 277, at 254 ("General warrants and writs of assistance were harmful because they
delegated to the officer the power to decide whom to search and for what to search ...
without a showing of individualized suspicion that evidence of criminal activity would be
found in a particular place.").
279. See LASSON, supra note 19, at 22-34 (discussing the use of the search power by dyers
to search for cloth, by tallow makers to search for oil, in addition to using it for seizing
political and religious materials for censorship and seizing property of competitors);
Salken, supra note 277, at 255 (describing how general warrants were used in England in
the 1600s "to suppress unwelcome printing"); Cloud, supra note 19, at 1717 (noting how it
is well known that general searches and seizures were used in England "to suppress reli-
gious heresy.., and political dissent" and remarking on Cuddihy's "account of how seven-
teenth-century Catholics used these methods to suppress Protestants and how Protestants
did the same to Catholics when the opportunity arose"); id. (noting Cuddihy's explanation
that general searches were used in America "in the south to control slaves").
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a determination on behalf of individual victims of the practices in in-
dividual cases.28 °
Systemic abuses of governmental power are as corrupting, if not
more so, than the judgment of an individual agent of the state, such as
a police officer determining the existence of probable cause. In Ed-
monds v. Goldsmith,281 Judge Posner, writing for the majority panel,
stated that: "Because it is infeasible to quantify the benefits and costs
of most law enforcement programs, the program approach might well
permit deep inroads into privacy. "282 Systemic arrest practices that ig-
nore the constitutional parameters of criminaljustice and law enforce-
ment are additional inroads into the protections of the Fourth
Amendment. The fact that the practice of arrests without prosecution
has persisted over time and involved such a large number of criminal
cases does not make the practice legitimate. "Long usage" cannot le-
gitimize a practice not found within, or that is contrary to, the explicit
constitutional protections of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments. 283
IV. BALANCING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND STATE INTERESTS
The premise of this Article is that individuals are harmed if they
are arrested when the state does not have a contemporaneous intent
or ability to fulfill the only lawful purpose of arrest-to attempt to
prove an individual's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and to afford
him the constitutional protections to which he is entitled in answering
the state's charges against him.
To achieve a balance between the individual liberties recognized
in the Fourth Amendment and governmental interests, the state
should be required to demonstrate why it is necessary that the in-
dependent right be infringed and that the deprivation is the best
means available to meet the stated need. This analysis would insure
that the government action is, in fact and in law, reasonable, and not
merely convenient.
Most of the impetus for the Bill of Rights was concern that, with-
out a separate and a distinct articulation of individual rights, such
280. See Cloud, supra note 19, at 1724, 1725 (discussing Cuddihy's conclusion "that ob-
jections to general warrants and general searches alike rested upon broad concerns about
protecting privacy, property, and liberty from unwarranted and unlimited intrusions").
281. 183 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1999).
282. Id. at 662.
283. See LASSON, supra note 19, at 47-48 (discussing early English cases in which general
warrants were found illegal and noting that these cases found the argument of long usage
ultimately unpersuasive).
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rights could be subsumed within and thereby obliterated by the new
federal government's executive powers.284 In that regard, James
Madison articulated the possibility that "Congress might even estab-
lish religious teachers in every parish, and pay them out of the Treas-
ury of the United States, leaving other teachers unmolested in their
functions." 285 The specific amendments within the Bill of Rights were
designed to draw a sharp line of demarcation between governmental
discretionary or "necessary and proper" authority on the one hand,
and the specific individual rights enumerated therein. 28 6 As de-
scribed by Justice Brandeis, the Fourth Amendment "conferred, as
against the Government, the right to be let alone."2 7 That purpose
and ordering of priorities in drafting the Bill of Rights remain intact
for those amendments, including the Fourth Amendment, that have
been applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment by the
selective incorporation doctrine. 288 That structure does not subsume
the Fourth Amendment's guarantees within the "necessary and
proper" functions of law enforcement.
States retain the authority to enact criminal laws for offenses com-
mitted within their respective borders and to specify how and by
284. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 46, at 119-21 (discussing the impetus for the Bill of
Rights, and quoting Chief Justice Marshall stating that "[s] erious fears were extensively
entertained that those powers which the patriot statesmen who then watched over the in-
terests of our country, deemed essential to the union, and to the attainment of those inval-
uable objects for which union was sought, might be exercised in a manner dangerous to
liberty" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet.
243, 250 (U.S. 1833))).
285. MORGAN, supra note 57, at 139 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, VOL. 13, 375-76 (Charles F. Hobson et al., eds. 1981)).
286. SeeJOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTIruTONAL LAW 412 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing the
Bill of Rights and the purpose of its adoption, and noting that "the drafters of the Bill of
Rights designed the amendments as a check on the new national government").
287. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
288. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30-34 (1963) (reiterating that the Fourth Amend-
ment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment and finding that the consti-
tutionality of a state search would be determined by the same standards that apply to
federal searches under the Fourth Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961)
("Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against
the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is enforceable
against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Govern-
ment"); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) (finding that the Fourth Amendment
is "enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause" of the Fourteenth
Amendment). The Fourteenth Amendment mandates, in part, that
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CoNsT. amend XIV.
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whom those laws are to be implemented.2"' The authority reserved
for the states, however, does not give carte blanche to the states for the
way in which they enforce criminal laws. As Garner made clear, not
every method employed by the states in carrying out the law enforce-
ment function can be presumed to be or, in fact is, constitutional.29 0
A. Individual Harm
Distinct harm occurs at approximately three stages after police
make a decision to arrest an individual. In the arrest phase, the indi-
vidual is subjected to (a) the loss of freedom when the police under-
take an investigatory stop, (b) an exacerbation of the loss of freedom
when the individual actually is placed under arrest, usually hand-
cuffed, placed behind bars, and loses freedom of association and
movement, and (c) public humiliation and embarrassment, especially
because the majority of arrests occur in public places.291
289. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 24, § 1.2 (discussing the allocation of state and
federal authority and noting that "[j]ust as each state can shape its substantive criminal
code to fit the value judgments and traditions shared by its people, each can also shape the
procedures that will be used in enforcing that code"). Arrest laws typically are written as
authorizations for arrest, not as mandatory directions to police officers, thereby leaving
police officers with wide discretion in the decision of whether to take a person into cus-
tody. See id. at 77-78 (explaining that "[a] great majority [of arrest laws] are in permissive
terms, usually indicating that the police 'may' arrest upon a given quantum of evidence").
The range of police discretion is reflected in the presumptive qualified immunity available
to police officers in the performance of their duties, including arrest. See Davis v. Scherer,
468 U.S. 183, 197 (1984) (holding that "[a] plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of
constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant official's qualified immunity
only showing that those rights were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue").
An exception to the discretion rule has grown out of advocacy for a more effective law
enforcement response to domestic violence. As of 1994, seven states had statutes mandat-
ing arrest if an officer had probable cause to believe domestic violence had occurred. See
James, supra note 22, app. at 516 (finding that arrest laws mandate that a police officer
"shall" arrest upon probable cause in the following states: Connecticut, Kansas, Nevada,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Wisconsin).
Law enforcement strategies also depend on police discretion to refrain from making
an arrest in a situation that otherwise might justify taking a suspect into custody. The new
emphasis on community policing often places higher priority on preventing crime than on
"reacting" to it by arrest and prosecution. Other changes in the police function, whether
driven by finite resources or an unrealistic public expectation of the role of police, simi-
larly depend on judgment calls about individual instances of law-breaking. See Herman
Goldstein, The New Policing: Confronting Complexity, in CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA, supra
note 216, at 97-100.
290. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 22 (1985) (striking down as unconstitutional a
Tennessee statute that authorized the police to use force against unarmed fleeing sus-
pects); supra notes 256-262 (discussing Tennessee v. Garner).
291. As mentioned, most prosecutors-prosecutor offices-do not know about felony
cases in their districts until after the arrests are made. See PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS,
1990, supra note 100, at 3. That means prosecutors were not involved in obtaining arrest
warrants or issuing informations before arrests in the majority of cases. Although some
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The post-arrest phase consists of the following: (a) prolonged de-
tention if the individual is not released on personal recognizance; 29 2
(b) costs of satisfying a bond requirement to be released pending
trial 293 and/or retaining an attorney if the arrestee is not entitled to
appointed counsel; (c) restrictions on day-to-day freedom of move-
ment depending on the conditions of pretrial release;2 94 (d) eco-
nomic loss caused by missing work time during arrest, arraignment,
and/or bail proceedings; 295 and (e) strain and disruption of familial
and/or social relationships throughout all phases, and even after the
formal proceedings are concluded.296
police agencies may apply directly to judicial officers for arrest warrants without a prosecu-
tor's knowledge, the prevalence of warrantless arrest laws suggests those are rare instances.
As discussed, Supreme Court case law upholds warrantless arrests in public places. See
Florida v. White, 119 S. Ct. 1555, 1559 (1999) (explaining that "although a warrant pre-
sumptively is required for a felony arrest in a suspect's home, the Fourth Amendment
permits warrantless arrests in public places where an officer has probable cause to believe
that a felony has occurred" (citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 416-24 (1976))).
Additionally, as Appendix A indicates, each jurisdiction authorizes warrantless arrests.
292. In 1990, data from a sample of 39 of the 75 most heavily populated counties in the
United States was used to estimate the pretrial detention rates as 32% for arrests on public-
order (nondriving) offenses, 35% for drug offenses, 33% for property offenses, and 37%
for violent offenses. See BUREAU OFJUsTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1992, at 533 tbl.5.61 (Kathleen Maguire et al. eds., 1993)
[hereinafter 1992 SOURCEBOOK]. The 1992 pretrial detention rates, gathered from a sam-
ple of 40 of the 75 most populous counties in the United States, were 42% for public order
arrests other than those involving driving or weapons, 29% in weapons cases, 32% for drug
offenses, 37% for property offenses, and 42% for violent offenses. See 1995 SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 172, at 510 tbl.5.63. Other public-order offenses-public-order offenses other
than those involving driving or weapons-" [i] nclude [ J flight/escape, parole or probation
violations, prison contraband, habitual offender, obstruction of justice, rioting, libel and
slander, .. . treason, perjury, prostitution/pandering, bribery, and tax law violations"). Id.
app. 15, at 681.
293. Of arrestees released before trial in 1992, in a sample of 40 out of the 75 largest
counties, 25% of the releases were based on financial terms. See 1995 SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 172, at 511 tbl.5.65. Public-order arrests, not involving driving or weapons violations,
resulted in bail amounts under $2,500 in 30% of the cases, $2,500-$9,999 in 27% of the
cases, $10,000-$19,999 in 15% of the cases, and $20,000 or more in 29% of the cases. See
id. at 511 tbl.5.66; supra note 292 (defining other public-order offenses).
294. See generally HON. JOHN L. WEINBERG, FEDERAL BAIL AND DETENTION HANDBOOK 6-6
(1999) (discussing possible conditions of pretrial release such as "Third-Party Custody" and
"Restrictions on Personal Associations, Place of Abode, or Travel").
295. See RONALD GOLDFARB, RANSOM: A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM 32
(1965) (noting that "[w]hen the defendant who cannot afford bail goes to jail before trial,
he loses his present earning capacity, and often his job").
296. See Elise Zealand, Protecting the Ties that Bind from Behind Bars: A Call for Equal Oppor-
tunities for Incarcerated Fathers and Their Children to Maintain the Parent-Child Relationship, 31
COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 247, 249 (1998) (discussing the effects of incarceration on fam-
ily relationships and characterizing prisoners' families as "the unintended victims of incar-
ceration" (citation omitted)); see also supra note 304 and accompanying text.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
The third phase consists of collateral and consequential harm.
Arrest and pending criminal charges can produce emotional and psy-
chological harm for the arrestee and for family members. This harm
is not necessarily "healed" if charges are dismissed without prosecu-
tion. 297 Employers or prospective employers may decide that an arrest
and pending criminal charges "disqualify" an individual for
employment.298
If an arrestee were previously convicted of a crime, the new arrest
can "rekindle" the earlier case, even if the individual has paid the
"costs" of the earlier crime, as by a term of imprisonment, fine, super-
vised probation, or any combination of those sanctions. 299 For a pa-
rolee or person on probation, a new arrest can constitute a violation
of the conditions of parole or probation, posing the prospect, at the
very least, of more intense scrutiny of day-to-day activities, if not the
revocation of parole or probation.3"' The relaxed evidentiary stan-
dards for revocation proceedings make it possible to incarcerate the
individual again based solely on a police officer's recitation of prob-
able cause for the new arrest, or even a probation officer's interpreta-
tion of the facts alleged to support the new arrest. 0 1
297. Cf GOLDFARB, supra note 295, at 42 (noting that "most important of all these disad-
vantages [of pre-trial incarceration] are not the pragmatic problems but the basic, spiritual
loss to the imprisoned defendant").
298. In those states that authorize expungement of criminal records in certain circum-
stances, expungement does not necessarily protect an individual's employment opportuni-
ties. For example, Maryland law authorizes the expungement of police and court records
if an individual is arrested but not charged, or if the defendant is acquitted, or the charges
are dismissed. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 736-737 (1996 & Supp. 1998). The statute
enables an individual not to have to disclose to an employer or to a prospective employer
any information related to the expunged records. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 740 (1996).
The statute prohibits an employer from failing to hire or discharging an individual for
refusing to disclose such information. Id. It does not, however, require employment or
continued employment of an individual who has been arrested. Id.
299. See HowARD ABADINSKY, PROBATION AND PAROLE: THEORY & PRACTICE 186 (2d ed.
1977) (describing how sentences left over from prior convictions are relevant when deter-
mining the proper punishment for parole violations).
300. See id. at 184-86 (discussing how some parole officers, without resorting to judicial
authority, can issue violation warrants, which mandate preliminary hearings and revocation
hearings that might ultimately lead to revocation of parole or of criminal prosecution); id.
at 105-10 (similarly discussing procedures following alleged violations of probation and of
subsequent revocation).
301. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 n.22 (1975) (recognizing that "revocation
proceedings may offer less protection from initial error than the more formal criminal
process"). Revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution, so that an individual
is afforded only minimal due process rights in the parole revocation process. See Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). No rules of procedure or evidence are constitutionally
prescribed; therefore, the process may be "flexible" and permit consideration of materials
such as letters and affidavits that would not be admissible in a criminal trial. See id. at 489.
The procedure for revocation of probation after sentence has been imposed is "constitu-
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Finally, an arrest record can follow an individual regardless of the
outcome (for example, dismissal) of the criminal charges. Even in
states that have laws that authorize expungement of police and/or
court records upon dismissal of charges, those laws are not always
"self-executing" at the moment of dismissal of charges.3" 2 A waiting
period or some other procedural requirement might be imposed
before expungement is allowed. 3 Criminal defense attorneys may
view expungement proceedings as separate civil actions, requiring
either a separate fee agreement or even a different attorney. Addi-
tionally, the arrestee may not even be aware that steps can be taken to
expunge criminal records, even in jurisdictions that have expunge-
ment laws.
In individual instances, the Court, in dicta, has recognized some
of the negative consequences of arrest. Those pronouncements, how-
ever, often sound regrettably as though the author of the opinion is
still pondering, as a theoretical matter, whether the harm actually oc-
curs. In Gerstein, the Court focused on the harm incident to pro-
longed pretrial detention, equally applicable to an arrest itself, which
might "imperil [a] suspect's job, interrupt his source of income, and
impair his family relationships."" 4 Onejustice has described an arrest
as an "offense to the dignity of the citizen who is arrested, handcuffed,
tionally indistinguishable" from parole revocation. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,
782 n.3 (1973).
302. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 737(a) (1996 & Supp. 1998) (requiring a written
petition for expungement to be complete).
303. For example, in Maryland, a petition for expungement cannot be filed earlier than
three years from the date of an acquittal, a dismissal of charges, or completion of proba-
tion beforejudgment. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 737(d)-(e). In the event of an acquit-
tal or dismissal, a defendant may file a petition for expungement earlier than three years
after the acquittal or dismissal, if he files with the petition a general waiver and release of
liability for tortious conduct based on the charge that resulted in acquittal or dismissal. See
id. § 737(d).
See also TEX. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. § 55.01 (West 1979 & Supp. 1999) (stating that a
person is entitled to expungement of records relating to a felony or a misdemeanor if he is
acquitted, or pardoned after conviction, or each of the following conditions are met: (1)
no indictment has been presented against him, or an indictment was dismissed because of
mistake, false information, or a similar reason indicating an absence of probable cause; (2)
the person is released, the charge has not resulted in a final conviction, and is no longer
pending; and (3) the person has not been convicted of a felony in the five years preceding
his arrest in the expunction case); TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 101.73 (West 1995) (stat-
ing that a person may apply for an expungement of records of conviction for consumption
on premises licensed for off-premises consumption after the first anniversary of conviction
containing a sworn statement of no additional alcohol consumption conviction during the
previous 12 months). But see N.Y. CORRECTION LAw § 168-n(5) (McKinney Supp. 1998)
(stating that the court shall order expungement of records related to a sex offender status
upon reversal of conviction).
304. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114.
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and searched on a public street."30 5 Justice Powell stated that, "custo-
dial arrest is the significant intrusion of state power into the privacy of
"3106one's person.
One measure of how the state regards harm caused by state ac-
tion is the remedies for the harm and/or sanctions for abuse of au-
thority that creates the harm. However, improvident, arbitrary, or
unlawful, seizures of individuals have virtually no legal consequences
and no remedy for the individuals.30 7 There seem to be two main
conceptual hurdles that prevent judicial recognition that the arrest
and the charging practices of the state violate the Fourth Amendment
in the sense argued here. As demonstrated in Whren and in other
cited cases involving actions of police officers in making vehicle stops,
the Supreme Court has measured police conduct against various de-
grees of intrusion. 0" In so doing, it has, for example, determined
that fears for an officer's safety in approaching an occupied vehicle
outweighed the embarrassment or inconvenience of ordering the
driver and/or passengers out of a stopped vehicle. 0 9
The Supreme Court, however, has not consistently or frequently
weighed the extent of the intrusion caused by full custody arrest-or
other seizure, as by shooting-against specific and articulated law en-
forcement goals. Garner was a rare exception. In Garner, the State
argued that criminal apprehension was a significant interest.3 10 The
State explained its view that the assumed deterrence of police author-
ity to use deadly force would significantly aid its apprehension ef-
305. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was
discussing an arrest that took place on a public street "simply because some bureaucrat
ha[d] failed to maintain an accurate computer data base." Id.
306. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 237 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Powell's comment supported the proposition that a lawful arrest authorizes a full
search of the arrestee's person. See id. (asserting that "I believe that an individual lawfully
subjected to a custodial arrest retains no significant Fourth Amendment interest in the
privacy of his person.").
307. See infra notes 321-330 and accompanying text (discussing legal obstacles to redress
in cases of unlawful seizure).
308. See supra notes 144-243 and accompanying text.
309. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1997) (explaining that "danger to an
officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater where there are passengers in addition to
the driver in the stopped car" and holding that "an officer making a traffic stop may order
passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop"); Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (per curiam) (describing a traffic stop as "a mere inconvenience
[that] cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate concerns for the officer's safety").
310. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) ("Being able to arrest... is a condition




forts.3 1 ' The Supreme Court, however, did not accept the State's
calculus at face value. The Court analyzed the testimony of the pursu-
ing officer, 31 2 and made an independent assessment of whether the
State's generalizations about its law enforcement goals outweighed
the civil rights of the decedent.
31 3
The point of the Garner decision is not to criticize governmental
action which, in hindsight, does not meet assumed expectations. 14
Its prophylactic rule, however, is that the government is responsible if
its calculus lacks adequate reasoning or factual support. The conse-
quences of arrest are concrete and certain. The Fourth Amendment
requires that the state justifies arrests at the outset, as likely to achieve
permissible and articulated law enforcement goals.31 5 In an environ-
ment and with a history where so many arrests do not lead to prosecu-
tion, the presumption that arrests will initiate criminal prosecutions is
not reasonable.
There is so little scrutiny of the consequences of the system-wide
practices discussed here, that the situation amounts to a virtual wall of
silence about the consequences of arrest on tens of thousands of indi-
viduals every year in the United States. This state of affairs tempts one
to hypothesize, not that individual officers, prosecutors, or justices or
judges cannot imagine what their own reaction would be to arrest, the
risk of pretrial detention, ensuing personal shame, psychological
harm, and loss of reputation, but that the persons most likely to be
arrested are not "real" or simply cannot be likened to those who make
the arrest and the prosecution decisions. Thus, the actual circum-
stances of arrest and of lingering criminal charges remain theory
rather than a day-to-day legal and policy issue.
311. See id. at 9 (recognizing the State's argument that "overall violence will be reduced
by encouraging the peaceful submission of suspects who know that they may be shot if they
flee").
312. Id. at 3-4 (discussing the arresting officers' testimony). One of the officers testified
that he did not see a weapon and that he was "reasonably sure" that the suspect was un-
armed. See id. at 3. The officer thought Garner was about 5'5" or 5'7" tall, and 17 or 18
years of age. See id. at 3-4. Garner, however, was unarmed, 15 years old, and 5'4" tall. See
id. at 4 n.2.
313. See id. at 8-10.
314. The Garner Court acknowledged the important goals of effective law enforcement
and was careful not to criticize them in its decision. The Court noted: "[w]ithout in any-
way disparaging the importance of these goals, we are not convinced that the use of deadly
force is a sufficiently productive means of accomplishing them to justify the killing of non-
violent suspects." Id. at 10.
315. See id. at 21 (concluding that the officer's decision to use deadly force was not
reasonably arrived at and therefore the action taken by the officer was not justified).
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As the facts and authorities move, actual arrests and charging de-
cisions are boiler plate processes, as though they are unlinked to seri-
ous constitutional standards. This situation has rendered the Fourth
Amendment literally irrelevant to millions of individuals who are ar-
rested each year. The most obvious social cost of the system is that a
class of "The Arrested" has grown up, primarily in large urban ar-
eas.116 That categorization of many members of minority communi-
ties virtually guarantees permanent social and economic disadvantage.
In Sibron v. New York, 3 7 the Court set out a principle for the uni-
verse of cases into which most arrests fall:
Many deep and abiding constitutional problems are encoun-
tered primarily at a level of "low visibility" in the criminal
process-in the context of prosecutions for "minor" offenses
which carry only short sentences. We do not believe that the
Constitution contemplates that people deprived of constitu-
316. For each of the years 1990-1994, more arrests occurred in cities having populations
larger than 100,000 (Group I and Group II cities) than in each of the four other city sizes
measured by the FBI. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CRIME
IN THE UNITED STATES: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1990, at 176 tbl.26 (1991) [hereinafter
1990 UCR] (36% of arrests); FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1991, at 215 tbl.31 (1992) (37%);
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES:
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1992, at 219 tbl.31 (1993) (36%); FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA-
TION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1993,
at 218 tbl.30 (1994) (36%); FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1994, at 219 tbl.31 (1995) (38%).
These percentages each represent the ratio of total arrests in cities over 100,000 to the total
number of arrests nationwide; however, the total national arrest figures contained in the
UCR tables cited above are lower than the annual arrest totals reported in the UCR tables
that quantify arrests by index or nonindex offense category. Cf, e.g., 1990 UCR, supra, at
tbls.24, 26. One possible explanation for the difference is that the offense category arrest
tables are each based on arrest figures supplied by reporting agencies and estimated arrests
for unreported areas. See, e.g., id. at 174, tbl. 21 n.1. One could surmise that the arrest
totals categorized by city size include only data supplied by reporting agencies. Of
11,865,793 total arrests reported by geographic area in 1994, 9,169,197 are reported for
cities, 4,168,290 in suburban areas, 1,882,094 in suburban counties, and 814,502 in rural
counties. 1995 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 172, at 396, tbl.4.3.
Numerous studies show the impact of arrest policies on large urban areas. One con-
cluded that in 1991 almost one-third of black men aged 20-29 living in Los Angeles County
had been jailed in that year. See MILLER, supra note 167, at 5. A 1990 study by the Rand
Corporation asserted that one-third of all African-American men aged 18-21 living in Wash-
ington, D.C. had been arrested and charged with an offense. See id. at 7. Data from a "one-
day" profile conducted by the National Center on Institutions and Alternatives in 1992
concluded that approximately 75% of all 18-year-old African-American males in Washing-
ton, D.C. could expect to be arrested at least once before age 35. See id. An earlier study
based on arrests during 1968-1972 in the 56 largest cities predicted that one out of four
males living in a large city would be arrested for a felony at some point in their lives. See id.
at 6.
317. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
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tional rights at this level should be left utterly remediless and
defenseless against repetitions of unconstitutional conduct.318
This language was directed to the argument that Sibron's appeal was
moot because he had completed his jail sentence by the time the case
reached the Supreme Court. 319 In the case of unlawful arrests, how-
ever, the Court has left individuals "remediless and defenseless."
Supreme Court precedent holds that the illegality of an arrest, in
and of itself, does not prevent the state from going forward with a
prosecution. Or, for many arrests examined here, despite illegal ar-
rests, the state may continue its hold on the individual through pre-
trial detention, bail on conditions that restrict an individual's
activities, or the stigma and the disabilities to which individuals may
be subjected by having criminal charges outstanding. 2 °
In Albrecht v. United States,3 21 the Court distinguished between the
legality of the charging document and the legal basis for an arrest.32 2
It phrased the issue as one of 'jurisdiction"; if the charging document
were valid (or could be validated by amendment), a court had juris-
diction over a defendant and the prosecution could proceed, even if
the arrest itself were illegal.323 The arrest was illegal in Albrecht be-
cause the affidavits were not notarized in conformance with federal
law.3 24 By the logic of the Albrecht decision, an illegal arrest apparently
constitutes a form of "no-harm, no-foul," even though it effectively
eliminates the guarantee against unreasonable seizures of persons.325
318. Id. at 52-53 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see also Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 766 n.12 (1969) ("The [Fourth] Amendment is designed to prevent, not simply
to redress, unlawful police action.").
319. See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 52.
320. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 592 n.34 (1980) (noting that "a defendant
must stand trial... even if the arrest is illegal" (citing United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463,
474 (1980))); Crews, 445 U.S. at 474 (explaining that "[a]n illegal arrest, without more, has
never been viewed as a bar to subsequent prosecution, nor as a defense to a valid convic-
tion"); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975) (declining to "retreat from the estab-
lished rule that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent conviction").
321. 273 U.S. 1 (1927).
322. Id. at 5. The Albrecht Court explained that
[a]s the affidavits on which the warrant issued had not been properly verified, the
arrest was in violation of the clause in the Fourth Amendment which declares that
"no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-
tion." But it does not follow that because the arrest was illegal, the information
was or became void.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
323. Id. at 8 (explaining that "a false arrest does not necessarily deprive the court of
jurisdiction of the proceeding in which it was made").
324. Id. at 5 (finding that "[als the affidavits on which the warrant issued had not been
properly verified, the arrest was in violation of... the Fourth Amendment").
325. See supra notes 321-324 and accompanying text.
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A rule is needed as a deterrent to the current and long-standing
systems in some jurisdictions where individuals are arrested even
though the jurisdictions will not or cannot prosecute them. As the
Court made clear in Arizona v. Evans32 6 and in Illinois v. Gates,3 2v the
legality of an arrest and the decision to impose an exclusionary rule
are separate issues.3 8 The point of the separate consideration is that,
while the former is a decision about the facts of an individual case, the
latter serves to set a standard of governmental action for society as a
whole. The Court stated in Weeks that "[t] o sanction such proceedings
[prosecutions with the use of illegally seized evidence] would be to
affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance
of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of
the people against such unauthorized action. 321
326. 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
327. 426 U.S. 213 (1983).
328. See Evans, 514 U.S. at 10 (stating that "[t]he question whether the exclusionary
rule's remedy is appropriate in a particular context has long been regarded as an issue
separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to
invoke the rule were violated by police conduct" (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 426 U.S. 213,
233 (1983)) (citing United States v. Harens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1980); Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 486-87 (1976); United States. v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974))).
329. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394 (1914). As noted, the Weeks decision
concerns the admissibility of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at
386, 394. Weeks established the so-called exclusionary rule, the purpose of which is to deter
police officers from conducting illegal searches or seizures by prohibiting the admission of
evidence that has been seized illegally. Id. at 394-98; see also Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348
(noting that "standing to invoke the exclusionary rule has been confined to situations
where the Government seeks to use such evidence to incriminate the victim of the unlawful
search," and further noting that "[t]his standing rule is premised on a recognition that the
need for deterrence and hence the rationale for excluding the evidence are strongest
where the Government's unlawful conduct would result in imposition of a criminal sanc-
tion of the victim of the search" (citations omitted)).
In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Supreme Court announced a modifi-
cation of the exclusionary rule. Leon holds that, where police officers were acting in good
faith, the exclusionary rule should not bar use of evidence obtained by those officers. Id. at
926. Leon, however, does not prohibit the use of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent in
appropriate cases. Id. at 921-22 (discussing the deterrence function of the exclusionary
rule, but concluding that "[p]enalizing the officer for the magistrate's error, rather than
his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations").
In Leon, police officers obtained a search warrant based upon information from
known informants after an extensive investigation. Id. at 901-02. In hearing motions to
suppress, the trial court determined that the warrant was insufficient because it did not
establish an informant's credibility or his personal knowledge of facts that he related to the
investigating officers. See id. at 903 n.2. The Supreme Court was satisfied that the police
officers conducted the search pursuant to the warrant in good faith; the officers had not
submitted false or deceptive information to the magistrate. Id. at 902. The Court found
that, in such circumstances, the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule would have no
effect because the police officers did not knowingly violate the law. Id. at 918-19 (conclud-
ing that "even assuming that the [exclusionary] rule effectively deters some police miscon-
duct and provides incentives for the law enforcement profession as a whole to conduct
[VOL. 59:1
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In Leon, the Court pointed out that the exclusionary rule is a "ju-
dicially created remedy" and not a "personal constitutional right of
the party aggrieved."33 However, that is a recognition that the ab-
sence of explicit sanctions within the Fourth Amendment itself does
not mean that the courts lack power to fashion remedies to deter vio-
lations of the guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures."' Yet courts have failed to consider and to sanction the pat-
terns of arrest described here. The context in which the Bill of Rights
was drafted may offer one possible intellectual explanation for the
lack of explicit provisions to address Fourth Amendment violations.
Much of the public and political discussion leading up to the
presentation of Madison's draft of the Bill of Rights in 1789 focused
on the question of the necessity of a specific enumeration of individ-
ual rights.33 One of the main arguments against the amendments
was that they were unnecessary because the Constitution ensured that
the national government would have only those powers enumerated
therein. 3 Therefore, individuals were guaranteed freedom and non-
itself in accord with the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be expected, and should not be
applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity").
The Court disapproved of "[i ] ndiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule," but
upheld the prophylactic sanction of excluding evidence unlawfully obtained. Id. at 908,
923 (explaining that in some circumstances, "[s]uppression . . . remains an appropriate
remedy"). Suppression requires case-by-case scrutiny of the lawfulness of governmental
action and authorizes sanctions appropriate to deter unlawful governmental action. See id.
at 918 (discussing deterrence and concluding that "suppression of evidence obtained pur-
suant to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis"). On the record
presented herein and in other circumstances demonstrating wide-spread dismissals without
prosecution, the courts have a duty to determine what steps can be taken to deter and to
hold states accountable for those arrests that are disconnected from constitutional
protections.
330. Id. at 906 (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348).
331. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886) (remedying Fourth and Fifth
Amendment violations by excluding the product of illegal searches from evidence).
332. See LEvy, supra note 46, at 3-10 (describing the various arguments surrounding the
question of whether it was necessary to include a specific enumeration of rights in the
Constitution).
333. See ANAsTAPLO, supra note 277, at 11 (recognizing the argument that "there was no
need to provide assurances for additional rights, since the powers of the proposed Con-
gress did not extend to putting those rights in jeopardy"); LEVY, supra note 46, at 4 (citing
James Wilson's line of reasoning that the federal government's "authority rested on enu-
merated powers. Therefore everything not delegated to the United States was reserved to
the people or the states").
Others argued that the Constitution did not need to specify individual rights because
state constitutions already protected such rights. See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, supra note 277, at 15.
That begged the question, in Professor Anastaplo's view, of the relationship between the
state constitutions, on the one hand, and the new national Constitution on the other. Id.
at 15-16. Tension between federal and state criminal procedural rights presumably be-
came moot after the selective incorporation doctrine was applied. In addition, the
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interference except in those instances and to the extent that govern-
mental action is specifically authorized.334
Leonard Levy characterized the Constitution-writing process as
"measuring the powers of government, not the rights of the peo-
ple."33 5 The language of the amendments supports that interpreta-
tion. The Fourth Amendment, for example, references "[t] he right of
the people" to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 336
The amendment is worded to emphasize the limits of government au-
thority, and not to wax eloquently about the derivation or breadth of
the referenced right, or how to ensure that it is not violated.
Lip service is paid by the Supreme Court and by the lower courts
to the availability of post-arrest remedies, such as actions for damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 3 "7 As a matter of law, however, the civil rem-
edy does not act as a deterrent to the unconstitutional practice of ar-
resting individuals without the intent or the ability to prosecute them.
Furthermore, as a practical matter, the remedy is virtually unavailable
to the millions of individuals who are arrested each year.
There is a hierarchy of defenses that make § 1983 largely ineffec-
tual. First and foremost, states are not subject to damage actions
Supremacy Clause is a basis for determining the respective priorities of state versus federal
law. See generally U.S. CONST. art. VI (stating, in part, that the "Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land").
As discussed, James Madison eventually was persuaded of the danger that, enumerated
powers notwithstanding, the national government would be able to override presumed
individual liberties by laws created to "implement" the enumerated powers. See LEVY, supra
note 46, at 9 (explaining that Madison was of the opinion that "all power is subject to
abuse," and that "[t]he government possessed only limited powers but it might misuse
them"); supra notes 43-57 and accompanying text. Madison's articulation of the usefulness
of actual declarations of individual rights perhaps demonstrated as much statesman-like
vision as it did the practical and political necessity of yielding to the demand for the Bill of
Rights. See LEVY, supra note 46, at 9 ("Madison, who had long opposed a bill of rights,
finally changed his mind-mainly for political reasons, but also because he came to under-
stand that a bill of rights would complete the Constitution.").
334. The Supreme Court has described the effect of the Fourth Amendment as the
following:
The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United States and
Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and
restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to forever secure the peo-
ple, their persons, houses, papers and effects against all unreasonable searches
and seizures under the guise of law.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914) (emphasis added).
335. LEVY, supra note 46, at ix.
336. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
337. See infra notes 338-358 (discussing court imposed obstacles to recovery under
§ 1983); infra note 486 (providing, in part, the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
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under § 1983 because the civil rights statute does not abrogate state
sovereign immunity."' Therefore, under § 1983, the states are im-
mune from monetary liability for the operation of their arrest laws.339
Monetary liability would provide the greatest incentive for states to
ensure that their law enforcement practices and laws are constitu-
tional. In the absence of that remedy, the courts should strive to up-
hold constitutional protections related to arrest by fashioning other
remedies proportionate to the harm inflicted.
Second, as discussed, Monell is a hurdle to suits for damages
against local cities and counties as well.340 Those jurisdictions employ
the vast majority of law enforcement officers with arrest powers and
have the most direct control over their actions. 341 As with states, the
absence of financial incentives for county and for local governments
to uphold the Fourth Amendment requires court-fashioned sanctions.
In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 342 however, noteworthy for its strongly-
worded dissent, the Court declined to hold a city financially liable
even for life-threatening arrest practices. 34 3
In Lyons, the Court held that an individual who was subjected to a
choke hold by police without provocation during a traffic stop lacked
standing for damages and even for injunctive relief under § 1983.344
The Court framed the standing issue as whether the plaintiff would be
subjected to choke holds in the future, not whether the practice of the
Los Angeles Police Department was unreasonable when applied
against the plaintiff or might be applied against others in the fu-
ture.345 The opinion reads like a stretch to bar § 1983 relief.
338. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989) ("We cannot
conclude that § 1983 was intended to disregard the well established immunity of a State
from being sued without its consent.").
339. See id.
340. See supra note 267.
341. See 1995 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 172, at 20 tbl.1.17 (showing that local govern-
ments employ 79.7% of criminal justice system employees who engage primarily in "police
protection" activity as opposed to state governments, which employ 10.1% and the Federal
government, which employs 10.2% of such employees).
342. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
343. Id. at 91, 112-13.
344. Id. at 105 (denying standing to respondent Lyons, because he "failed to demon-
strate a case or controversy with the City that would justify the equitable relief sought"
(footnote omitted)).
345. Id. The Court stated:
That Lyons may have been illegally choked by the police .. .while presumably
affording Lyons standing to claim damages against the individual officers and
perhaps against the City, does nothing to establish a real and immediate threat
that he would again be stopped for a traffic violation, or for any other offense, by
an officer or officers who would illegally choke him into unconsciousness without
any provocation or resistance on his part.
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At the outset, the Court and the City agreed that the case was not
moot, even though the City had voluntarily imposed a moratorium on
the use of choke holds after numerous deaths.346 The Court main-
tained that the controversy was still alive because the moratorium
could be lifted at any time. 47 The plaintiff was not, however, entitled
to benefit from that logic. Justice Marshall, in his dissent, argued that
the majority opinion "immunizes from prospective equitable relief any
policy that authorizes persistent deprivations of constitutional rights
as long as no individual can establish with substantial certainty that he
will be injured, or injured again, in the future. 3 48
Third, § 1983 actions often are unsuccessful because the doctrine
of qualified immunity applies presumptively to actions of individual
law enforcement officers. 349 Additionally, state arrest laws themselves
give the officers a blanket shield of immunity. To overcome the pre-
sumption of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
individual, acting under color of law, acted either contrary to well-
established law, or in a manner that the individual could not have
believed was lawful.35 °
As demonstrated in Appendix A, the legal threshold for an indi-
vidual officer's decision to arrest an individual is set out in the respec-
tive laws of each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia. The
state statutes generally set probable cause as the standard for warrant-
less arrests. 351 As far as § 1983 is concerned, a police officer's decision
Id.
346. See id. at 101 (agreeing with the City's argument "that the case is not moot, since
the moratorium by its terms is not permanent").
347. Id.
348. Id. at 137 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
349. Cf Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1692, 1696 (1999) (explaining that "government
officials performing discretionary functions generally are granted a qualified immunity
and are 'shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known'" (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982))).
350. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191 (1984) (explaining that such individuals "are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known" (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818)).
351. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 594B(C) (1996 & Supp. 1998) (explaining that
"[a] police officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the officer has probable cause
to believe that a felony has been committed or attempted and that such person has com-
mitted or attempted to commit a felony whether or not in the officer's presence or view.").
As shown in Appendix A, numerous states also authorize warrantless arrests when an of-
fense is committed in the presence of a police officer. The "in the presence" formulation
also constitutes probable cause, and is not a separate legal distinction. An officer's observa-
tion of a crime would give that officer a reasonable belief that a crime occurred, and that
the person the officer observed committed it. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102
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to arrest can easily be made to fit the statutory requirements of arrest.
Many scenarios and assumptions fall within the probable cause formu-
lation; the odds are greatly in favor of police officers articulating
enough "belief' to meet the threshold.
The interaction of statutory standards for arrest and the practical
realities of how those standards are applied calls into question
whether qualified immunity should be presumed when police officers
make arrests. The statutory bases for arrest prescribed in state laws
are, in actuality, legal conclusions rather than legal standards. They
do not define or delineate permissible official action. 52 Each police
officer is allowed to decide for himself whether the circumstances of a
particular case constitute probable cause. Thus, there is, in reality, no
"established law" of probable cause. As long as an officer states his
belief that the facts before him constituted a crime and that the ar-
rested individual committed that crime, there is precious little likeli-
hood that the officer will be held liable under § 1983 for an
unreasonable arrest.
35 3
Finally, prosecutors cannot be held financially liable under
§ 1983 for their decisions to go forward on a case or group of cases or
(1959) (stating that "[p]robable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the
officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed" (citing
Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878))); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161
(1925) ("If the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of
prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been omitted, it is sufficient."
(quoting Stacey, 97 U.S. at 645)).
352. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 594B (employing a probable cause standard for
arrests but never defining probable cause).
353. Individuals are arrested even though their conduct is not covered by applicable
criminal statutes. Those arrests surely are unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. The reluctance of courts to apply § 1983 towards police officers and munici-
palities in such situations has the effect of sanctioning flagrant abuses of power. As pres-
sure mounts on police departments to protect the "quality of life" in neighborhoods, it is
foreseeable that arrests will proliferate for individuals who gather on public streets and
frequent public areas. See Herman Goldstein, The New Policing: Confronting Complexity, in
CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA, supra note 216, at 95, 97 (discussing the increase in commu-
nity policing and stating that "the new forms of policing expand the police function from
crime fighting, without an abdication of that role, to include maintaining order, dealing
with quality-of-life offenses, and fixing the 'broken windows'"); supra note 289. It can be
expected that more individuals will be arrested for "loitering," for example. Police officers
could construe loitering ordinances and statutes to allow them to order individuals away
from particular locations or public streets, and to arrest individuals who disobey those
orders.
It can also be expected that states will argue that such "mistakes" of law by police
officers fall within Leon's good faith test for application of the exclusionary rule. For pur-
poses of § 1983 and the exclusionary rule, courts should consider whether police officer
claims of "ignorance of the law" mask either an indifference to appropriate legal standards,
or even conscious disregard of them.
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to dismiss cases. In Imbler v. Pachtman,3 "4 the Court held that
prosecutorial discretion is absolutely immune from liability. 5 5 Imbler
relied on Griffith v. Slinkard, 6 the first case, in the United States, on
prosecutorial immunity from a suit. Griffith upheld a prosecutor's ab-
solute immunity in the face of a claim that he allowed a case lacking
probable cause to go forward. 7 Imbler recognized the difference be-
tween qualified immunity, which is available to police officers, and the
absolute immunity of prosecutors and judicial officers. The Court
explained:
The procedural difference between the absolute and the
qualified immunities is important. An absolute immunity
defeats a suit at the outset, so long as the official's actions
were within the scope of the immunity. The fate of an offi-
cial with qualified immunity depends upon the circum-
stances and motivations of his actions, as established by the
evidence at trial.3 58
The absolute immunity afforded prosecutors in the performance
of their prosecutorial duties is based on prudential considerations of
preventing harassment of public officials and encouraging courage
and independence in prosecutorial decisionmaking. 359 The Court
has also surmised that the possibility of civil liability of prosecutors
could put the criminal justice system itself injeopardy.36 0 The Court's
decisions on prosecutorial immunity, however, take generalizations
about law enforcement interests at face value, instead of considering
whether those generalizations are accurate. Courts need to consider
354. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
355. Id. at 431. Imbler was a § 1983 suit for malicious prosecution. Id. at 410. Following
Imbler's conviction for felony murder, the state court prosecutor notified the Governor of
California that he had uncovered evidence substantiating Imbler's claimed alibi, and cast-
ing doubt on a key government witness. See id. at 412.
356. 44 N.E. 1001 (Ind. 1896).
357. See id. at 1002 (explaining that "[t] here is... no more liability against the prosecut-
ing attorney than there is against the grand jury for the return of an indictment maliciously
and without probable cause").
358. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 419 n.13 (citing Scherer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1974);
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320-22 (1975)).
359. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422-23 (noting that the "common-law immunity of a prosecu-
tor is based upon the same considerations that underlie the common-law immunities of
judges and grand jurors" and that these considerations include preventing harassment and
allowing the prosecutor to exercise discretion).
360. See id. at 426-29 (considering the effect that constant fear of defendant retaliation
would have on prosecutors trying to do their duty); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343
(1986) ("Exposing the prosecutor to liability for the initial phase of his prosecutorial work
could interfere with his exercise of independentjudgment at every phase of his work, since
the prosecutor might come to see later decisions in terms of their effect on his potential
liability.").
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carefully whether the asserted working assumptions about law enforce-
ment and prosecution have overtaken explicit constitutional
provisions.
Imbler presented an opportunity for the Court to make a distinc-
tion between cases where prosecutorial decisionmaking merits immu-
nity, and those where it does not. Griffith presented a claim that the
prosecutor caused a case to go forward, even though he knew prob-
able cause was not present.3 6' The prosecutor in Imbler, by contrast,
took the extraordinary steps of continuing to investigate facts of the
case even after conviction and sentencing, and then disclosing excul-
patory information.3 62 Thus, the two cases present both extremes of
prosecutorial discretion, yet the Court treated them as of a piece. The
Court's historical fears about the chilling effect of prosecutorial liabil-
ity have supplanted the creation of a standard of review to distinguish
between the good faith cases and those involving improper
conduct. 36
3
361. Griffith, 44 N.E. at 1001-02.
362. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 412.
363. A more recent case involving prosecutorial immunity, Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S.
118 (1997), shows how distinctions can be made about a prosecutor's actions. Kalina af-
firmed the traditional absolute immunity for a prosecutor's decisions relating to charging
crimes. See id. The Court, however, stated that a prosecutor was only entitled to quali-
fied-not absolute-immunity for the evidentiary affirmation in the procurement of an
arrest warrant, a role traditionally performed by police and not by prosecutors. Id. It is too
soon to know whether the Court will follow Kalina's example of parsing individual
prosecutorial decisions to determine whether some do not merit absolute immunity. See
also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 275 (1993) (holding that prosecutors were enti-
tled only to qualified immunity for their actions in acquiring a bootprint before a special
grand jury was empaneled and stating that "[t]he prosecutors' conduct occurred well
before they could properly claim to be acting as advocates"); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,
494 (1991) (holding that a prosecutor could claim only qualified immunity for the act of
giving advice to police resulting in a confession obtained under hypnosis, and stating that
"[a]bsolute immunity is designed to free the judicial process from the harassment and
intimidation associated with litigation. That concern therefore justifies absolute
prosecutorial immunity only for actions that are connected with the prosecutor's role in
judicial proceedings, not for every litigation-inducing conduct").
The focus of the Kalina and Imbler opinions on the actions of prosecutors that consti-
tute prosecutorial discretion assumes that prosecutors are, in fact, making knowing and
intentional decisions about the cases before them. As the discussion about charging prac-
tices indicates, however, many criminal cases are initiated without the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. See supra notes 100-148 and accompanying text. Those cases, pri-
marily misdemeanors, are initiated solely upon the charging decisions of arresting police
officers. Prosecutors literally become aware of the cases for the first time when they appear
at a hearing or on the scheduled trial date. In those instances, prosecutorial discretion has
not been exercised. Thus, judicial abstention and application of absolute immunity are
not appropriate. The state should be held responsible for its failure of the prosecution
function, especially where the failure either encourages, or does not guard against, Fourth
Amendment violations.
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The sum total of the Court's approach to remedying violations of
Fourth Amendment rights during arrests makes the likelihood of pre-
vailing in a § 1983 suit so slim that the statute does not serve as an
effective deterrent against illegal arrests.3
64
B. The Public Interest
1. Measuring the Public Interest.-Most of the controlling law on
the Fourth Amendment regarding arrests constitutes what Justice
Scalia has termed the Supreme Court's "own (quite irrefutable be-
cause entirely value laden) 'balancing' of the competing demands of
the individual and the State." '365 Scalia's characterization of the stan-
dards as "irrefutable" is on the mark. Except on rare occasions, such
as Tennessee v. Garner,36 6 the Court has not looked behind the "irrefu-
table" or even supposed (because not articulated) justifications for law
enforcement practices. There is currently no burden on states to jus-
tify any of their routine practices with regard to arrests.
The justification for decisions to arrest a person and to charge
him with a crime, and whether to detain him until the case is dis-
missed or release him before final disposition with restrictions on his
freedom, should be easy to articulate. Requiring articulation is the
only way to ensure that the guarantees in the Bill of Rights are not
subsumed, just as some of the Framers feared, by the day-to-day func-
tions and assumed prerogatives of the states.367
It is a straight-forward proposition that law enforcement is neces-
sary to protect public interests and the safety of individuals and their
property. That common sense theory aside, the practical application
of arrest laws, as discussed in this Article, has two main problems that
undermine the law enforcement rationale. First, for millions of ar-
rests, the state does not articulate how most individual arrests or even
categories of arrest further its interests sufficiently to overcome the
presumptive right of individuals to be left alone that is embodied in
364. In Imbler, the Court wanted to "emphasize" that the absolute immunity from finan-
cial liability available to prosecutors "does not leave the public powerless to deter miscon-
duct or to punish that which occurs." Imbler, 424 U.S. at 428-29. The Court stated that
criminal prosecution and professional discipline were sufficient alternative "checks" on
prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 429. It is necessary then to consider whether either of
those sanctions are applied frequently enough to constitute a "check."
365. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 65 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
366. 471 U.S. 1 (1985); see supra notes 256-262 and accompanying text.
367. See MYKKELTVEDT, supra note 89, at 1-13 (noting that some of the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment thought its purpose was to make the Bill of Rights wholly applica-
ble to state governments).
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the Fourth Amendment. 368 Second, operation of the arrest power, as
discussed here, is counter to the public interest.
Garner is an example of how a court can and should weigh the
individual right/government interest equation. 69 The Court reiter-
ated that reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment depends on
both when and on how a seizure takes place.' The state contended
that the discretion to use deadly force against burglary suspects was
essential, in view of the danger of violence during apprehension. 1
In considering that contention, the Court relied on the Unform Crime
Reports published by the FBI that are used in this Article to document
the incidences of arrests and convictions. The statistics used by the
Court documented that only 3.8% of all burglaries from 1973 through
1982 involved violence.3 7 2 The Court also noted that the FBI catego-
rized burglary as a property, rather than a violent crime.3 7 3
In addition, the Court was persuaded by research showing that
deadly force laws similar to Tennessee's "actually do not protect citi-
zens or law enforcement officers, do not deter crime or alleviate the
problems caused by crime, and do not improve the crime fighting
ability of law enforcement agencies. ' 374 The Court found support for
that view in a "long-term movement" by states and by police agencies
away from use of deadly force toward any fleeing felon, without proof
of the felon's dangerousness. 5
368. See generally ANAsTAPLO, supra note 277, at 69-71 (discussing the development of the
right not to be subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures).
369. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 8-12 (discussing the application of a "balancing of competing
interests" to determine whether the use of deadly force on a fleeing suspect is constitu-
tional in the presence of mitigating circumstances (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452
U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981))).
370. Id. at 9-11 (finding that the use of deadly force is a seizure of a suspect's life and
that such seizure is unconstitutional unless the officer has probable cause to believe the
suspect poses a threat of serious harm to either the officer or to others).
371. See id. at 11.
372. Id. at 21.
373. Id.; see supra notes 154-159 and accompanying text (regarding compilation of the
FBI statistics).
374. Garner, 471 U.S. at 19 (citing Brief for Police Foundation, et al., as Amici Curiae, at
11).
375. Id. at 18. The dissent argued that a constitutional challenge to a state statute "does
not impose a burden on the State to produce social science statistics or to dispel any possi-
ble doubts about the necessity of the conduct." Id. at 28 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). None-
theless, the dissent relied on Department ofJustice statistics showing the number of violent
crimes committed during burglaries. Id. at 26-27. Justice O'Connor seemed to be swayed
because less restrictive deadly force laws had "the approval of nearly half of the state legisla-
tures," as well as a history predating the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 32.
For the dissent, however, the ultimate consideration for determining the reasonable-
ness of the use of deadly force pursuant to the Tennessee statute was the knowledge, or
lack thereof, of the individual officer pursuing the suspect. Id. at 29-30. In Garner, the
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The Court's examination of the stated law enforcement rationale
in Garner against the public interest resulted in a determination that
the public interest was not served by the state's deadly force statute.3 76
In view of the large and varied number of offenses in which arrest is
authorized solely upon the decision of individual police officers, cou-
pled with the large numbers of those arrests that do not result in pros-
ecution, the courts should affirmatively inquire into whether Fourth
Amendment rights are properly balanced against law enforcement
interests.
2. Threats to the Public Interest.-It is an understatement to say
that arrest practices since the 1970s have not been a "sufficiently pro-
ductive means of accomplishing" the ultimate ends of law enforce-
ment.3 77 The rising crime rates during the 1980s and 1990s refute the
assumed utility of the arrest practices. If those rates are viewed in rela-
tion to the number of arrests during the period, the deterrent value of
arrests is dubious.
Arrests have a consequential negative impact on the persons ar-
rested and on their families, yet the record discussed in this Article
discloses more than ten million arrests annually.3 7' These facts, cou-
pled with crime rates throughout the period, lead to the conclusion
that some other factor is at work that refutes the logical conclusion
that arrests deter the commission of crime. In response to that
enigma, one might conclude that the "wrong" people are being ar-
rested; the crime rate (even adjusted by recent downward trends) and
prosecution rates suggest that millions of criminals apparently remain
free.37 9
police officer testified at trial that he was "'reasonably sure'" and "'figured'" that Garner
was unarmed and thought that Garner was 17 or 18 years old and about 5'5" or 5'7" tall.
Garner, 471 U.S. at 3-4 (citation omitted). Additionally, Justice O'Connor noted the officer
who "pursued a suspect in the darkened backyard of a house that from all indications had
just been burglarized," was not certain if the suspect was alone or armed, nor did he know
what happened in the house. Garner, 471 U.S. at 29-30 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Taking
these facts into consideration, Justice O'Connor concluded by stating:
Whatever the constitutional limits on police use of deadly force in order to appre-
hend a fleeing felon, I do not believe they are exceeded in a case in which a
police officer has probable cause to arrest a suspect at the scene of a residential
burglary, orders the suspect to halt, and then fires his weapon as a last resort to
prevent the suspect's escape into the night.
Id. at 32.
376. Garner, 471 U.S. at 9-10 (discussing how the use of deadly force not only "frustrates
the interest of the individual," but is a "self defeating way of apprehending a suspect and so
setting the criminal justice mechanism in motion").
377. Id. at 10.
378. See app. C, tbls.2, 3, & 4 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 172-201 and accompanying text.
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An equally plausible explanation is that arrest practices do not
deter crime because "the word is out" that arrests do not lead to prose-
cution in a large number of cases. Thus, hardened criminals or re-
peat offenders might be willing to risk arrest through the commission
of crimes, because it is only a temporary inconvenience. The odds of
a longer lasting or more severe sanction are not great because the
dismissal rate is so high. That "cost-benefit analysis" by some offend-
ers means that current wholesale arrest practices produce a distinct
harm to the public interest because they are not working. State arrest
laws and practices have to be judged from the perspective of the harm
they cause to individual rights and to the larger public interest.380
Despite a law enforcement rationale that frequent arrests deter
crime and/or create respect for law, common sense and empirical
data undercut that assertion. 8 1 It is not difficult to test the respect-
for-law argument. On any given work day in any major city in the
country, the halls of the local courthouse are teeming with individuals
brought before the bar of justice, often accompanied by family mem-
bers, neighbors, or friends who are equally disoriented about the pro-
cess about to unfold. Arrestees who were not able to post bond might
be brought through a courtroom hallway shackled together, like an
insolent daisy chain.
The criminal courtrooms are a beehive of activity. They are one
of the few urban venues that are usually filled to capacity before 10:00
a.m. The assembled crowd is treated to an endless drone of names
and case numbers. Many of the outcomes are bewilderingly familiar.
The court or prosecutor will announce that a case is dismissed and
that a defendant is discharged, at times, even before the defendant
has had sufficient time to make his way through the crowd to stand
before the bench. Usually no reason is given when a case is dismissed.
That scenario, replicated hundreds, if not thousands, of times in
our nation's courts every day, undermines the perception of effective
law enforcement. The most dangerous result is that defendants who
pose a genuine threat to society quickly surmise that the odds of being
380. Obviously, the overwhelming majority of the law enforcement community does not
contend that every law violation necessitates an arrest. One element of the discretion held
by law enforcement officers is the authority not to make arrests in given circumstances.
Common sense and hard budgetary facts make it clear that no system could bear the finan-
cial burden of pursuing every law violation. Cf Goldstein, supra note 289, at 95 (stating
that "we need to be aware of the avalanche of business that ... [an] expansion of the
police function invites lest it constitute a serious self-inflicted wound"). Those limitations
demand a far more judicious and rational arrest policy than many jurisdictions
demonstrate.
381. See infra note 385.
2000]
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sanctioned for criminal conduct are in a defendant's favor. To the
many urban residents who are disaffected from the criminal justice
system, these daily outcomes can only reinforce a sense that there is no
sense to the system. When so many cases are dismissed, it is not irra-
tional to speculate that the stated reasons for many arrests were
fabrications.
Even those citizens who harbor some faith in the fairness and in
the rationality of the system must become disillusioned by the percep-
tion that "nothing" happens in the courts, despite the time spent and
the large number of people involved.38 2 The competency of govern-
ment officers is drawn into doubt from the perception that so many
"weak" cases are filed. The same conclusion can result from the per-
ception that the government is unable to prepare cases sufficiently to
go to trial.
Poor public perception is not the only cost of a system filled to
overcapacity with cases that are not prosecuted. Police officers spend
countless hours off public streets preparing for the many cases that
are not prosecuted. Arrest reports and other paperwork must be com-
pleted. Arrestees must be transported and processed for booking. Of-
ficers wait in courthouses for hours, often at the loss of sleep and rest,
before they are informed that cases are dismissed. Any of the time
spent on these activities are hours when police are not patrolling pub-
lic streets, investigating cases that should be prosecuted, or doing
other police work that might produce beneficial results.
Each of these circumstances presents a concrete danger to soci-
ety. Any such danger warrants a close examination of the system that
produces it. Those dangers, coupled with the deprivation of liberty
for many citizens contrary to the criminal procedures required by the
Constitution, require that the courts look behind blanket law enforce-
ment rationales.
3. Deterrence as a Rationale. -Numerous studies have been
designed to measure the effects of arrest, and of particular arrest poli-
cies, such as those aimed at particular categories of crimes.38 3 The
382. Cf FEENEY ET AL. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ARRESTS WITHOUT CONVICTION: How
OFTEN THEY OCCUR AND WHY 8 (1983) (discussing how case attrition offends the public's
sense of justice in that the wrongs to be righted by the justice system are not being
vindicated).
383. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Sherman, Policing for Crime Prevention, in OFFCE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PREVENTING CRIME: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN'T,
WHAT'S PROMISING 8-1 (1997) (finding that robbery, disorder, gun violence, drunk driving,
and domestic violence may be prevented by police action "but only by using certain meth-
ods under certain conditions").
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studies range from those that are individual-specific and use recidi-
vism as the measure for the effectiveness of arrest policies, to those
that might be jurisdiction or offense based.384 These latter categories
may study whether arrest policies directed at specific offenses have an
impact on the future occurrence of those offenses, or whether a more
general but increased arrest policy affects the incidence of crime gen-
erally, or affects the types of offenses. Whatever the methodology, the
studies do not document that theories of deterrence correlate to the
millions of arrests that take place annually throughout the United
States.385
Of more fundamental importance, our system does not sanction
depriving some individuals of their constitutional rights to deter
others. Some might assert, for example, that strict law enforcement
against "squeegee" cleaners in New York City deters other forms of
crime.386 Proponents of such policies might contend that deterrence
occurs because more police are on the streets who can apprehend law
breakers, or because the policy sends the message that any law viola-
tion, no matter how minor, will be prosecuted.
The Constitution requires that each individual be accorded his
individual rights. The operating assumption has to be that an individ-
ual is arrested only for crimes that he has committed and only if the
state has the intention-and the wherewithal-to prosecute the ar-
384. See, e.g., id. at 8-1, 8-16 (comparing policing techniques intended to prevent crime
that focus either on the individual offender or categorical crimes).
385. The results of research about the effectiveness of increased arrests on crime rates
are mixed. Out of seven studies on reactive arrests reported between 1974 and 1991, three
studies documented no correlation between higher arrest rates and crime; one found a
correlation beyond a "tipping point"-a threshold beyond which the effects of increased
arrests become evident-with no effect for a number of arrests below the tip point; one
reported a tipping effect of increased arrest rates on cities with populations under 10,000;
however, another found no arrest rate effect for cities of more than 10,000. See id. at 8-17
fig.8-5a. One study showed that increased arrests correlated to a reduction in robberies,
but not to four property crimes. See id. at 8-16, 8-17 fig.8-5a.
Similar disparate findings were made on the effect of increased arrest in drug market
areas, for drunk driving and under "zero-tolerance" policies. See id. at 8-22 fig.8-6c, 8-23
fig.8-6d & 8-6e. Specific deterrence aimed at juvenile crime and domestic violence simi-
larly yielded no exact correlation. See id. at 8-18 fig.8-5b.
386. Cf David Whitman, On Not Believing the Good News, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
Dec. 29, 1997, at 3 (claiming that those arrested for minor "quality of life offenses" often
had rap sheets for violent crimes or were carrying unregistered weapons and " [a]s a result,
word spread on the street that it was a bad idea to carry weapons in public, which curbed




rested person in accordance with the law."8 7 Similarly, arrests cannot
be used only to give the appearance of orderly neighborhoods or to
demonstrate an effective police presence. Arrests for disorderly con-
duct, loitering, and other so-called "quality of life" offenses are lawful
only if probable cause exists for the arrests, and if the purpose of the
arrests is to initiate prosecution for the offenses."' 8 In Ex parte Qui-
r/n, s9 the Court made clear that an individual's rights cannot be sacri-
ficed for general theories of law enforcement. The Court stated that
"[c] onstitutional safeguards for the protection of all who are charged
with offenses are not to be disregarded in order to inflict merited pun-
ishments on some who are guilty." 9 °
4. Negative Social Consequences. -Numerous scholars have stud-
ied and have documented the numerical disparities between whites
and nonwhites in the criminal justice system.391 One direct conse-
quence and harm of the disparities is the psychological and economic
impact the disparate treatment has on minorities.392 Despite evidence
of the disproportionate representations of minorities in the criminal
justice system, there is nonetheless a tendency among the majority
population to dissociate feelings of alienation among minorities from
their likely contributing factors. Such dissociation allows one to mar-
387. But see Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979) ("The Constitution does not
guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested. If it did, § 1983 would provide a cause of
action for every defendant acquitted-indeed, for every suspect released.").
388. See generally Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 165-68 (1972) (discussing
the range of conduct that such vagrancy ordinances cover and finding its breadth unconsti-
tutional in that it is so large and so vague that ascertainable standards of guilt and even-
handed prosecution are lacking).
389. 371 U.S. 1 (1942).
390. Id. at 25.
391. See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAw (1997); MILLER, supra note
167; KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE FEAR, BLACK
PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND OTHER MACROAGGRESSIONS (1998); MICHAEL
TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995).
Katheryn Russell cited Uniform Crime Reports data that estimates that blacks accounted
for approximately 30% of arrests between 1991 and 1995, despite constituting only 12% of
the population. RUSSELL, supra, at 111-13 & tbl.7.2. She presented, however, numerous
factors indicating that conclusions about the existence of or lack of racial discrimination in
the criminal justice system may be flawed, because the conclusions, for example, do not
measure other significant phases of police/citizen interaction. Id. at 28, 32-33. She
pointed out that a traffic or investigatory stop of a black person by police often sets a
dynamic in motion that is predictive that an arrest will occur. Id. at 32-33. If the identical
profiles for such stops and attitudes accompanying the stops are not used on white per-
sons, they are not at risk of arrest with the same frequency as black persons are.
392. See RUSSELL, supra note 391, at 111-29 (discussing how police discretion, when mak-
ing arrests, accounts for inflated arrest rates for blacks and noting the effect that arrest
records will have on present and future employment).
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vel, for example, at the phenomenon of so-called "black rage," be-
cause it does not link the rage with the belief that minorities suffer
poorer treatment by police than white persons. However, continua-
tion of staggering numbers of arrests that do not result in prosecu-
tion cause the perceptions to solidify.
At least one consequential effect of the high arrest rate for minor-
ities is the maintenance of a perpetual underclass.393 Even if the inci-
dences of poverty, less education, and unemployment are relatively
high among minority members even without entanglement with the
criminal justice system, that status easily becomes a predictable and
permanent fixture after an individual of color waltzes in handcuffs
through booking and arraignment. As discussed, an arrest can "relate
back" to a prior conviction, such that an individual remains locked
into the criminal justice system in perpetuity.
The stigmatization of a criminal record is one effect of improvi-
dent arrests. Another effect is the documented correlation between
arrests and unemployment. In a study of juveniles between 1940 and
1958, researchers found that "incarceration appears to cut off oppor-
tunities and prospects for stable employment later in life.., job stabil-
ity in turn has importance in explaining later crime." '94 For adults,
another researcher concluded by 1992 that "[e]ven if most underclass
males who are arrested do not go to jail, the experience of arrest can
have long-term, even intergenerational repercussions . . .a criminal
arrest record has detrimental consequences for labor market out-
comes, with negative effects on employment as much as eight years
later."
395
Jerome G. Miller has documented research indicating the phe-
nomenon of "racial labeling." Social psychologists and sociologists
contend that the stigma of having a criminal record can create and
perpetuate social alienation that increases the likelihood of future law
violations.3 96
The probation and parole systems also intensify the negative ef-
fect of arrests, thereby contributing to perpetual disadvantage. Those
systems mirror popular views about retribution, the need to be
393. See id. at 111-24 (illustrating how discretionary arrests inflate national black versus
white criminal activity and arrest statistics); see also supra notes 291-298, 302-304, 342-345,
and accompanying text.
394. John H. Laub & RobertJ. Sampson, "The Long Term Effect of Punitive Discipline"
(Feb. 1993), revised version of paper presented at the Life History Research Society Meet-
ing, May 6, 1992 (cited in MILLER, supra note 167, at 116).
395. John Hagan, The Poverty of a Classless Criminology, J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 30, No. 1, 10
(Feb. 1992) (cited in MILLER, supra note 167, at 117).
396. See MILLER, supra note 167, at 112.
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"tough" on law violators, and common fears about the risk of personal
harm. These factors have led to the anomalous situation where "pro-
bation is now as likely as not to increase the risk of rearrest and impris-
onment."397 Strict enforcement of minor conditions of release and an
attitude of "[w]hen in doubt ... revoke parole" create this contradic-
tory result.
398
Finally, a high arrest rate among minorities, no matter what the
outcome of the criminal charges, fixes a public perception of minori-
ties that keeps the cycle alive. That perception undoubtedly is fed by
news accounts, but its provenance is the many arrests of minorities. 99
397. Id.
398. William Dickey, "Reflections of a Former Corrections Director: Are Offenders
Tougher Today?," Federal Probation 56 no. 2, 43 (June 1992) (cited in MILLER, supra note
167, at 129); see also MILLER, supra note 167, at 131 (reporting that in 1993, more than one
third of the 120,000 inmates in the California prison system were back in prison because
their parole officers revoked parole due to minor violations, such as failing to report a new
address, or missing appointments, and that readmission to prison for technical parole vio-
lations increased nationally from 14.5% to 30.5% of all prison admissions between 1977
and 1991).
399. Scholars contribute to the public perception by their reliance on "arithmetic." In
Race, Crime and the Law, for example, Randall Kennedy took on what he termed "a ten-
dency to deny troublesome realities"-in particular, the tendency to "deny claims that
blacks commit a disproportionate percentage of street crimes." KENNEDY, supra note 391, at
22 (emphasis added). Professor Kennedy's authority for the proposition that the amount
of crime committed by blacks is statistics indicating blacks are arrested for 44.8% of all
violent crime, 55.1% of homicides, 42.8% of those arrested for rape, and 60.9% of those
arrested for robbery. Id. at 22-23. Without analysis of the outcome of those arrests, the
statistics are misleading.
Charles Silberman contributed to similar inexactitude by correlating arrest statistics
with the presumed rates of commission of crimes by minority group members. SILBERMAN,
supra note 1, at 161-65. Silberman extrapolated available data to prove his point that arrest
rates generally correlate with the commission of crime. Silberman's methods also adopt
some common assumptions that bear more careful treatment. He contended, for exam-
ple, that the different arrest rate between blacks (higher) and Hispanics (lower) confirms
the notion that arrests equal crimes committed. Because each group is subjected to ra-
cism, Silberman reasoned, the only reason for the different arrest rates must be that one
group-blacks-in fact commits more crime than the other. Id. at 161-62. That logic does
not take into account, for example, whether the racial experience of the two groups dif-
fers, whether it be harassment by police, or the likelihood of a police encounter resulting
in arrest.
Silberman also relied on victimization reports. He contended that those reports sup-
port his conclusion that arrests are an accurate measure of the commission of crimes by
blacks because, for example, in 1975 robbery victims identified the offender as black 60%
of the time, and blacks made up 58.8% of robbery arrests that year. Id. at 616. That rea-
soning plays carelessly into public attitudes by which black men often are presumed to be
the assailant or dangerous. See RUSSELL, supra note 391, at 76-86 (discussing the impact of
racial hoaxes on crime); id. at 26-46 (evaluating studies on disproportionate crime statistics
against other factors, such as police treatment of black men).
Michael Tonry used similar statistics and reasoning for his conclusion that "[a]rrests
can by and large be taken as reasonable reflections of the involvement in serious crimes of
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V. DISTRACTIONS FROM THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
One result of pressing for a direct relationship between arrests
and outcomes in the criminal justice system is laying bare two decid-
edly opposite views of the Fourth Amendment. The one I propose
requires government tojustify both its systemic practices and its arrest
decisions in individual cases. I do not presume the "need" for every
arrest that occurs under current practices, whether the issue is viewed
from the perspective of the public interest in safety or from theories
of deterrence. On the available record, there is no basis for conclud-
ing that arrest rates correlate to the commission of crime. The rates at
which prosecutors dismiss cases mean that the number of arrests does
not establish the criminality of many individuals who are arrested.
The ratio between arrests for serious offenses and those for nonseri-
ous offenses, and the subsequent effect on the nature of criminal
cases in which most convictions are obtained, mean that arrest rates
are not an accurate measure of public safety.
The countervailing view of law enforcement presumes justifica-
tion for the manner by which individual states implement their re-
spective arrest laws. Despite the fact that the public benefit derived
from current arrest and from prosecution practices remains vague or
even dubious, jurisdictions in the United States are not tasked by the
courts with justifying arrests against the deprivation of individual lib-
erty that so many individuals experience. A law enforcement rationale
is taken at face value, even if it is not articulated.400 Under this latter
members of different racial groups." MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 71 (1995). Tonry also relied on studies showing a correlation
between victimization reports and offenses by members of minority racial groups. Id. at 68-
80. The studies he used measured victimization reports for the crimes of robbery, assault,
and larceny-crimes in which a victim is most likely to see his assailant. As discussed,
however, those crimes represent a much smaller percentage of total arrests. And his data is
current only through 1991; Professor Tonry's book did not have the "benefit" of statistics
reflecting increased drug arrests through the 1990s. In addition, none of the cited data
documents the relationship between arrests and case outcomes for minority groups in mis-
demeanor cases, the largest category of arrests.
Finally, Tonry made plain that researchers report an inability to document disparate
racial treatment. Id. at 71. In an area so heavily laden with unspoken human motivations
and incentives not to document racial animus, reliance on a statistical non-event may prove
too much.
The tendency of some scholars to equate arrests with crime commission does not en-
courage disciplined and careful analysis of major issues of law or public policy. This ten-
dency also undermines the principle that, under our criminal justice system, no one is
presumed guilty until and unless proven guilty in the manner constitutionally provided.
See also supra notes 124-126 and accompanying text.
400. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1975) (stating that probable cause is the
standard for arrest and is "defined in terms of facts and circumstances 'sufficient to war-
rant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an
2000]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
view, arrest practices are drawn into question only if the extraordinary
occurs in individual cases, such as the fatal shooting in Garner v.
Tennessee.4 01
A. Fealty to Federalism
Two intellectual approaches may account for the latter interpre-
tation. At least two distinct tensions are articulated in many Fourth
Amendment cases. The first is whether the Supreme Court has the
"authority" to review state court decisions and state laws about search
and seizure.4" 2 The second is a presumption that state law enforce-
ment authorities enjoy virtually unfettered discretion in protecting
the public interest, and a corollary assumption that judicial review (at
least, review by the federal courts) undermines long-standing defer-
ence to that discretion.4 °3 Each concern misperceives application of
the Fourth Amendment to the states.
In Wolf v. Colorado,4°4 the Fourth Amendment was incorporated
into the Fourteenth Amendment and thereby made applicable to the
states.40 5 Wolf was not a decision on the choice of laws-state versus
federal-available in Fourth Amendment cases; its determination that
the Fourth Amendment involved fundamental values established a
constitutional benchmark for state conduct.406 Despite the incorpora-
tion doctrine, however, the Supreme Court has continued to treat
search and seizure issues as though state laws alone determine the
legality of governmental action.
The Court's efforts to inject the issue of federal-state relations
into its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence have resulted in a diminu-
offense"' and stating that the standard, "like those for searches and seizures, represents a
necessary accommodation between the individual's right to liberty and the state's duty to
control crime." (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964))).
401. 471 U.S. 1 (1985); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996) (dis-
cussing the lack ofjudicial review for police enforcement practices).
402. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963) (finding that "[s] tates are not thereby
precluded from developing workable rules governing arrests, searches and seizures to meet
'the practical demands of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement' in the
States, provided that those rules do not violate the constitutional proscription of unreason-
able searches and seizures" (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 252 (1960))).
403. Cf Whren, 517 U.S. at 814-15 (discussing an officer's authority to make arrests based
on probable cause and on the judiciary's inability to speculate about an officer's reaction
to a set of circumstances except in extraordinary cases).
404. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
405. See generally supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
406. Wolf 338 U.S. at 27 ("The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the
police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is
therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause.").
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tion of an explicit individual guarantee. The federal-state game of
"tug o' war" treats the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unrea-
sonable search and seizure as a "zero sum" game; if the amendment is
enforced by its terms and given weight as a delineation between state
powers and individual liberty, the reasoning seems to go, state sover-
eignty is perforce endangered. That approach confuses the issue of
prescribing the bases and methods of search and seizure (an appro-
priate state function), on the one hand, and determining compliance
with the Fourth Amendment (a judicial function) on the other. Ker v.
California4 °7 helped keep the area murky.
In Ker, the first Fourth Amendment case decided after Mapp in-
volving application of the exclusionary rule to state prosecutions, the
Court stated that Mapp "implied no total obliteration of state laws re-
lating to arrests and seizures in favor of federal law."408 On that
much, there is little genuine dispute. State laws continued to govern
arrest and search practices generally.4"9
The plaintiff in Ker, however, asserted that his Fourth Amend-
ment rights had been violated.410 The issue was whether officers'
unannounced entry into an apartment was illegal.411 If the search
and seizure were illegal, Mapp required exclusion of any resulting evi-
dence.412 The Court, however, framed the issue in a way that sug-
gested a conflict between the federal and state law when one did not
exist.41
3
A California statute requires that officers first demand entry and
state their purpose.4 14 A 1955 decision by the California Supreme
Court required exclusion of evidence obtained by an unlawful search
and seizure.415 The California courts had, however, affirmed an ex-
ception to the prior-announcement law, identical to that recognized
407. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
408. Id. at 31.
409. See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589-90 (1948) (finding that, in the absence
of a specific federal provision, state law governing warrantless arrests applies, even to ar-
rests by federal law enforcement officers).
410. Ker, 374 U.S. at 24-25.
411. See id.
412. See id. at 30-31.
413. See id. at 34-37 (finding that, because the officers had no search warrant, the admis-
sibility of the evidence turned on whether it was the product of a search incident to a
lawful arrest and determining that the lawfulness of arrests for federal offenses are deter-
mined by state law as long as it is not in violation of the Constitution).
414. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 844 (West 1985).
415. See People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 906 (Cal. 1955) (excluding evidence obtained by
officers who made forcible entries and seizures without search warrants on the grounds
that such activity was a violation of constitutional guarantees).
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under federal law-if exigent circumstances existed, police could
make an immediate and forcible entry.416 The officers in Ker demon-
strated a reasonable basis for believing that the suspects were trying to
destroy evidence, one of the exigent circumstances recognized under
federal law before Wo/fand Mapp.417 The California trial and appel-
late courts upheld the conviction on the basis of the exception to the
prior announcement statute. The California court decisions were
consistent with federal Fourth Amendment law; the Supreme Court
could have simply affirmed the California decision on that basis. In-
stead, the Court used the case as a platform to reinforce a view of the
supremacy of state laws in the area of search and seizure.41
The Court stated its responsibility to review state court findings
regarding constitutional rights.419 The Court, however, characterized
the "specific question" before it in the Ker case as "whether Mapp re-
quires the exclusion of evidence in this case which the California Dis-
trict Court of Appeals has held to be lawfully seized."42 It is hard to
imagine how the Supreme Court could have concluded that the Cali-
fornia decision violated Mapp. Mapp extended the federal exclusion-
ary rule to state court prosecutions; the incorporation doctrine
extended the body of Supreme Court law regarding the Fourth
Amendment to the states.4 2 1 Federal law upheld exceptions to the
prior announcement rule identical to that recognized by the Califor-
nia courts.422
Perforce, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction in Ker.42 3
The Court's formulation of the issue in Ker, however, would insulate
many Fourth Amendment issues arising from state court prosecutions
from federal court review for compliance with the Fourth Amend-
ment. Convictions occur in state court prosecutions after search and
416. See People v. Maddox, 294 P.2d 6, 9 (Cal. 1956) (en banc) (concluding that compli-
ance with prior-announcement law is not required if the officer's peril would have been
increased or the arrest frustrated had he demanded entrance and stated his purpose).
417. See supra notes 404-413 and accompanying text.
418. Ker, 374 U.S. at 37.
419. Id. at 34.
420. Id. at 31.
421. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (recognizing that the right to privacy em-
bodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states and that the
prosecutorial practice of using unconstitutionally seized evidence in state courts is a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment).
422. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984) (concluding that "the common-
sense approach utilized by most lower courts is required by the Fourth Amendment prohi-
bition on 'unreasonable searches and seizures' and hold[ing] that an important factor to
be considered when determining whether an exigency exists is the gravity of the underly-
ing offense for which the arrest is being made").
423. Ker, 347 U.S. at 46.
[VOL. 59:1
ARRESTS WITHOUT PROSECUTION
seizure issues are decided by state courts adverse to defendants; fed-
eral review occurs only after state appellate courts affirm the search
and seizure decisions.4"4 Key's articulated reluctance to overturn state
court Fourth Amendment decisions would make the constitutional is-
sues unreviewable.425
The Ker opinion also quoted Mapp's language that reasonable-
ness under the Fourth Amendment does not lend itself to a "fixed
formula. '4 26 Ker utilized the statement for the proposition that varia-
tions among state criminal procedure laws should be given defer-
ence. 427  Mapp's criticism of fixed formulas, however, related to
varying fact situations presented by individual cases, not variations
among state laws.428
This tendency to see federal-state conflicts automatically when in-
dividual rights are at issue reenacts a tension that existed among the
Framers in the 1700s about the appropriate role of the new national
government. That tension was a fundamental disagreement about the
states' relationship to the national government-whether the individ-
ual states would retain exclusive authority to determine their citizens'
relationship to and rights vis-a-vis each state government.4 29 Antifed-
eralists, such as Richard Henry Lee, wanted to use the opportunity of
drafting the Bill of Rights to amend the new Constitution to protect
powers of the states vis-a-vis the federal government.4 30 The Framers
did not make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states; explicit appli-
cation of individual amendments did not occur until many years
later.43' The Framers, however, refused to enact proposed revisions
424. See generally LaFave, supra note 93, at 2-31 (discussing, as an overview, the general
steps of the criminal justice process). See also supra notes 289-290 and accompanying text.
425. Ker, 374 U.S. at 33 (stating that the Court's responsibility to review the admissibility
of evidence under the Constitution while reiterating that the reasonableness of a search is
a substantive determination to be made by the trial court in light of the Fourth
Amendment).
426. Id. at 32 (quoting Mapp, 367 U.S. at 653).
427. See supra note 402 and accompanying text.
428. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 650-51.
429. Historians have documented the disparate, if not conflicting, political strains that
swirled around ratification, including, of course, views about the relationship of the states
to the new national government. See, e.g., CREATING THE BiLL OF RGHTS, supra note 41.
430. See id. at ix.
431. See MYKKELTVEDT, supra note 89, at 2, 11 (noting that "it had been settled constitu-
tional doctrine that the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights applied exclusively to
the national government" and that "this doctrine had been rigidly upheld for one hundred
years until court decisions allowed the due process clause to emerge as the constitutional
provision which the Court has invoked to extend protection against adverse state actions
for most of the important rights contained in the first eight amendments").
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that were intended to preserve state autonomy in the face of the new
national government.
4 3 2
After the theoretical and political venting about the need for or
wisdom of enumerated individual rights, James Madison set to the task
of drafting the Bill of Rights in the spring of 1789.13 ' He was aided by
concrete proposals from the states.434 During the state constitutional
ratifying conventions, eight states proposed amendments.435 Dis-
counting duplication among the states' proposals, about 100 separate
amendments were offered by the states.43 6
Most of the proposals submitted by the states sought changes in
the draft of the new Constitution relating to governmental structure,
particularly with regard to ways in which the new form of government
might usurp powers of the states.43 7 Madison's draft of the Bill of
Rights submitted to the House in June 1789 included most of the indi-
vidual rights recommended by the states, but none of the structural
proposals.438 In response to political critics who highlighted that his
draft ignored the many proposals for structural changes to the new
government, Madison responded that the primary impetus for the
amendments was the demands of the people in the states for guaran-
tees of individual rights and not redesign of the relationship between
states of the republic and the national government.43 9
432. See GOLDWIN, supra note 84, at 89-90 (discussing Madison's intentional exclusion of
every provision that related to governmental powers rather than individual rights).
433. See MORGAN, supra note 285, at 132.
434. See id. at 133.
435. Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Penn-
sylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia proposed amendments. See CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 41, at x-xi. Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, and New Jersey ratified
without proposing amendments, and Rhode Island did not ratify the Constitution until
many years later. See id.
436. See id. at x-xi.
437. See id. at xi.
438. See GOLDWIN, supra note 84, at 80; see also supra notes 332-334 and accompanying
text.
439. See GOLDWIN, supra note 84, at 81. Ironically, Madison took his own shot at using
the Bill of Rights to effect a structural change in the relationship between the national
government and the states. One of the amendments, in his initial draft, provided that "no
[sic] state shall violate the equal right of conscience, freedom of the press, or trial by jury
in criminal cases; because it is proper that every government should be disarmed of powers
which trench upon those particular rights." MORGAN, supra note 285, at 140 (alteration in
original) (quoting THE PAPERS OFJAMEs MADISON 12:206-7).
Congress rejected that proposed explicit statement of limitations on state powers, as
well as Madison's version of a "preamble," asserting the government's duty to aid citizens
in achieving, among other things, "happiness and safety," and that the people retain the
right to change their government when it becomes adverse to or inadequate for their inter-
ests. See CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 41, at xiv-xvi.
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The effect of incorporation of specific amendments into the
Fourteenth Amendment years later was to set minimum standards for
state conduct covered by the incorporated amendments. Incorpora-
tion reflected the substance of the rights protected by the amend-
ments. Therefore, after incorporation, the individual guarantees of
the Fourth Amendment had to be maintained, and distinguished
from, the states' preferences for particular methods of search and
seizure.
The Court eventually even asserted its supervisory power to en-
sure Fourth Amendment compliance in state prosecutions, when state
laws or practices undercut the Fourth Amendment.440 In Gerstein, for
example, the Court held that an arrestee is entitled to a "timely" prob-
able cause hearing after arrest.44 1 Florida law at the time did not al-
low a preliminary hearing for a defendant charged by information
rather than by indictment. 442 A defendant charged by information
could get a judicial determination of probable cause only at arraign-
ment, which was usually thirty days or more after arrest.443 Even ac-
cepting that the practicalities and the administrative steps of arrest
and booking necessitate "a brief period of detention," the Court held
that "prolonged detention" required a probable cause
determination.444
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the nonspecific "timely"
probable cause requirement enunciated in Gerstein still was not ensur-
ing the Fourth Amendment rights of arrestees in state prosecutions.445
Therefore, the Court held in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin446 that a
probable cause determination must occur within forty-eight hours of
arrest.44 7 The County of Riverside combined arraignments with prob-
able cause hearings. Although California law requires arraignment
"without unnecessary delay" and, in any event, no later than two days
after arrest,448 the statute excludes weekends and holidays from the
440. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 102, 125 (1975) (finding that a state's criminal proce-
dure "must provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for
any significant pretrial liberty, and this determination must be made by a judicial officer"
to achieve constitutionality (internal footnote omitted)).
441. Id. at 126.
442. See id. at 116.
443. See id. at 116 n.18.
444. Id. at 114.
445. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 50 (1991) (granting certiorari
to resolve the conflicts as to what constitutes a "prompt" probable cause determination
under Gerstein).
446. Id.
447. See id. at 56.
448. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 825 (West 1985).
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time computation, meaning arraignments could occur even five days
after arrest and nonetheless comply with the state law. The Court ex-
plained why it became necessary to establish a specific time limit:
Significantly, [in Gerstein] the Court stopped short of holding
that jurisdictions were constitutionally compelled to provide
a probable cause hearing immediately upon taking a suspect
into custody and completing booking procedures. We ac-
knowledged the burden that proliferation of pretrial pro-
ceedings places on the criminal justice system and
recognized that the interests of everyone involved, including
those persons who are arrested, might be disserved by intro-
ducing further procedural complexity into an already intri-
cate system. Accordingly, we left it to the individual States to
integrate prompt probable cause determinations into their
differing systems of pretrial procedures.44
The Court recognized that "state systems of criminal procedure vary
widely."45 ° It concluded, however, that its ruling on the timeliness of
probable cause determinations "gave proper deference to the de-
mands of federalism.
451
The experience of probable cause determinations, even after Ger-
stein, demonstrated that blanket deference to state laws related to
criminal procedure could result in a patchwork of procedures so
"fluid" that constitutional rights would dissipate. Constitutionalism,
by contrast, fixes relationships and powers, and gives them perma-
nence. Thereby neither vague nor unarticulated "realities of law en-
forcement,'' 4 2  or "systemic complexity" within individual
jurisdictions453 can trump constitutional rights.
449. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 53 (internal footnotes omitted) (discussing Gerstein, 420
U.S. at 119-24).
450. Id. at 53 (quoting Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 123).
451. Id.
452. See id. (quoting Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113).
453. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the Court discussed Ker and its
presumed detente between the states and federal courts over criminal procedure. Id. at
451-53. New Hampshire law authorized justices of the peace to issue search warrants. See
id. at 447 (discussing N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 595:1 (repealed 1969)). The state attorney
general, who was a justice of the peace, and also prosecuting the case, signed a search
warrant that turned up incriminating evidence. See id. New Hampshire argued that its
search practices met Ker's test of "workable rules governing arrests, search and seizures to
meet 'the practical demands of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement' in the
States." Id. at 452 (quoting Ker, 367 U.S. at 34).
The Coolidge Court did not pause to reflect on or to respond to the state's arguments
about its need for flexibility and practicality. The opinion went back to basic principles,
holding that:
[I] t is too plain for extensive discussion that this now abandoned New Hampshire
method of issuing 'search warrants' violated a fundamental premise of both the
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B. History as Stasis
The new national Constitution was written upon a clean slate won
through the American Revolution. Whatever the mores or sovereign
prerogatives of England or any of the nations that helped populate
the new country had been, the new government structure would fit
American needs and perceptions of the role of central government.
The new government's reallocation of powers was "unprecedented
under the sun." '4 5 4 Fourth Amendment case law, however, still plays
out a debate of whether it is a departure from English common law
precedents or perpetuation of assumptions about citizenship and
about individual rights from the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries.45 5
By 1789, when the Bill of Rights was drafted and presented to
Congress, the citizens of the United States had more than a century of
local governance by the separate and respective states in which they
lived. Although seven of the new eleven states had earlier adopted
declarations of rights, their respective guarantees were not uni-
form.4 5 6 Those facts alone disprove an assumption that the citizens
shared a common view about individual rights.
On this record, nonetheless, some contend that the amendments
in the Bill of Rights either are transplants of rights attributed to Eng-
land for hundreds of years, or should be interpreted according to
English legal theories and social mores.4 57 The first impediment to
accepting this "historical" view is the obvious contradiction between
making a new nation "from scratch," on the one hand, and leaving the
definition of guiding principles to the history of the country from
which Americans had declared themselves independent. Another is
that the constitutional record does not support that view; the "histori-
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments-a premise fully developed and articulated
long before this Court's decisions in Ker v. California .... and Mapp v. Ohio.
Id. at 453 (citations omitted).
454. FORREST McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 276 (1985).
455. See LASSON, supra note 19, at 23, 83.
456. Professor Schwartz highlighted the differences; among them were: (1) although
strongly influenced by the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, Pennsylvania included a
right to counsel and was the first American constitutional document guaranteeing the
rights of freedom of speech and of the press; (2) Delaware's document was the first to
protect against the quartering of soldiers and ex post facto laws; (3) the Maryland declara-
tion was the first to prohibit bills of attainder; and (4) Vermont outlawed slavery and in-
dentured servitude, and created a just compensation clause for takings. SCHWARTZ, supra
note 46, at 72-78.
457. See id. at 26-33.
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cal" record consists of post hoc explications of the supposed reactions
of the new Americans to the historical treatment of individual rights.
But an even more fundamental divergence between the Bill of
Rights and its English antecedents is the relationship between citizens
and their government. By the time the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights were each drafted and ratified, the new nation was already
deeply rooted in, and had been founded upon, a tradition of individ-
ual states having sovereignty apart from that of the national govern-
ment."5 ' The United States Constitution explicitly limits the
prerogatives of the national sovereign and reserves all other powers to
the people, whether as states or as individuals."5 ' The underlying
premise of the English "precedents," however, was that rights existed
only to the extent that they were granted by the sovereign. 46 °
The contradiction of using English political and social norms to
interpret the United States Constitution is played out in the distinc-
tion between arrests made in public places and entries into homes. As
discussed earlier, warrantless arrests in public places have become the
rule, while the warrant requirement is still rigidly enforced for most
entries into private homes and living spaces. 461 The stated rationale
for distinguishing between arrests in public places and arrests in the
home is that the Fourth Amendment is based on English progeny that
supposedly recognized that "A man's home is his castle. '462 We have
come full circle back to Charles Silberman's declaration about the
hapless choice between falsity and irrelevance in characterizations of
criminal justice.463
The referenced British tradition did not, in fact, embody the es-
sence of the Bill of Rights' enumerations-that they were derived
from the people themselves."64 The Magna Carta in 1215 and even
the English Petition of Right in 1628 did not alter the fundamental
458. See id. at 52.
459. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10; U.S. CONST. amend. X.
460. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 46, at 51-52 (explaining that "colonial documents... did
not really have the status of constitutions, since they were subject to alteration or repeal at
the discretion of the legislature," or by the English Crown or Parliament, so that individual
rights granted in those documents were not recognized as fundamental).
461. See supra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
462. In his doctoral dissertation on the Fourth Amendment, William J. Cuddihy traces
the first American use of the reference of a man's home as his castle to 1647; the Rhode
Island code used the term in a subsection entitled "Forcible Entry and Detainer," 1647 R.I.
AcTs, Acts 5. William John Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original
Meaning (unpublished Ph.D. dissertion) (on file with author).
463. See supra note 1.
464. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 46, at 164-68; LASSON, supra note 19, at 99, 105.
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nature of the relationship between the sovereign and the governed.4 65
In England, any safeguards against unreasonable entry and search
were at the pleasure of the sovereign.
The "castle" concept has been traced prior to the Fourteenth
Century in Great Britain.4 6 6 The presumed sanctity of private homes
is thought to go as far back as ancient biblical, Jewish and Roman
practices."' The Romans especially maintained household gods,
making the inner sanctum pious as against every intrusion, even by
state officers.468
Another element of early Roman and British laws makes them
dubious intellectual authority for the primacy of the home vis-a-vis
government. Professor Lasson pointed out that Roman actions wereprivate prosecutions.469 The perceived abuse was searches of a man's
home by his accuser, who was a private individual, not the state.47°
The many search and seizure abuses in England between the 1300s
and the 1700s, which led to the prohibition on general warrants, also
were committed by private citizens against other citizens. 471 Neither
those conditions, nor reactions to them, therefore, can provide the
complete rationale for America's laws. As soon as the record makes it
clear that English laws and social movements were not the exact mod-
els for American laws, it is less logical to insist that American laws be
interpreted only or primarily with regard to those earlier foreign
conditions.
Professor Lasson documented a law in 1335 that authorized inn-
keepers to search their guests, and Henry VI's authorization to dyers
465. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 46, at 2-14 (discussing the Magna Carta and the 1628
Petition of Rights as English antecedents to rights embodied in the Constitution).
Schwartz contended that the true value of the Magna Carta is that it came into being at all,
and that it became the core of the body of rights basic to the colonists' views of their
prerogatives as a new nation. Id. at 7. There is a distinction, however, between the impetus
to imagine and to create structures of government, on the one hand, and attributing the
specific characteristics of a resulting governmental structure to specific historical premises
or sources, on the other.
466. See LAsSON, supra note 19, at 13 (noting that even in ancient times, there was evi-
dence of the concept that a man's house is his castle).
467. See id. (noting that "Biblical literature affords a number of illustrative instances of a
relatively strong respect for the dwelling as a place which was not subject to arbitrary visita-
tion, even on the part of official authority").
468. See id. at 15 (finding that, according to Roman history and law, "the house was not
only an asylum but under the special protection of the household gods").
469. Id.
470. See id. at 15-17.
471. See generally id. at 23-25 (discussing the development of general warrants in Eng-
land, which arose from innkeeper and from trade union powers).
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to seize competitors' cloth and to search shearmen in the 1400s. 47 2
Henry VIII gave a dispensation to tallow makers (aided by town offi-
cials) to search for oil.4 73 Additionally, the Star Chamber Court and
James I authorized broad searches by private citizens against religious
dissidents, political enemies, and trade competitors throughout the
1600s.4 74
As these examples show, the history of search and seizure for
hundreds of years in England has primarily been concerned with pri-
vate conduct, not with the state's authority to enter private homes or
to seize personal property. The history of English abuses may have
inspired the colonists to enact legal safeguards against invasion of
their homes, whether by private citizens or by the government.4 7 5 It
does not follow, however, from the supposed reaction to the English
experience, that the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect pri-
vate homes to the exclusion or to the diminution of the other zones
expressly covered, such as seizures of persons.
As discussed, American courts also trace the Fourth Amendment
to the use of general warrants or of writs of assistance in England and
in the colonies.4 7 6 The evil of the warrants and of the writs was the
lack of specificity of places to be searched or of things to be seized.
They allowed officials to rummage through private property until in-
criminating evidence was discovered.4 7 7 In Entick v. Carrington and
Three Other King's Messengers,4 78 the landmark case on general warrants,
Lord Pratt decried the exercise of such "an unreasonable power" with-
out specific and explicit legal authorization.4 7 9 General warrants were
utilized in the American colonies until the mid-1700s, primarily to en-
force customs laws.4 8 ° In 1776, Virginia's Bill of Rights outlawed war-
rants that authorized searches and seizures without evidence of a
472. Id. at 23-24 (discussing a practice that may have resulted in certain traders being
granted general searching powers to enforce their organizational rules).
473. See id. at 24.
474. See id. at 24-29 (describing the Star Chamber Court).
475. See id. at 58-60 (examining colonist's arguments concerning England's policies to-
wards searches of colonial property).
476. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-25 (1886) (discussing the use of general
warrants and of writs of assistance in England and in the colonies and remarking that the
misuse of these instruments was "fresh in the memories of those who achieved our inde-
pendence and established our form of government").
477. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625-26 (discussing the use of writs in colonial America and
noting the problems relevant in empowering officers to search at their discretion).
478. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
479. See id.; see also LAssON, supra note 19, at 47-48.




violation, a specific statement of the offense alleged, and identifica-
tion of persons to be seized.48 l
Like the Virginia Bill of Rights, the Warrant Clause of the Fourth
Amendment reflects condemnation of general warrants that
originated in England. The outlawed general warrants were utilized
originally and largely in connection with commerce; they empowered
tradesmen and guilds to harass competitors, and powerful individuals
to hound political and religious freethinkers. In the colonies, officials
used them to ferret out contraband, evasion of customs duties, and
other crimes in connection with trade.4 8 2 This history also fails to sup-
port the "castle" limitation or priority that some cases read into the
Fourth Amendment.483
Of equal importance to historical fidelity, there is another dan-
gerous tangent in justifying the Fourth Amendment today by what En-
glishmen may or may not have intended or achieved in the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. That danger is reading Amer-
ican constitutional provisions through the lens of the social conditions
prevailing in England at the time some of the "great rights" are be-
lieved to have been granted, and attitudes about those social
conditions.
The Boyd opinion, for example, cited Lord Camden in Entick for
the proposition that "[t] he great end for which men entered society
was to secure their property .... By the laws of England, every inva-
sion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trepass." '4 84 The
Magna Carta also was steeped in resentment against the king by
landed classes.4" 5 Incantation of these platitudes, without examina-
tion of the premises and of the conditions underlying American insti-
tutions, recasts our own organic documents and principles into the
nondemocratic features of centuries of English law.
Ironically, the phenomenon experienced in the United States of
a system where so many arrests do not result in prosecution looks
strikingly like the Star Chamber and arrests-on-a-whim that England
experienced. The result of those practices in the United States is a
nation split between those who sit in marbled courtrooms and librar-
ies of rich wood and stained glass who have no reason to fear the
481. See id. at 79 & n.3.
482. See id. at 51-78.
483. See id. at 57-60 (discussing "James Otis, Sr., of Barnstable, and eminent lawyer" in
Massachusetts in 1760 and his abomination of the use of the writ of assistance in the colo-
nies, particularly because such general warrants annihilate "one of the most essential
branches of English liberty"-"[t]hat a man's house was his castle").
484. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627.
485. See ScHWARTZ, supra note 46, at 3-4.
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arbitrary use of government power, on the one hand, and, on the
other, those without castle or "papers or effects" who may be assumed
to have nothing to lose. Such a result indeed may resemble seven-
teenth century England, but it does not hold a candle to this country's
tenets.
VI. REMEDIES
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people against
unlawful searches and seizures by the state. The state is the sum of its
parts: legislatures, courts, prosecutors, and law enforcement officers.
Each of those elements has the ability and the duty to ensure that
arrests are used solely as the initiation of criminal prosecutions, rather
than ends unto themselves, as the data discussed in this Article docu-
ments. The question is whether each component in fact exercises its
authority to remedy the situation of arrests unrelated to constitution-
ally permitted outcomes, or whether remedies must be imposed to
protect Fourth Amendment rights.
A. Class Actions for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief
If state officials do not take the initiative to ensure that arrests are
made only when the state has the intention and the ability to prose-
cute arrested persons, judicial relief is available to require the nexus
between arrests and the constitutionally required procedures in crimi-
nal cases. In addition to permitting claims for money damages against
individuals acting under color of law and municipalities, declaratory
and injunctive relief is available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to correct and
to prevent infringements of constitutional rights. 48 6
Plaintiffs in both Gerstein v. Pugh4 87 and County of Riverside v. Mc-
Laughlin488 sought declaratory and injunctive relief under § 1983.4"9
In both cases, the class representatives sought relief on behalf of
themselves and on behalf of other individuals who were detained pur-
suant to state laws but not provided prompt determinations of prob-
able cause.4 9 ° In Gerstein, the district court ordered officials in Dade
486. Section 1983 provides, in part, that a person acting under color of law who subjects
or causes to be subjected any citizen to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, and immu-
nities of the Constitution and laws "shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." (emphasis added). 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; see also supra notes 337-364 and accompanying text.
487. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
488. 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
489. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 107 n.5; McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 47.
490. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 106-07; McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 47-48.
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County, Florida, to give the named plaintiffs immediate probable
cause hearings and to submit a plan requiring probable cause deter-
minations in all criminal cases instituted by an information.4"'
The named plaintiffs in Gerstein were no longer in pretrial deten-
tion at the time of the Supreme Court review.4" 2 The Court recog-
nized, however, that pretrial detention is by its nature temporary, and
ruled that the right to probable cause determinations promptly after
arrest falls within the class of cases that are "capable of repetition, yet
evading review."49  Cases in which individuals are arrested even
though the state does not have a contemporaneous intention and abil-
ity to prosecute them for the charged crimes fit the Sosna "capable of
repetition" category as well. Appellate review of those cases would
also occur only long after charges are dismissed and the immediate
conditions and restraints resulting from the arrests had been lifted.
Continuation of the arrest practices still puts other citizens at risk of
the arbitrary loss of freedom.
Gerstein and Sosna considered whether mootness of the named
plaintiffs' claims (as by release from pretrial detention) also termi-
nates the claims of unnamed members of the class. The Court de-
clared that the class claims were not rendered moot.4 9 4 The claims of
persons arrested under the circumstances described in this Article do
not become moot when charges are dismissed. The direct conse-
quences of arrest, such as social stigma, interference with family and
social relationships, difficulty in finding employment, and economic
costs associated with arrest, bail, and retention of counsel can con-
tinue long after the dismissal of charges.49 5 Thus, individuals sub-
jected to arrest when the state knows it will not follow the cases
through to prosecution experience harm even after the charges are
dismissed.
Statistics used in this Article are broken down by individual juris-
dictions. Claims for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to
§ 1983 also should identify relevant jurisdictions and specify state
491. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 107-08. At the time the Cerstein § 1983 action was filed, Florida
law required indictment by a grand jury only for capital offenses; all other criminal cases
could be brought by an information issued by a prosecutor. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 105. Even
though the then Florida criminal procedure statute authorized adversary hearings for pre-
liminary determinations of probable cause, Florida courts had held that a defendant
charged by an information was not entitled to a preliminary hearing. See Gerstein, 420 U.S.
at 105-06 (citations omitted).
492. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 110 n.1l.
493. Id. (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 n.l (1975)).
494. See id.; Sosna, 419 U.S. at 401-02.
495. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 110; Sosna, 419 U.S. at 402.
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and/or local practices or laws that subject citizens to arrest under the
circumstances described here. It would be appropriate for courts to
consider plans submitted by the relevant jurisdictions in fashioning
judicial relief in § 1983 suits.49 6
Injunctive relief could be designed to cover any phase of a crimi-
nal case leading up to the ultimate decision whether to dismiss a case
or to prosecute. Prophylactic remedies based on evidence of the im-
pact of particular arrest practices could be ordered.
For example, evidence about the resources of courts, prosecutors,
and correctional services within a given jurisdiction and the number
of criminal cases filed annually might justify limits on the number of
criminal cases pending in the jurisdiction at any given time. Such
court-ordered limits could yield benefits for law enforcement and for
prosecution. Logically, fewer criminal cases to investigate and to pre-
pare for trial should allow more thorough preparation for prosecu-
tion and the opportunity to devote more resources to particularly
serious offenses or to types of offenders.
Statutes of limitations for particular offenses create the outside
parameter for charging offenses. Even with limits imposed on the
number of pending cases, prosecutors retain the authority to order
their cases in a way that ensures prosecution within a given statutory
limit.
B. Amendments to State Law
There are legal and practical reasons for state legislatures to re-
consider laws relating to arrest. With the incorporation of the Fourth
Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment, each state became re-
sponsible for ensuring that its criminal laws comply with constitutional
standards.497
As discussed in Part II, state arrest laws authorize warrantless ar-
rests for both misdemeanor and felony offenses. Because of those
broad arrest powers, there is virtually no limit to the number of crimi-
nal cases police officers initiate. State legislatures should be con-
496. The plans submitted by the Dade County defendants in Gerstein contained detailed
post-arrest procedures; at the same time, the Florida Supreme Court issued procedural
rules governing preliminary hearings. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 108. The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that the District Court should review the revised rules for constitu-
tional compliance. See id. at 109. Even the state's amended rules did not guarantee prob-
able cause determinations for defendants charged by information; therefore, the District
Court declared Florida's practices unconstitutional. See id. at 109-10.
497. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); see also supra note 82 (discussing Wolfv.




cerned about whether the arrest powers are effective in combating
crime, and about whether they operate to widen social disparities.
The arithmetic in the statistics reported by individual jurisdic-
tions warrant full-scale review of arrest laws. Counties where non-
prosecution rates approach more than 40% should serve as
bellwethers for more accountability. An examination of the types of
cases dismissed would also yield hard evidence about the effectiveness
of law enforcement and of prosecution. For example, although the
public understandably focuses on crimes of violence, arrest and prose-
cution data indicate that felonies are as likely to be dismissed as misde-
meanors in which violence does not occur.4 9 8
The information gleaned from reexamination of the operation of
state arrest laws also would yield valuable data about the use of finan-
cial resources devoted to law enforcement and to prosecution. Polit-
ical pressure to increase arrests (so-called "zero tolerance" policies)
are meaningless unless sufficient resources are added to prosecutorial
and court budgets to handle the increase in criminal cases. On the
other hand, a long-standing record of a high-dismissal rate despite a
relatively static budget-little or no increase or decrease-draws into
question the abilities of prosecution offices in a jurisdiction.499
State legislatures need to reconsider whether their arrest laws
provide sufficient guidance about the grounds for arrest. A high dis-
missal rate also calls into question the legality of many arrests. As dis-
cussed, numerous state laws authorize arrests without warrant when an
offense is committed in the presence of a police officer. Presumably,
the evidence necessary to prosecute such cases would be minimal or
be already under the control of the witnessing officer(s), such as the
arresting officer's testimony and physical evidence or contraband he
seized pursuant to the arrest.
Dismissals of many such cases without prosecution suggest that
the arresting officers did not possess the modicum of information re-
quired by state arrest laws. Prosecutors should be required to dismiss
cases as soon as they learn that arresting officers did not, in fact, wit-
ness the alleged offenses or, that the conduct witnessed does not con-
stitute an offense. On balance, the rate of cases that do not result in
498. See app. C, tbls.1-8, 10-12 (providing data showing various city, state and federal
arrest, trial disposition, and conviction rates).
499. Jerold Israel addressed this issue. He asserted that the effectiveness of some prose-
cution offices would not be enhanced by budget increases. Israel, supra note 5, at 778-79.
He also contended that office work habits, morale, or individual work attitudes among
prosecutors can result in low "productivity" irrespective of the relative sufficiency of prose-
cution budgets. Id. at 761-62.
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prosecution should prompt state legislatures to rethink the operation
of state arrest laws, as well as budget allocations associated with law
enforcement and with prosecution.
C. Improving Police/Prosecutor Relations
The possibility of court-ordered remedies to correct the imbal-
ance between arrests and prosecutions should also be a sufficient in-
centive for police and for prosecutors to rethink their arrest and
prosecution policies and procedures. After all, a high dismissal rate
supports the assumption that not every case, and, in some jurisdic-
tions, not even half of the cases, resulting in arrest are prosecutable or
meritorious. If an individual's presumptive right to freedom is bal-
anced against speculation that charges against the individual are capa-
ble of being prosecuted (as opposed to obtaining a conviction), the
individual right must prevail. °
One of the most important components of effective law enforce-
ment is the relationship between police officers and prosecutors.
Although each of the two entities possesses specialized skills related to
the implementation of their respective tasks, prosecution of a given
case requires coordination. For jurisdictions with high rates of non-
prosecution, improvements in the prosecutability of cases will be evi-
dent only after that coordination is choreographed and implemented.
There are at least three crucial elements in the relationship be-
tween police and prosecutors: (1) articulation of prosecution poli-
cies; (2) police officer training in investigation and arrests, and
controlling law for each aspect of arrest and charging; and (3) gui-
dance about creating adequate evidentiary records. Whether, and to
what extent, any of these elements is present may be dependent on
political considerations within a jurisdiction 51' and the availability of
500. Measuring the likelihood of an arrest leading to prosecution is not the same as
measuring whether a prosecutor will be able to prove any particular criminal case beyond a
reasonable doubt. In the former situation, state players can help determine the
prosecutability of a case by testing it for legal sufficiency, requiring that the state compo-
nents follow legal precedent, and allocating resources in a way that allows proper case
preparation.
In the latter situation of obtaining a verdict against a criminal defendant, independent
variants, such as witnesses and juries, combine to determine whether a conviction is ob-
tained. If a prosecutor presents a case in good faith and with due diligence, the failure to
obtain a conviction should not be attributed to the prosecution.
501. Conflicting political pressures might take the form of the desire of either (or
both) the prosecutor's office or police department to emphasize its independence, rather
than interrelationship; the need of either component to stress its own achievements to
justify existing or increased financial resources; or, for elected officials, political "one-
upmanship" to ensure votes.
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financial resources. °2 However, the anticipated budgetary and polit-
ical costs might be illusory compared to the current expenditures on
criminal cases that do not result in prosecution.
1. Training.--Standards adopted by the American Bar Associa-
tion propose that prosecutors "aid in training police in the perform-
ance of their function in accordance with law." 5°3 Classes conducted
by prosecuting attorneys are a cost-effective method of preparing new
and experienced officers for legal issues encountered in many crimi-
nal cases. Classroom interaction also would facilitate more productive
relationships between police and prosecutors, at the departmental as
well as individual levels.
The lack of training undoubtedly results in more non-
prosecutable cases being charged. Under existing practices, however,
there is no accountability for arrests in such cases, or their impact on
the resources of the criminal justice system. Courts enable this dys-
function; they recognize that many criminal cases may receive little or
no prosecutorial review until the brink of trial, yet they do not exer-
cise their supervisory or review powers to require greater accountabil-
ity.5 0 4 Silence from the bench about police officers who demonstrate
lack of familiarity with applicable legal standards perpetuates the sta-
tus quo of many failed prosecutions.
2. Articulation of Prosecution Policies.--Criminal justice statistics
suggest that the articulation of law enforcement policies and priorities
is one of the weakest elements in law enforcement. Comparable or
disproportionate nonprosecution rates for felony and for misde-
meanor cases is one indicator of a failure to prioritize cases for prose-
cution. For example, data from Kings County, New York, indicates
that convictions occurred in 19% of felony arrests in 1994, but in 28%
of misdemeanor arrests. 50 5
502. This might include training budgets, allocations for increased supervisory person-
nel, or reallocations to facilitate changes in employee duties (such as the need for follow-
up investigation by police).
503. STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 2.7(b).
504. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 35 (1972) ("Prosecutors walk into
courtrooms to try simple cases as they take their initial looks at the files." (quoting THE
REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 128 (1967))).




In Riverside County, California, in 1991506 convictions were ob-
tained in 27% of felony cases presented for prosecution, and in 53%
of misdemeanor cases.5 ° 7 Nationwide, between 1990 and 1994, there
were a total of 8,647,100 index arrests and 56,625,400 nonindex ar-
rests. The data shows that 12,900 fewer index arrests were made in
1994 than in 1990, yet the number of nonindex arrests in 1994 was
466,500 cases higher than in 1990.
518
On their face, the arrest/request figures suggest policy determi-
nations that nonserious cases are the law enforcement priorities in the
cited jurisdictions. The conviction data supports either of two hypoth-
eses: (1) greater preparation occurs in the prosecution of misde-
meanor cases; or (2) prosecution of misdemeanor cases diverts
resources from preparation of felony cases for prosecution.
Either dynamic calls for examination and articulation of policies
regarding the use of law enforcement resources. These can occur by
prosecutors issuing guidelines to police departments about the prior-
ity of specific offenses from the perspective of prosecution. Police de-
partments also retain the discretion to instruct their officers in the
manner in which arrest efforts should be expended.5 0 9
The arrest/conviction statistics reveal one glaring irony. Despite
the wide leeway and even immunity that police and that prosecutors
enjoy in the exercise of their respective discretionary functions, in a
number of large jurisdictions, that discretion is not being used to en-
sure effective case outcomes or to address adequately instances of vio-
lent crime. 1
°
Existing rules of civil and of criminal procedure contain mecha-
nisms for such accountability. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, for
example, allows the imposition of sanctions if court filings do not
have an adequate legal or factual basis, or a good faith argument for
the extension or reconsideration of existing law. 511 An attorney's sig-
506. The last year of the five-year period studied in this Article for which complete con-
viction statistics were available for both felony and misdemeanor cases in materials pub-
lished by the Riverside County Office of the District Attorney was 1991.
507. See app. C, tbls.6, 11 (showing felony case data and misdemeanor case data from
Riverside County, California).
508. See app. C, tbl.1 (showing state and local government arrests from 1990-94).
509. Police departments do, of course, direct resources at particular targets. Neighbor-
hood complaints might lead to concentrated prostitution arrests, for example. Similar di-
rectives are issued for drug "sweeps."
510. See supra notes 172-201 and accompanying text (discussing data from 1990 through
1994 and the relationship of arrests to prosecution indicate a low correlation).
511. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing,
filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper,
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nature on a court filing is treated as the attorney's certification of ade-
quate facts or of supporting law. Where deprivations of individual
liberty are concerned, prosecuting attorneys should be held to the
same standard. To ensure that the largest number of criminal cases
are held to that standard, police and prosecutors should be required
to develop procedures enabling prosecutorial review of individual
cases, and prosecutors should be required to certify that facts and ap-
plicable law justify warrantless arrests.5 12
D. The Role of Defense Attorneys
Our adversarial criminal justice system assumes that the state and
the defense each will maximize their efforts toward the overall good of
their respective clients. The statistics regarding the numbers of crimi-
nal cases that are dismissed without prosecution-often months after
an individual's arrest-beg the question of the performance of de-
fense attorneys on behalf of their clients.
The Supreme Court's declarations of the "critical stages" in a
criminal case-when the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment attaches-are not the outer limits of participation by de-
fense counsel. Private counsel is retained and public defenders are
appointed in many cases soon after an individual's arrest. The initial
deprivation of liberty, the arrest, has already occurred by that time,
but diligent defense efforts can ameliorate some of the consequences
of that deprivation.
A defense attorney's participation at a bail hearing, for example,
can help ensure that the requirements of bail laws are adhered to, and
that available review of initial bail determinations occurs. Challenges
an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under
the circumstances,-
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose.
(2) the claims.., and other legal contentions therein are warranted by ex-
isting law ... ;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support
.. ;and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence ....
FED. R. Civ. P. lI(b) (Supp. 1997).
512. The current law states:
[i] n any criminal case (other than a case in which the defendant is represented by
assigned counsel paid for by the public) ... [the court] may award to a prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee and other litiga-
tion expenses, where the court finds that the position of the United States was
vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith, unless the court finds that special circum-
stances make such an award unjust.
18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1998).
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to probable cause for arrest at the earliest practicable time present the
prospect of nonmeritorious cases being dismissed sooner. Those chal-
lenges must include thorough understanding of applicable offenses
and their elements and effective oral advocacy. Initial client inter-
views and prompt preliminary investigation can strengthen motions to
suppress evidence, based on illegalities surrounding arrests, police
questioning, and searches.
Defense attorneys should consider whether court delays are, in
fact, in their clients' best interests. The defense bar often engages in
wistful thinking that delays will result in the deterioration of the prose-
cution's case. Such courthouse "folklore" should not supplant dili-
gent preparation and advocacy based on either the merits of pending
charges or on the fairness of the prosecution's conduct in preparing
and in presenting its case.
CONCLUSION
Arrest practices in the United States merit scrutiny and monitor-
ing simply on the basis of the numbers of arrests that occur annually.
Their toll on the lives of millions of individuals each year warrants
reconsideration of the relationship between our government, state
and federal, and the population. Wholesale arrests may be a sign that
common assumptions of the American people about their govern-
ment are incorrect. Arrest totals of more than fourteen million each
year mean that American "liberty" has a distinctly more narrow conno-
tation to a substantial portion of our population than civics platitudes
convey.
Numerous scholars have pointed out the perception of criminal
justice among minorities. Nonetheless, systemic overhauls of criminal
justice practices occur rarely, and even more rarely with an eye toward
addressing the facts and the perceptions of the mistreatment of mi-
norities. Arrest practices themselves are not examined for the role
they play in those facts and perceptions of maltreatment. The cause-
and-effect dynamic is so stark that silence about arrest practices
amounts to deliberate indifference to the protection of Constitutional
rights of minorities.
On the one hand, arrest rates indicate that enormous sums are
expended by every jurisdiction in the country for one aspect of law
enforcement. On the other, we profess bewilderment that the large
expenditures do not produce better results. At the same time, we also




Courts justify curtailment of individual rights related to criminal
procedure on alleged financial impediments. Courts sanction less
strict adherence to constitutional and to statutory rules because of
heavy criminal caseloads, yet do not hold police and prosecutors ac-
countable for the flood of cases created by arrests. Even the great
numbers of improvident, if not abusive, arrests do not give voice to
reforms. The bottom line is that claims about criminal justice in this
country often are false. We perpetuate conveyor belt systems that de-
prive millions of individuals of basic constitutional rights. Ennui and
indifference have taken the place of administration and decision-
making in our prosecutors' offices and courts. In an absolute sense,
our jurisdictions expend disproportionate resources on criminal jus-
tice compared to the results achieved.
Comparison of rates of victimization to conviction rates in many
jurisdictions proves that our criminal justice efforts are largely irrele-
vant in the face of crime. Debate about criminal procedure and con-
stitutional law miss the point if they do not address the phenomenon
of the loss of liberty experienced by millions of people without benefit
of the constitutional protections that the rest of us automatically as-
sume accompany criminal prosecution.
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APPENDIX B: PROSECUTIONS WITHOUT ARREST: FBI CRIME
CATEGORIES AND DEFINITIONS
A. INDEX OFFENSES
1. Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter.-The willful (nonnegli-
gent) killing of one human being by another.'
2. Forcible Rape.-The carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and
against her will. It includes assaults or attempts to rape by force or
threat of force. It excludes statutory rape (without force) and other
sex offenses.
2
3. Robbery.-The taking or attempting to take anything of value
from the care, custody, or control of a person or persons by force or
threat of force or violence and/or by putting the victim in fear.'
4. Aggravated Assault.-An unlawful attack by one person upon
another for the purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated bodily in-
jury. Attempts are included.4
5. Burglary.-The unlawful entry of a structure to commit a fel-
ony or theft. The use of force to gain entry is not required. Its three
subclassifications are forcible entry, unlawful entry where no force is
used, and attempted forcible entry.5
6. Larceny-Theft.-The unlawful taking, carrying, leading, or rid-
ing away of property from the possession or constructive possession of
another. It includes shoplifting, pocket-picking, purse-snatching,
thefts from motor vehicles, thefts of motor vehicle parts and accesso-
ries, bicycle thefts, etc. where no force, violence or fraud occurs. It
does not include embezzlement, "con" games, forgery, and worthless
checks. Thefts of motor vehicles are a separate category.6
7. Motor Vehicle Theft.-The theft or attempted theft of a motor
vehicle, including the stealing of automobiles, trucks, buses,
motorcycles, motorscooters, snowmobiles, etc. It excludes the taking
of a motor vehicle for temporary use by persons having lawful access.7
8. Arson.-Any willful or malicious burning or attempt to bum,
with or without intent to defraud, a dwelling house, public building,
1. FEDERAL BuREAu OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1990, at 8 (1991).
2. Id. at 15.
3. Id. at 18.
4. Id. at 23.
5. Id. at 27.
6. Id. at 32.
7. Id. at 38.
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motor vehicle or aircraft, personal property of another, etc. Fires of




2. Forgery and counterfeiting.
3. Fraud.
4. Embezzlement.
5. Stolen property, buying, receiving, possessing.
6. Vandalism.
7. Weapons, carrying, possessing, etc.
8. Prostitution and commercialized vice.
9. Sex offenses (except forcible rape and prostitution).
10. Drug abuse violations.
11. Gambling.
12. Offenses against family and children.





18. All other offenses.
19. Curfew and loitering law violations.'°
8. Id. at 42.
9. Id. at 174 tbl.24.
10. Runaways are included among the non-index offenses. See id. This Article treats
only arrests of adults. Curfew violations also would be juvenile offenses. It is not possible,
however, to determine from the available data how many arrests in the "curfew and loiter-




YEAR ESTIMATED ARRESTS NONINDEX ARRESTS INDEX AGNCS1
19902 14,195,100 11,271,800 2,923,300 12,401
19913 14,211,900 11,240,500 2,971,400 12,805
19924 14,075,100 11,186,900 2,888,200 13,032
19935 14,036,300 11,187,900 2,848,400 13,041
19946 14,648,700 11,738,000 2,910,400 13,124
1. These numbers represent the number of local county, and state law enforcement
agencies reporting to the UCR program each year. Cf FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1995, at 278
(1996) [hereinafter 1995 UCR].
2. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1990, at 174 tbl.24, 237 (1991) [hereinafter 1990 UCR].
3. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1991, at 213 tbl.29, 290 (1992) [hereinafter 1991 UCR].
4. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1992, at 217 tbl.29, 289 (1993).
5. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1993, at 217 tbl.29, 288 (1994).
6. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1994, at 217 tbl.29, 289 (1995).
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TABLE 1
STATE AND LoCAL GOVERNMENT ARRESTS 1990-1994
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TABLE 2
STATE COURT FELONY CONVICTIONs/ARRESTS 1990
FELONY CONVICTIONS INDEX ARRESTS1  NONINDEX ARRESTS
TOTAL 829,344 TOTAL 2,923,300 TOTAL 11,271,800
VIOLENT 147,766 705,500 NOT REPORTED SEPARATELY
PROPERTY 280,748 2,217,800 NOT REPORTED SEPARATELY
DRUGS 274,613 NOT REPORTED SEPARATELY DRUGS 1,089,500
WEAPONS 20,733 NOT REPORTED SEPARATELY WEAPONS 221,200
OTHER2 105,484 NOT REPORTED SEPARATELY NOT REPORTED
SEPARATELY3
1. See 1990 UCR, supra note 2 to tbl.1, at 174 tbl.24 (citing data for 1990 index and
nonindex arrests).
2. "Other" is made up of nonviolent offenses such as receiving stolen property and
driving while intoxicated. See id. at 527 n.f.
3. Of the total number of felony convictions in 1990, 751,993 resulted from guilty
please and 77,351 by guilty verdict after trial. See id. at 528 tbl.5.51.
Isaac Ehrlich and George D. Brower found conviction rate data to be of poor quality.
See On the Issue of Causality in the Economic Model of Crime and Law Enforcement: Some
Theoretical Considerations and Experimental Evidence, 77 AM. ECON. REv. 99, 104 (1984). The
1990, 1992, and 1994 felony conviction data reported by the Bureau of Justice Statistics,
and its methodology, may bear out that assessment.
The arrest data reported annually by the FBI has had the benefit of input from
literally thousands of reporting agencies; however, BJS indicates that the conviction rate
data reported for 1990, 1992, and 1994 was derived from biennial BJS/Census Bureau
samplings of approximately 300 chief prosecutors nationwide. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 1990, at 2 (1992)
[hereinafter PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 1990]; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 1992, at 2 (1993) [hereinafter
PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 1992]; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS, 1994, at 1 (1998).
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TABLE 3
STATE COURT FELONY CONVICTIONS/ARRESTS 1992
FELONY
CONVICTIONS1  INDEX ARRESTS 2  NONINDEX
TOTAL 3 893,630 2,888,200 11,186,900
VIOLENT 165,099 742,130 NOT REPORTED SEPARATELY
PROPERTY 297,494 2,146,000 NOT REPORTED SEPARATELY
DRUGS 280,232 NOT REPORTED SEPARATELY 1,066,400
WEAPONS 26,422 NOT REPORTED SEPARATELY 239,300
OTHER 105,484 124,383 NOT REPORTED SEPARATELY
124,383
1. BUREAU OF JusTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICs-1995, at 497 tbl.5.44 [hereinafter 1995 SOURCEBOOK]. In 1992, guilty
pleas accounted for 820,622 of the convictions, and guilty verdicts for 72,968 of the
convictions. See id. at 498 tbl.5.47.
2. See 1992 UCR, supra note 4 to tbl.1, at 217 tbl.29. The Crime Index is used to
"gauge fluctuations in the overall volume and rate of crime reported to law enforcement."
See 1995 UCR, supra note 1 to tbl.1, at 5. The offenses included in the Crime Index are the
violent crimes of murder, nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated
assault, the property crimes of burglary, larceny-theft, motor-vehicle theft, and arson. 1992
UCR, supra note 4 to tbl.1, at 5; see also Appendix B.
3. The numbers of convictions reported by the specific offense categories do not
equal the "total figure. BJS does not explain the discrepancy. See 1995 SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 1, at 497 tbl.5.44.
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TABLE 4
STATE COURT FELONY CONVICTIONS/ARRESTS 1994
CONVICTIONS1  INDEX ARRESTS
2  NONINDEX ARRESTS 3
TOTAL 872,217 TOTAL 2,910,400 TOTAL 11,738,300
VIOLENT 164,583 778,730 NOT REPORTED SEPARATELY
PROPERTY 275,198 2,131,700 NOT REPORTED SEPARATELY
DRUGS 274,245 1,351,400 NOT REPORTED SEPARATELY
WEAPONS 31,010 259,400 NOT REPORTED SEPARATELY
OTHER 127,180 3,743,200 NOT REPORTED SEPARATELY
1. See BuREAu OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATITIcS-1997, at 421 tbl.5.44 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore, eds., 1998).
2. See 1995 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1 to tbl.3, at 394 tbl.4.1. Please note that the
other category does not include traffic offenses. See id.
3. See id. Index and Nonindex Arrests are not reported separately. See id. According
to the 1995 Sourcebook, the total number of Index Arrests was 2,910,400. Id. Therefore, the
remaining 11,738,300 arrests are categorized as Nonindex. See id.
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TABLE 5
KINGS COUNTY, NEW YORK 1990 POPULATION 2,299,2851
FELONY CASE DATA
YEAR FELONY ARRESTS2  FELONY PROSECUTIONS
3  CONVICTIONS 4
1990 42,932 13,332 9,310
1991 41,013 15,075 10,509
1992 36,126 13,901 9,806
1993 35,116 12,171 9,529
1994 39,884 10,414 7,667
1. See New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, Criminal Justice Indicators,
Kings County: 1990-1994 (last modified Nov. 28, 1997) http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/
cgi/internet/areastat/areastat.cgi, Table: Adult Arrests [hereinafter DCJS, Kings County
Indicators].
2. See id.
3. See id. at tbl.5: Prosecutions.
4. See id. at tbl.5: Convictions and Sentences.
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TABLE 6
RIVERSIDE COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 1990 POPULATION 1,170,4131 FELONY
CASE DATA
YEAR FELONY REQUESTS FELONY FILED CONVICTIONS
19902 21,644 8652/76533 4359/5199
19914 20,162 8829/10584 5543
19925 22,532 10,584 5565
19936 25,156 12,050 656919947 22,303 11,718 N/A
1. U.S. Population, at 421.
2. In the Eastern Division, in 1990, there were 4361 felonies requested. See OFFICE OF
THE DISTRICT AYrORNEY RIVERSIDE COUNTY, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 13 [hereinafter 1990
ANNUAL REPORT]. In the Western Division, in 1990, there were 17,283 felonies requested.
See id. at 19. Therefore, there was a total of 21,644 felonies requested in 1990. In the
Eastern Division, in 1990, there were 1300 felonies filed. See id. at 13. In the Western
Division, there were 7352 felony complaints filed. See id. at 19. Therefore, according to
the 1990 Annual Report, there was a total of 8652 felonies filed.
3. If two numbers are presented in a category on these tables, the first represents the
data found in the Riverside County Annual Report, and the second represents the data
found in the Riverside County Biennial Report. For 1990, the Annual Report states that
8652 felony cases were filed. However, the 1992-1993 Biennial Report states that 7653
felony cases were filed in 1990. OFFICE OF THE DISTRICr ATTORNEY RIVERSIDE COUNTY, 1992-
1993 BIENNIAL REPORT (unnumbered) (1993) [hereinafter 1992-1993 BIENNIAL REPORT].
According to the 1990 Annual Report, there were 4359 felons convicted in superior court in
1990. 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 1. According to the 1992-1993 Biennial Report, there were 5199
felony convictions. 1992-1993 BIENNIAL REPORT (unnumbered).
4. In 1991, the Western Division reported 16,138 felonies requested. See OFFICE OF
THE DISTRICT AT-roRNEy RIVERSIDE COUNTY, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 5 [hereinafter 1991
ANNUAL REPORT]. In the Eastern Division there were 4024 felonies requested. See id. at 19.
Therefore, there was a total of 20,162 felonies requested in Riverside County. In the
Western Division, there were 7125 felony requests. See id. at 5. In the Eastern Division,
there were 1345 felonies filed. See id. at 19. Therefore, there was a total of 8829 felony
complaint requests. The 1992-1993 Biennial Report stated that a total of 10,584 felony
requests was filed. 1992-1993 BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 3, tbl.6 (unnumbered). The
total of felony convictions was 5543. See id. (unnumbered).
5. See 1992-1993 BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 3, tbl.6 (unnumbered).
6. See id.
7. The Eastern Division, in 1994, requested 5842 felony cases. See OFFICE OF THE
DIsTRICT ATTORNEY RIVERSIDE COUNTY, 1994-1995 BIENNIAL REPORT (unnumbered)
[hereinafter 1994-1995 BIENNIAL REPORT]. The Western Division had 16,461 felony
requests. See id. (unnumbered). Therefore, the total number of felonies requested was
22,303. The Eastern Division, in 1994, filed 2999 cases as felonies. See id. (unnumbered).
The Western Division listed having 8451 felony requests filed in 1994 and as having 268
felony requests in 1994. See id. (unnumbered). Therefore, the total felony requests filed
were 11,718. The two divisions of the Riverside County office, Eastern and Western,
reported their respective 1994 data differently. The Eastern Division did not report the
number of misdemeanor or felony convictions for 1994. The Western Division reported
that the number of felony cases resulting in "conviction and sentencing" (6446) and gave a
conviction rate of 98%. See id. (unnumbered). The Western Division also provided only
the total number of misdemeanor cases filed and its own computation of the conviction
rate for the misdemeanor cases that went to jury trial, 98%. See id. (unnumbered).
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TABLE 7
1970 FELONY CASE DISPOSITION DATA'
HARRIS
CITY OR COOK LOS ANGELES KINGS DETROIT BALTIMORE CO.
COUNTY CO. (IL) CO. (CA) CO. (NY) (MI) CITY (MD) (TX)
POPULATION 5.5 MIL 7.2 MIL 2.6 MIL 1.7 MIL 980,000 1.8 MIL
ARRESTS 22,000 69,000 15,000 20,000 8,000 16,000
IND/INF2  5,000 21,400 3,000 9,000 6,500 7,000
GUILTY PLEAS 2,300 9,400 2,500 4,800 900 5,500
TRIALS 9003 10,4004 3005 9006 5,1257 3608
1. See McIntyre & Lippman, supra note 194 to main text, at 1156. See generally FEENEY
ET AI., supra note 382 to main text, at 21 (observing the attrition rate of cases in California
at three distinct stages; the rate is 43% between arrests and the filing of charges, 26%
between the filing and a case reaching trial court, and 14% after a case is in the trial
court). The importance of prosecutorial screening in the criminal justice process is
confirmed by the fact that the prosecutor alone would have had the authority to dismiss
most cases during the first two stages. The percentage of cases dismissed in the third
stage-those dismissed by the courts due to legal or evidentiary problems-is higher
nationwide (between 27-31%) than percentages reported by FEENEY ET AL. (14%). For
discussion of this data, see supra main text accompanying notes 165-200.
2. IND/INF refers to indictments or informations.
3. In Cook County, there were 600 contested nonjury trials and 300 contested jury
trials, for a total of 900 trials. See McIntyre & Lippman, supra note 194 to main text, at
1156.
4. In Los Angeles, there were 9500 contested nonjury trials, of which the "majority...
[were] adjudicated on transcript of preliminary hearing," and 900 contested jury trials, for
a total of 10,400 trials. Id.
5. In Kings County, there were 100 contested nonjury trials and 200 contested jury
trials, for a total of 900 trials. See id.
6. The City of Detroit had 600 contested nonjury trials and 300 contested jury trials,
for a total of 900 trials. See id.
7. The City of Baltimore had 5000 contested nonjury trials and 125 contested jury
trials, for a total of 5125 trials. See id. It is noted that "Uj]uries are traditionally waived" in
the City of Baltimore. Id.
8. In Harris County, there were 60 contested nonjury trials and 300 contested jury
trials, for a total of 350 trials. See id.
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TABLE 8
FELONY CASE DISPOSITION FROM ARREST JANUARY-JUNE 1977'
COBB CO. SALT LAKE NEW ORLEANS LOS ANGELES
JURISDICTION (GA) D.C. CO. (UT) (LA) CO. (CA)
NUMBER OF CASES 632 3,141 1,402 3,167 19,418
ACQUITTALS 1% 2% NONE/NA 3% 1%
CONVICTION/
PLEA 62% 2  46% 3  NA 4/33% 33%5 21%
6
DISMISSALS 29% 7  49% 8  44%' 55% 1 0  52% 1
REFERRALS AND
OTHER
PROSECUTIONS 2% 0% 1% 9% 24%
1. See BROSi, supra note 195 to main text, at 7 fig.2. Brosi also used the attrition rates
of the above jurisdictions, both from arrest and from filing, to demonstrate the
prosecutor's unimpeded discretion. The attrition rates are as follows: Cobb County,
Georgia, 31% from arrest, 14% from filing; District of Columbia, 49% from arrest, 35%
from filing; Salt Lake City, 45% from arrest, 38% from filing; New Orleans, 55% from
arrest, 17% from filing; Los Angeles, 52% from arrest, 34% from filing. Id. at 8. Brosi
illustrated a prosecutor's unlimited discretion by describing the prosecutor's main
function as "controlling the door to the court . . . the prosecutor decides which arrests
result in court cases, and which will not." Id. at 11. The scope of this control is great, as a
prosecutor's decision is generally not subject to review by the court. See also supra notes
111-117 to main text and accompanying text (asserting that prosecutors wield
impenetrable discretion).
The prosecutor's absolute discretion in deciding whether to charge has been upheld
judicially, in both federal and state courts. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607
(1985) (stating that "[t]his broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the
decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review"); Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (stating that "so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to
believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or
not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury generally rests
entirely in his discretion"); United States v. Cespedes, 151 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11 th Cir. 1998)
(stating that "[s]uch discretion is an integral feature of the criminal justice system, and is
appropriate, so long as it is one based upon improper factors" (quoting United States v.
LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751 (1997))); United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1335-36 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (stating that "as an incident of the constitutional separation of powers, the courts are
not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the U.S. attorneys in
their control over prosecutions"); State v. Krotza, 548 N.W.2d 252, 254 (Minn. 1996)
(upholding the prosecutor's broad charging discretion and stating that "under established
separation of powers rules, absent evidence of selective or discriminatory prosecutorial
discretion, the judiciary is powerless to interfere with the prosecutor's charging
authority"). But see main text accompanying notes 100-110 (regarding the lack of
prosecutorial review of charging).
2. There were no convictions at trial, and 62% of felony cases ended in pleas. See
BROSI, supra note 195 to main text, at 7 fig.2.
3. Six percent of felony cases ended with convictions at trial, and 40% ended with
pleas, for a total of 46%. See id.
4. Data was not available for the percentage of convictions at trial. See id.
5. Six percent of the felony cases ended in convictions at trial, and 27% ended in
pleas, for a total of 33%. See id.
6. Four percent of the felony cases end in convictions at trial, and 17% ended in
pleas, for a total of 21%. See id.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
7. Eleven percent of felony cases were dropped after filing, and 18% were rejected at
screening, for a total of 29% ending in dismissals. See id.
8. Twenty-seven percent of felony cases were dropped after filing, and 22% were
rejected at screening, for a total of 49%. See id.
9. Twenty-five percent of the felony cases were dropped after filing, and 19% were
rejected at screening, for a total of 44%. See id.
10. Seven percent of the felony cases were dropped after filing, and 48% were rejected
at screening, for a total of 55%. See id.
11. Twelve percent of the felony cases were dropped after filing, and 40% were
rejected at screening, for a total of 52%. See id.
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TABLE 9
BJS MISDEMEANOR CONVICTION RATES
JULY 1991 -JUNE 19921
PROSECUTOR 25TH 50TH 75TH
OFFICE SIZE 2  PERCENTILE PERCENTILE PERCENTILE
CONVICTION RATE 78% 88% 94%
19943
[PART-TIME
POPULATION MORE LESS THAN PROSECUTOR
SERVED THAN 50,000 50,000 OFFICE]
CONVICTION RATE 74% 90% 88%
1. PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 1992, supra note 3 to tbl.2, at 3 tbl.3.
2. Id. at 2 tbl.2.
3. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE
COURTS, 1994, at 5 (1996) [hereinafter PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 1994].
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TABLE 10
Los ANGELES CITY, CALIFORNIA' 1990 POPULATION 3,485,0002
MISDEMEANOR CASE DATA
YEAR NUMBER REVIEWED NUMBER CHARGED CONVICTIONS
1990 219,541 177,762 136,976
1991 197,576 155,609 125,671
1992 176,710 139,080 112,325
1993 161,238 125,655 113,226
1994 161,750 120,534 122,653
1. Los ANGELES CITY ATr'Ys OFFICE, STATISTICAL REVIEW: A CALENDAR YEAR SUMMARY
OF CRIMINAL BRANCH PROSECUTION AcrTv (1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994).
2. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1994, at 45 (114th ed. 1994).
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TABLE 11
RIVERSIDE COUNTY, CALIFORNIA MISDEMEANOR CASE DATA
MISDEMEANORS MISDEMEANORS
YEAR REQUESTED FILED CONVICTIONS
19901 31,465 21,100/29,172 14,248
19912 28,625 23,772/29,708 15,214
19923 26,728 19,643 NA
19934 26,782 20,430 NA
1994 25,774 18,294 NA
1. In the Eastern Division, there were 7730 misdemeanor requests and 4725
misdemeanors filed. See 1990 Annual Report, supra note 2 to tbl.6, at 13. These numbers
do "not include direct filings to the Court, which include all first-offense driving under the
influence of alcohol or drugs." Id. In the Western Division, there were 23,735
misdemeanor requests and 16,375 misdemeanor complaints filed. See id. at 19. Therefore,
there was a total of 31,465 misdemeanor requests and 21,000 misdemeanors filed.
However, according to the 1992-1993 Biennial Report there were 29,172 misdemeanors
filed. See 1992-1993 BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 3 to tbl.6 (unnumbered).
2. In the Western Division, there were 21,365 misdemeanor requests and 19,283
misdemeanor complaints filed. See 1991 Annual Report, supra note 4 to tbl.6, at 5. In the
Eastern Division, there were 7260 misdemeanors requested and 4489 misdemeanors filed.
See id. at 19. Again, the numbers for the Eastern Division do "not include direct filings to
the court." Id. Therefore, the total number of misdemeanor requests was 28,625, and the
total number of misdemeanors filed were 23,772. However, according to the 1992-1993
Biennial Report there were 29,708 misdemeanors filed. See 1992-1993 BIENNIAL REPORT,
supra note 3 to tbl.6 (unnumbered).
3. In the Western Division, there were 20,526 misdemeanor requests and 13,994
requests filed as misdemeanors. See 1992-1993 Biennial Report, supra note 3 to tbl.6
(unnumbered). In the Eastern Division, there were 6202 misdemeanor cases requested
and 5649 misdemeanors filed. Id. Misdemeanor requests "does not include misdemeanors
filed by law enforcement directly." Id. Therefore, there was a total of 26,728
misdemeanors requested and 19,643 misdemeanors filed. In their ten year retrospective,
however, the 1992-1993 Biennial Report lists the number of misdemeanors filed at 29,708.
Id.
4. In the Western Division, there were 19,451 misdemeanor requests and 14,565
requests filed as misdemeanors. See id. In the Eastern Division, there were 7331
misdemeanor cases requested and 5865 misdemeanors filed. See id. Misdemeanor
requests "does not include misdemeanors filed by law enforcement directly." Id.
Therefore, there was a total of 26,782 misdemeanor requests and 20,430 misdemeanors
filed.
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TABLE 12
KINGS CouNTY, NEW YORK MISDEMEANOR CASE DATA
MISDEMEANOR MISDEMEANOR
YEAR ARRESTS






1. DCJS, Kings County Indicators, supra note 1 to tbl.5, at tbl. Adult Arrests.
2. Id. at tbl. 5: Convictions and Sentences.
